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SYNOPSIS
I commence this essay with the question - ’How is it that memory 
is in fact reliable?’ - because, as we all know, memory ms, in general, 
reliable. My first question is therefore, ’Why should any problem 
arise at all?’, and the answer to this question - ’Because sometimes 
memory does let us down; our deceptive memories seem, on the face of 
things, to be in no way distinguishable from our correct ones. All 
memories have at least an initial authority.
In Chapter I I list and consider the ways in which specific 
memories can fail us, and show that all these specific failures 
simply underline the general problem - no memory can ever be self- 
guaranteed; no single 'kind' of memory is wholly immune from error.
I therefore put forward the suggestion - at this stage very 
tentatively - that error may arise, when it does, from the interpre­
tation of our memories rather than from our 'actual remembering’.
In Chapter II I show that all attempts to provide rigid 
definitions of memory must prove fruitless because we are in fact 
operating with two distinct criteria, neither of which we can 
reasonably abandon: the present 'memory-experience' and the past 
state of affairs. I therefore suggest a loose 'neo-ostensive' 
definition based upon three independent criteria, any one of which 
qualifies an instance for consideration as memory: (l) 'initial 
authority', the feeling of belief which accompanies (or forms part of)
i
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the thought; (2) the ability to perform in certain ways which are 
dependent upon a knowledge of past events or knowledge gained in the 
past; and (3) the factual truth (as supported by independent evidence) 
of what is claimed to be remembered* Whether the 'ultimate criterion' 
of memory is the present experience or the past states of affairs I 
leave an open question, and I turn my attention to the analysis of 
memory as defined in this loose 'neo-ostensive' way.
Firstly I make a distinction between distinctions. I call those 
distinctions which apply to memory but are not peculiar to memory 
'primary' and those distinctions which 'lie within' memory 'secondary', 
and I make the point, important for my subsequent argument, that the 
disposition/occurrence distinction is of the first (or primary) kind.
In Chayjter III I consider the relationships between remembering 
events, remembering individuals, and remembering qualities of 
individuals. I attempt to show that these distinctions are dependent 
upon our points of interest rather than upon anything in the memories 
themselves; they are distinctions in what we are claiming to remember 
rather than in what or how we are remembering. I then consider the 
relationships between remembering propositions and remembering 
sentences, and the connection of these with the memory of events 
and of individuals. I go on to make the distinction, central to my 
subsequent argument, between reii?embering propositions and remembering 
in propositions. I raise the question - 'Can we remember without 
either images or words?' and argue that this must be possible.
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Finally, I consider the distinction between recognition and 
recall and conclude that recognition involves memory but is not 
strictly a form of memory.
I suggest that to remember an event is something over and above 
remembering any number of propositions about that event. Therefore 
the question whether or not some event was remembered correctly cannot 
rest solely upon the accuracy of the claims made about that event.
In Chapter IV I examine the relationships between (a) the public 
event which is remembered (b) the perception of that event (c) the 
’remembering state of mind’ and (d) the memory-claims about the event. 
I suggest, for consideration, this 'model': Memory-claims refer 
directly to past public events; they are based upon current memories 
(the present remembering state of mind) and these memories are of 
private events - our own past perceptual states.
To forestall a likely objection I argue that even in the case of 
’negative memory' (memory that something was not the case) there is a 
positive element which makes the memory/claim distinction possible.
Wherever there is interpretation there is the possibility of 
re-interpretation and I claim, therefore, that so long as there 
exists occurrent memory-imagery, the checking of memory-claims by 
introspection alone is possible. I then raise the question whether 
the imagery itself is merely a representative of past perceptual 
experience or a direct re-presentation to us of the past public event, 
and I stress the need for some ’physical element’ in the memory- 
experience to justify our confidence in our memories.
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In Chapter V I diverge from the main argument to consider the 
relationship, if any, between remembering events and remembering how 
to do things. After considering the reasons for claiming that 'how 
to do things’ is one kind of remembering which defies all attempts 
to reduce it to, or explain it in terms of, occurrent memories of 
past events, I argue that there is a distinction we all understand 
between 'remembering how to' and 'being able to' and attempt to show 
that the former must depend upon occurrent memories. I base my argument 
upon the analysis of various uses of 'intelligent', seeking to show that 
tne only use of that word which serves to distinguish intelligent 
performances (instances of 'remembering how to') both from automatic 
performances and from accidental performances is that use in which it 
means 'thought-directed' or 'memory-directed'. I also argue that in 
our performances we actualize both mental dispositions to remember 
and physical dispositions to act in certain ways, both actualizations 
being essential to an 'intelligent performance', and that 'remembering 
an event' need not involve the specific recollection of any instance 
we should refer to as 'an event' in normal every-day life.
In Chapter VI I argue that the difference between memory-images 
and imagination-images is one of degree only. There is a basis of 
memory in all imagination and an element of imagination in a great 
deal that is accepted as memory. The matter in doubt in any given 
instance is the extent to which a 'single image' re-presents to us 
a 'single past occasion', and I suggest three criteria by which we
Vdo in fact decide this: ’firmness’ of the imagery, its controllability, 
and the ’expansion’ of the image context.
I next consider the ’organic origins' of imagery, the relation­
ship of imagery to sensation, and the possible 'subjects’ of imagery, 
and conclude that only appearances, as presented to us by the objects
we perceive, can be re-presented to us in imagery. Two points, both
very important for my argument, emerge from this enquiry: (1) there 
is no logical reason why the occurrence of any image should exclude 
the simultaneous occurrence of any other image; and (2) sensations 
can be distinguished from images by the manner of their presentation 
alone.
In Chapter VII I put the question - ’What is it to have images?' -
and consider the case for the 'entity' view of imagery. I reject
this view on the grounds that nothing in our memory-experience in any 
way demands the existence of any such ’entity’. I then define imagery 
as our way of remembering past appearances, and challenge the argu­
ment to show that recognition could not entail occurrent imagery (an 
'infinite regress' argument) by making three distinctions: between 
recognising images and recognising by means of images; between 
'considered recognition' and developed motor-response; and between 
appearances and relational facts noted about those appearances. I 
argue that imagery is a prerequisite of certain kinds of recognition 
or the recognition of certain kinds of ’objects’ and claim that, 
insofar as we are concerned with appearances, the capacity to recog­
nise and the capacity to image are one and the same.
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I consider an alternative way of remembering events - by verbal 
descriptions - and show the limitations of this method. By it we can 
only ever know ’that A was B’; in imagery we know ’how A was’ (or 
how A appeared to us). I suggest that the denial by some men that 
they have imagery at all results from a mistaken idea of what imagery 
is, and I claim that some remembering is possible only in terms of 
how things appeared - and this is the actual remembering of past events.
I examine ’generic imagery' in the light of my analysis and 
definition and conclude that it must be either a multiplicity of 
specific images (or imagings) £r a concept (not imagery at all) 
arising out of, or supported and exemplified by, imagery.
In my final chapter I restate the problem and summarise my 
arguments and conclusions. I claim that in imagery we are actually 
presented with a past event in the same way and to the 3ame extent 
as we are presented with a present event in perception. I support 
this claim by arguing that the distinction between perceiving, 
remembering and imagining is one of degree only; that sensation is 
not a different kind of ’evidence’ from imagery for the events which 
occur - it is simply the ideal limit of ’firm imagery’. And from 
a consideration of the ’specious present’ I argue that only on my 
view can we account for the continuity which characterises our 
experience. As a natural outcome of my argument I define ’the past’ 
as simply ’the not-present within the real*.
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I then deal with temporal location of remembered events and 
conclude that in remembering any event, we remember, however indeter­
minately, a contextual setting which extends up to the present 
moment.
I conclude that since all memory can be reduced to memory of 
events, and in imagery we are 'given* the appearances presented by 
the events themselves, no error in a memory-claim is irredeemable. 
Perceiving is simply a sub-species of remembering, and therefore our 
perception-claims are no less fallible than our memory-claims. 
Certainty about matters offset is always psychological, not logical, 
and we rely on our memories for the same reasons, and with the same 
right, &3 we rely on our perception of the world about us.
C hapter I
DOUBTING THE AUTHORITY OF OUR MEMORIES 
1 . The ’ s c e p t ic a l*  approach
N e a rly  every  work on R em em bering ' in tro d u c e s  us to  th e  's c e p t i c '  
whose ta s k  i t  i s  to  show us n o t on ly  t h a t  memory p la y s  us f a l s e ,  bu t 
t h a t  our m em ories, however e s s e n t i a l  th e y  a re  to  th e  everyday  conduct 
o f  our a f f a i r s ,  sh o u ld  n ev er be t r u s t e d  s in c e  n o th in g  can ev e r 
c o n c lu s iv e ly  p rove t h a t  any g iv en  memory i s  n o t f a l s e .  We can r e p ly  
to  t h i s  s c e p t ic  t h a t  th e  same k in d  o f argum ents a s  he u se s  cou ld  e q u a lly  
w ell be employed to  show t h a t  we canno t prove c o n c lu s iv e ly  t h a t  a  g iv e n  
memory i s  n o t t r u e ,  t h a t  by seek in g  lo g ic a l  c r i t e r i a  f o r  what i s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  an e m p ir ic a l q u e s tio n  he i s  s e t t i n g  h im se lf  a l o g i c a l l y  
im p o ss ib le  t a s k .  1 b e l ie v e  th e r e f o r e  t h a t  th e  in t r o d u c t io n  o f t h i s  
s c e p t i c ,  w h ils t  i t  may be a u s e fu l  d ev ice  fo r  r a i s i n g  q u e s t io n s ,  may 
w e ll be harm fu l to  th e  en q u iry  in  t h a t  i t  s u g g e s ts  to  us t h a t  a s c e p t i ­
c a l o r t e n t a t i v e  a t t i t u d e  to  a l l  o f our m em ories can be a re a so n a b le  
p o s i t io n  to  h o ld . C le a r ly  i t  i s  n o t .  We a l l  o f us answ er q u e s tio n s  
abou t ou r p a s t  e x p e rie n c e s  w ith o u t any h e s i t a t i o n  o r  d o u b t, we s i t  on 
c h a i r s  w ith  th e  u tm ost co n fid e n ce  t h a t  th e y  w i l l  su p p o rt u s ,  we walk 
a long  f a m i l i a r  ro ad s  w ith  com plete c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  th e y  w i l l  le a d  us 
to  where we wish to  go .
I t  may be o b je c te d  t h a t  th e  s c e p t i c  does n o t  in  f a c t  doubt th e  
a u th o r i ty  o f a l l  h i s  m em ories, he on ly  i n s i s t s  t h a t  memory i s  alw ays
1
2logically open to doubt, that though in fact many memories are reliable, 
and are known to be reliable, it is still logically possible that none 
of them is. But if this is all he claims he is a poor sort of sceptic, 
for few if any people would wish to disagree with him. Being sceptical 
involves rejecting, or holding strong reservations about, some view 
seriously put forward by its adherents. A man may be sceptical about 
the virtues of socialism or the truth of the Christian doctrines. In
these cases some idea is put forward for his consideration, which has
not, or need not have been, previously entertained at all.
But when we first come to consider the credentials of memory we 
have already tacitly accepted them, have taken memory for granted, 
trusted it implicitly, and experienced surprise and alarm when it has 
proved unworthy of that trust. It is not the ordinary function of 
memory, but its capacity for giving us unpleasant surprises, that first
leads us to enquire into its workings. The natural question which
presents itself is not 'How is it that memory can be informative?' - 
but - 'How is it that memory is sometimes misinforraative?'. The 
proper formulation of our problem, therefore, is not - ’why should 
we trust our memories?' — but — 'Why may we be led sometimes to doubt 
them?'•
2. The initial authority of memory
I say we are led sometimes to doubt them. It is certain that we 
do not always, or even often, doubt them* Our memories have an 
initial authority which usually cannot be gainsaid. Even when evidence
3to the contrary is very strong we are inclined to stand by the 
authority of our own memories* A book is not where I remember leaving 
it* I ask who has moved it* Everyone assures me that he has not*
Yet I am quite confident that somebody must have done so. I find the 
reply, fYou must have made a mistake1 a quite unconvincing answer to 
my insistence that 1 remember putting it there.
Perhaps 1 have made a mistake. Perhaps I came back and moved 
it myself 'unthinkingly'. Perhaps I left it there yesterday, not 
today. Certainly, assuming that nobody is lying, somebody is mis- 
remembering. The saving fact is that if such a question is pursued 
long enough, the misrememberer nearly always finds himself out. For 
other people this 'finding out* will simply amount to the recall of 
something which had been temporarily forgotten. For the agent it 
may be a matter of revising or repudiating what he had regarded as 
his memory of the event.
What I have called the initial authority of memory - the belief 
about the past which is quite independent of any outside evidence - 
is inseparable from whatever we accept as remembering. We would not 
regard ourselves as remembering otherwise. But it is present in 
varying degrees, so that sometimes it is possible for us to 'back 
down', to admit that we are probably wrong, not because of any revision 
or variation of our memories, but simply because we have the experience 
of misremembering, and in the light of this the degree of confidence 
we feel in our memories is insufficient to withstand the pressure of
4external counter-evidence. But at other times ve feel absolutely 
sure, on the authority of the memory experience alone, that we are 
not mistaken.
The great difficulty here is deciding what it is to be ’absolutely 
sure'. Frequently two people claim to be absolutely sure of incompatible 
things. And which of them has the better right to be sure cannot be 
decided wholly according to which of them happens in fact to be right.
If, for instance, one savage believes the earth to be flat because 
he has observed that unsupported bodies always fall, whilst another 
believes it to be globular simply because this seems to him a more 
satisfactory shape, then the second happens to be right in his belief, 
but the first seems to have the better right to hold his belief. In 
the case of direct remembering, however, there seems to be at least 
a prima-facie case for allowing the one who is in fact right the 
right to be sure.
But, whilst ’head-on collisions' do sometimes occur between 
initially authoritative memories, they are comparatively rare. For 
every irreconcilable 'memory* there are countless others that fit 
easily and naturally into the general scheme of known fact. Our 
strongly authoritative memories are rarely challenged, either by the 
memories of other people or by the facts as presented to us. Our 
less strongly authoritative memories can usually be made to dovetail 
with the testimony of other people and with the facts as we find
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them by minor, and quite ’painless', modifications. Most of our
5memories have both ‘strong* and 'weak* parts. If 1 'remember* coming 
to work at 9.30 a.m. yesterday, and I am told by my neighbour lhat he 
saw me at home at 9.45, I am quite happy to reconsider my 'memory*.
Had he claimed that he saw me at home all day my reaction would have 
been quite different. I remember very definitely that I went to work, 
but much less definitely that it was at 9.30 a.m.
Nevertheless the whole of the original 'memory' had some degree 
of initial authority, the weakness of which became apparent only 
when my claim was challenged. In fact it is generally only when any 
memory is challenged by presented facts, or by the testimony of other 
people, or by subsequent memories of one's own, that the question of 
the degree of its initial authority arises at all. And because it is 
so easy to say, after a successful challenge - 'No, I wasn't remem­
bering that at all' or 'Of course, that was the day before' or 'It 
certainly happened; it doesn't much matter where', we are apt to 
overlook the fact that all our memories come to us in the first place 
with the same kind, if not the same degree, of initial authority. We 
are apt to overlook it, that is, until a discrepancy of the 'head-on' 
kind forces us to wonder just what sort of authority a memory can 
ever really have.
3. The causes of doubt
The question, 'Wherein does the authority of memory lie?' is 
not just a 'philosopher's puzzle', it is a problem which must present 
itself sooner or later to any thinking person. The man wno seems to
6remember something quite clearly but discovers that he must be 
mistaken is bound to ask Himself - 'What is peculiar about this case? 
How is it that my memory, usually so reliable, has let me down this 
time?'. And when the only peculiar thing he can find is that his 
memory gave him the wrong answer, he must inevitably wonder how many 
of his memories which happen not to have been challenged have been 
equally false, and how he can ever know that he is not being deluded»
Moreover, the errors of memory are by no means all of the same 
kind. There does not seem to be any situation, or group of situations, 
in which we can say 'Here I must be on my guard against delusion', or 
'Here I am completely safe'. Why then are we so confident and unhesi- 
tant about our memories? Is it simply a matter of a beneficial 
stupidity as some pragmatically inclined philosophers have suggested?
Or is there a secure and indubitable basis of memory that justifies 
our belief that whatever errors of remembering we may make, further 
remembering can eventually set matters right for us; that doubt, though 
it can exist, cannot go on forever?
It does not seem enough to say that our memories are more often 
found to be right than wrong, that we are comparatively rarely 
surprised; this is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
our confidence. Very few people are ever struck by lightning, but 
in general people are apprehensive of lightning in a quite different 
way from that in which they are apprehensive of being misled by their 
own memories. Our memories seem to be 'in our own control' in a way
7that lightning is not. We seem to have some ground for assurance 
more fundamental than the mere averaging of instances. The guarantee 
that I get with my watch does not ensure that it will not go wrong, 
only that if it does the makers will replace it with another - and if 
necessary another again - until I have one which is reliable. They 
are in a position to give such a guarantee because, in addition to 
their observation that their watches do not in fact generally go wrong, 
they have a knowledge of their design and structure which satisfies 
them that the watches ought not to go wrong. Therefore if one of them 
does so it must be as the result of some accidental departure from that 
design and structure. We feel that if we had some analogous insight 
into the structure of memory itself, we should be able to understand 
why, and not only how, particular memories are false. We should be 
able to guarantee our memories in the way that the watchmaker guarantees 
his watches. But when we turn from the specific failures of memory 
to the business of remembering in general we find that eacn specific 
failure seems to have its counterpart in a general problem. Let us, 
then, first consider in detail the particular ways in which memory 
can play us false, and then go on to look at the general doubts which 
these errors raise about the authority of memory, 
a ) Specific Errors of memory
i• Errors of Omission
Whatever can be remembered can also, ipso facto, be forgotten. 
Forgetting, i.e. failing to remember what we are in a position to 
remember, may be total or partial.
8a. Total forgetting. This can take the form of a complete failure
to recollect some past experience. Of course, since the fact that I am 
not now recollecting a certain experience does not entail that I never 
again shall do so, the only occasions when I can be said to be totally 
forgetting are those when the temporary total forgetfulness is made 
apparent; when I am asked wnat I did on a certain day and am quite 
unable to answer, or I am asked how I enjoyed the film I saw on the 
previous evening and I look blank and ask 'What film?1. The question 
of forgetting can only arise when the assumption is mane that something 
is, or should be, remembered.
Other forms of total forgetting are the failure to recognise and 
the inability to perform once mastered tasks. A house in which I know 
that I once lived looks quite unfamiliar to me; a man who appears to be 
a total stranger shows by nis benaviour that I ought to know him; I 
am surprised to hear that a new coat I have bought is 'exactly like' 
one I had some years ago. I mount a bicycle after many years of driving 
a car and fail off because 1 simply cannot balance; or when I am asked 
to work out the square root of a number by simple arithmetic I find 
that 1 have forgotten where to start. In all these cases, as in the 
first, the failure of memory is apparent only as the result of other 
knowledge, not itself direct memory.
b. Partial forgetting. It is the partial 'lapses of memory' which 
most commonly concern us, because they are continually brought home to 
us without the aid of any independent authority. I do recognise a
9man's face but cannot remember his name; I remember, however, that 
I have heard it. I distinctly remember a certain cricket match but 
cannot remember who was wicket keeper, though I remember remarking 
how good he was. Such omissions of memory we find particularly irri­
tating. For memory tells us enough, as it were, to make us feel that 
it should tell us more; it supplies the blanks but refuses to fill them, 
c. Omission as error. In all these cases we are not so much doing 
something as not doing something. And it may be felt, therefore, that 
whilst tney are omissions, they are not strictly errors. We do not 
say that the boy who has not even attempted the examination question 
has got it wrong, but tnis boy gets no more marks, and may even get 
less, than the boy who has attempted it and got it wrong. And consider 
the case where we are confident that only three people were present at 
a meeting we attended, not because we did not notice the fourth at 
the time - we may nave spoken to him - but simply because, quite 
unaccountably, we do not remember nim. A three-man conference is 
clearly a different thing from a four-man conference. Omissions, though 
not themselves errors of memory, are certainly a source of such errors, 
ii. Errors of commission
jfe now turn to the positive case, less frequent perhaps, but by 
no means infrequent. I 'remember* locking the door, but when I come 
home it is not locked. I am asked what colour my friend's car is 
and I immediately reply 'Blue'. I 'see it quite plainly' - but when 
he arrives it is brown, and it has not been re-painted. The dis­
tressing thing is that, although I must accept the evidence in such 
\
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cases, and sometimes am able to say ’Of course - it is Bill's car 
that is blue', or ’It was yesterday that I locked the door’, there 
are other times when the original 'memory* seems to persist as 
strongly authoritative as ever, and I must simply allow myself to 
remain mystified for fear of becoming a bore on the question, 
iii. The ’George IV case1.
So called because George IV is alleged to have 'remembered' 
leading a charge at Waterloo, this type of error is sometimes regarded 
simply as an extreme case of error of commission. But we may well 
feel that the difference from the cases cited above is not only one 
of degree. Those cases seem to rest upon the misplacement rather 
than the sheer invention of a memory. 1 have locked doors and have 
seen blue cars, but George IV never led a charge anywhere. The 
difference seems parallel in many ways to that between illusion and 
hallucination: the one has a basis in fact which the other has not.
It is true, of course, that there was in fact a Battle of Waterloo 
which did not include George IV, just as there are elephants which 
are not pink; even an hallucination must be relatable to actual fact 
in order to carry the conviction which it does. Nevertheless the 
distinction between being relatable to fact in this way and being 
based on fact in the manner of a misplaced memory or misinterpreted 
visual experience should be quite clear. I shall therefore call such 
extreme cases ’mnemic hallucinations'. These are not to be confused
with memories of_ hallucinations, memories which may themselves be
11
perfectly veridical and in no way deceptive. But the somewhat 
grandiose term 'hallucination* must not mislead us into thinking that 
something like a charge at Waterloo must be involved. A man is doing 
the same kind of thing as George IV, though less spectacularly, if, 
having seen his colleagues at school with boils on their necks, and 
having vividly imagined how unpleasant such a boil would feel, he 
subsequently 'remembers' having a boil on his own neck as a boy.
Both ii. and iii. deal with 'remembering' what in fact is not the 
case, but ii. is the insertion of a memory into the wrong context,
iii. is the taking of imagination for memory.*
iv. Memory not recognised as such
We now consider the reverse positions what is in fact memory is 
sometimes taken to be mere imagination. A man awakes in the morning 
after a wild night out, quite dispassionately he contemplates the 
picture of his friends and himself climbing lampposts, breaking windows, 
being apprehended by the police - and suddenly he realises that it 
all really happened. We might say here that his drunken state had 
given a dream-like quality to his experiences so that the recall of 
them felt at first more like imagining than remembering. But there is 
no reason why this same error should not occur under perfectly normal 
conditions, and ample evidence that it sometimes does. A composer 
may be dismayed to hear played on the radio the very melody which he 
1
At this stage I am simply setting out the apparent 'kinds of error'. 
In ch. VI I shall argue against any rigid distinction here.
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himself had just ’composed’, and realise that he must have been 
remembering, not imagining, as he wrote. It is very hard to be certain 
of the complete originality of one's own work. I have, for instance, 
a shrewd suspicion that my example of the boil on the neck in the 
preceding paragraph is something I read once, though I cannot say where 
or when. Nor is this error confined to what we might call 'creative 
activity'• A friend of mine recently showed surprise at finding a 
full packet of cigarettes in his pocket. I asked him if he did not 
remember buying them and he replied that he 'supposed he did*. He had 
been aware, he said, in some way, of having gone into the shop for 
them, but he had not thought it had really happened, 
v. Unexplained familiarity - de.ja vu.
Most of us have at some time experienced the rather uncanny feeling 
that some incident, some view, some group of words or sounds, was 
familiar to us, so that, although this strange familiarity is felt after 
the event (or is noted by us after the event) it seems as if from the 
first instant we could have predicted exactly what would follow; the 
feeling of familiarity is like the feeling we have when watching a 
film for the second time. We do not generally think of these experi­
ences as remembering. Rather we should be inclined to describe them 
as 'as if we were remembering', and to suspect that the odd experience 
is caused by some unplaced or 'unconscious' memory of a very similar 
incident. The worrying thing is that if we ask why it feels as if we 
are remembering, the only answer possible seems to be that we have a
13
/
sense of familiarity. But, since this also seems to be all we can 
say when we are asked what it is like to recognise something, and 
since some epistemologists have regarded this same sense of familia­
rity as the feature which distinguishes memory from imagination, when 
something feels familiar we like to know why it feels familiar. If, 
in the de.ja vu case, we can have a sense of familiarity for no reason 
that we or anybody else can discover, what right have we to regard 
this same sense of familiarity as the hallmark of recognition and 
recollection? 
vi. Conflicting memory
Perhaps the greatest confidence shaker of all is the conflict 
which arises between our own memories. I am describing some event 
I have experienced - ’Last Saturday afternoon - no, morning - I’m 
sorry, Sunday morning, a fellow got out of a black car - no, it was 
a green utility - and walked straight into a puddle without looking, - 
wait, 1 remember now, he did see it but...' and so on. A fairly 
normal reconstruction, we may say, by the time-honoured method of 
trial and error. But why the error; why the need for trial? Why 
did the wrong answers come up in the first place? And if one 
correction is necessary how do we know another is not - and another? 
For these changes are not always simply modifications or elaborations, 
they are often downright contradictions.
The extent of the problem is seen more clearly when the 
contradictions are spaced out, as it were, in time, when we remember 
both the event and our earlier 'remembering' of it, and find that
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they do not tally. We are frequently obliged to correct one memory- 
claim in the light of another later memory of the same event. There 
is the further difficulty that even when one memory-version has given 
place to another, this does not mean that it is vanquished for all 
time. Wnen we are climbing hills, it often happens that just before 
we reach what we have been taking to be the peak another 'peak1 comes 
into view. This can happen many times in the same climb. But when 
we do reach the real peak there can be no further doubt about it. 
Conflicting memories are not like this? there is no simple set of 
fixed criteria for distinguishing the true from the false.
Each of the specific failures of memory brings its own contri­
bution to our suspicion about the validity of memory as a whole - not 
just an empty suspicion that 'it could always be otherwise', but a 
real suspicion that 'it always may be otherwise*. We now turn to the 
more general difficulties which seem to confirm this suspicion, 
b) General problems of memory 
i. Unaccountabi1ity
It seems wholly natural to think of memory, rightly or wrongly, 
as being closely akin to perception. Yet on examination the analogy 
soon runs into difficulties. We see things by looking with our eyes, 
hear things by listening with our ears, and the things we see and hear 
and there for anybody to see and hear. But memories seem almost to 
come and go of their own accord; all we can say is that we are aware 
of them, or aware of something because of them. A man can lose his
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memory just as he can lose his eyesight, but whereas in the latter 
case we can tell by physically examining him that he is incapable of 
seeing, in the former case all we can know is that he does not in 
fact remember anything prior to a certain time. Or, with a different 
kind of loss or failure of memory, we know that he is very poor at 
remembering things. Seeing and hearing and smelling and tasting and 
touching are all in some way like each other; there is a uniformity 
about them; we can in certain enquiries predict discoveries about one 
from the observation of another. But memory does not seem to be
like anything else. We seem driven to allow that our ability to
remember things is a quite unaccountable 'brute fact' which defies any 
attempt at 'structural analysis', 
ii. The independence of knowledge of the past
We might say that even if memory is totally unlike perception 
from a physiological or organic standpoint, at least it is like it 
from a functional standpoint; memory provides us with knowledge of the 
past just as perception provides us with the knowledge of the
present. But this will not do. Whilst it might well help to
convey to a child how the word 'remember' is used, it can cast no 
light upon what remembering is, nor is it strictly true. Both per­
ception and memory are needed for our knowledge of both the past and 
the present. That we could not know the past without memory is true 
only because we could not know anything without memory, in the 
ordinary sense of 'know'• That I know about some past event is no 
proof that I remember the event in question; I could be reading about
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it in a book. And, because this is so, the fact that I am able to 
relate some incident that I did in fact witness is no proof that I 
am actually remembering it at the time. My inability to relate an 
incident may prove that I am not remembering it (allowing that I 
have no language difficulty'), but my ability to relate it is no more 
than a fair indication that I am remembering. It is sometimes very 
hard indeed to sort out our actual memories from knowledge acquired 
by other means. This is amply illustrated by what Von Leyden has 
called 'the childhood test case'.*
iii. The 'childhood test case' - its general applicability
This is, in effect, the general problem arising out of errors of 
commission as such, and 'mnemic hallucinations' in particular. Most 
of us have some favourite memories of our own childhood: our first 
visit to the seaside; or the time we climbed on to the back of the 
pony and were thrown off. Not uncommonly such memories are accompanied 
by quite vivid visual imagery. It is alarming, therefore, when we 
discover, on revisiting the seaside place, that it is simply nothing 
like our 'memory' of it, or we learn from a visiting uncle that it 
was not ourselves at all but our brothers who were thrown from the 
pony. On reflection we realise that we were, in any case, far too 
young to remember so clearly. We guess, rightly no doubt, that our 
images were built up in our imaginations by stories we heard our
1
'Remembering', p.38ff.
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parents and their friends tell, and that these images became so 
familiar to us that they felt like memories - and still do feel like 
memories. In a sense, perhaps they are; they are the memories of 
our earlier imaginings. But this is not what we took them to be.
We may then begin to wonder how many more of our childhood 
memories are memories only in this derivative sense. The real problem 
is not those that are plainly false but those that are substantially 
true. After all, if our uncle had confirmed instead of denying that 
we were thrown by the pony, we should still think we remembered the 
incident itself though our 'memory' would not be one whit different. 
And why only childhood memories? If there is nothing save counter 
evidence to show us the difference between our remembered experiences 
and our remembered imaginings, and if we are capable - as clearly we 
are - of imagining situations involving ourselves as they are reported 
to us, then how can we ever know what we are really remembering and 
what we only seem to be remembering? 
iv. The 'subjective element1 in factual memory
Closely allied to this is another difficulty arising out of 
the free play of our imaginations. When we remember a state of 
affairs we remember it as it appeared to us. This is quite natural, 
right and proper, so long as we always remain capable of distin­
guishing the state of affairs from our own attitudes towards it. But 
do we always? I remember very little about a certain Latin master 
except that he was a great villain with a cruel smile and a rasping
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voice. If I were to meet him again it is not improbable that I should 
find him a charming gentleman. I remember the annual fair on Gretham 
village green as a much more grand affair than any such local fairs are 
nowadays, yet it seems unlikely that it really was so. Everyone can 
supply examples of this kind of distortion from his own experience.
Some time ago the name of a lad I was at school with came up in 
conversation and I immediately had a clear visual image of him. But 
on reflection I realised that the image was of a man my own age, not 
of a boy at all, almost as if the memory had grown up with me.
Because I had always thought of him as my contemporary I remembered 
him as my contemporary.
Now, suppose I make an ordinary perceptual error; I think that it 
is Black and not White that has won the race I am watching. 1 then 
see my error and know that the winner is White. Notwithstanding this 
there is no small chance that I will subsequently 'remember' seeing 
Black win. I have quite genuinely thought this, seen what I took to 
be this, why should 1 not remember this? Samual Alexander may 
perhaps have overstated the case when he wrote: 'Though we do not
often attend to our past mental states, we never remember a past 
object without some consciousness however faint of the past state',* 
but there can be little doubt that our feelings and attitudes and 
interpretations frequently do intrude into our recollections of past
'Space, Time and Deity’, Vol. I, p.125.
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events we have witnessed, and that, within the memory, the event 
and the attitude ^the subjective colouration of it) are very hard to 
separate.
v. No memory can guarantee its own permanence
When we ask ‘Do you remember the night the bomb fell?' we may 
be told ’Yes - and I'm not likely to forget it', or even 'Yes, I 
shall never forget it*. But this last is a somewhat reckless claim; 
'permanent memories', like permanent waves, are not always permanent. 
There is no intrinsic difference between those memories which last a 
lifetime and those which soon disappear forever. Even the fact that 
I remember having 'remembered' sometning every day for the past 
year, cannot guarantee that I shall ever remember it again. Nor can 
it guarantee that, if I do remember it again, I shall not misremember 
it in some way. We may say with some justification that the fact that 
I have remembered it correctly many times in the past makes it induc­
tively probable that I shall remember it correctly again, but this 
is to assume that my remembering of my previous memory is accurate.
And it always ij3 a matter of assuming; the only checking available 
to us is to think again. This brings me to the last and greatest 
difficulty.
vi• The problem of confirming memories
It may be protested that remembering again is not the only way 
we have of confirming memories. If what I remember is that I have 
bought milk each day this month the account from the milkman surely
20
confirms this. And my memory that I have promised to take my wife to 
the theatre is surely confirmed by the fact that she has just entered 
dressed in her best clothes. Certainly these occurrences do not 
specifically establish that the events I claim to remember did occur, 
but when the initial authority of my memories has already provided the 
hypotheses all that is required is that these be strengthened.
All this is true. Indeed it would be a bad look-out for us if 
it were not. But there are a number of reasons why it can only relieve, 
cannot solve, the problem we are faced with.
a. Adequate cause/effect evidence is not always available. At best 
cause/effect evidence tells in favour of this or that memory. If it 
always told in favour no problem would arise. But, as we have seen, 
all too often the evidence points to our having misremembered. The 
successful confirmation of one memory, therefore, does not necessarily 
increase the probability of the truth of another. I grant that we may 
discover from experience that we tend to remember more reliably in 
dealing with one type of question than in dealing with another type.
But the value of such a discovery rests upon our ability to Classify* 
questions, and can never be more than a useful rule of thumb. Each 
individual memory may stand or fall quite independently of any others 
without detriment to such a 'rule*. The point is that it is not 
always obvious how we can confirm a memory in the way that it ijs
Iobvious how we must verify a perception. If it were obvious the cross­
questioning of witnesses would he a waste of time. For instance, I
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may remember very clearly that I saw a man pedal down the road on 
a bicycle at 5 a.m., but how could I possibly prove it, even to 
myself?
Even if independent supporting evidence were always available, it 
would be quite impossible in practice to confirm every memory by it; 
tftere simply would not be time* Only when we have already cause to 
doubt do we seek confirmation to allay that doubt* We seek it in 
further memories, in the testimony of other people, and in present 
conditions as we perceive tnem, Wbat evidence we are able to find is 
an empirical question, dependent upon the circumstances of the case* 
And whether or not it aoes in fact allay our doubts is ultimately a 
psychological question* The expression 'reasonable doubt* may be 
used in the law. But what constitutes reasonable doubt cannot be laid 
down oy the law or by any other source of decisions, 
b* 'Cause/effect' is dependent upon memory, riven wnen independent 
evidence does support a particular memory, such evidence can never be 
conclusive* For, no matter what form it takes, it always presupposes 
the accuracy of some other memory or memories. If I remember that 
the vicar called, and then support this memory by remembering that my 
wife remarked how shabby his coat was and that my daughter spilled 
tea over his trousers, I may well be satisfied that my original memory 
is correct. But it is hanging, so to speak, by a sky-hook; the 
supporting memories are not themselves independently supported. If 
I rely on the testimony of other people - the neighbours agree that
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the vicar did call that day — then I am only adding their memories 
to my own to give it extra weight. If I find his hat left in the 
hall I must remember that it ia_ his hat, and even if it has his calling 
card inside it marked with the date of his visit, 1 can take this as 
conclusive evidence of his visit only on the assumption that such 
objects do not materialise in such places of their own accord. And 
this assumption, arising as it does out of our ability to associate 
observed instances with similar previously observed instances, pre­
supposes the validity of memory. Furthermore, even when the assumption 
has become an accepted maxim it can be retained, as a maxim, only by 
memory. Even an established inductive rule can be forgotten. Under 
strong emotional stress men have been known to try to walk through 
walls, and children are notoriously capable of forgetting that eggs 
break when dropped on the floor.
c. The impossibility of direct comparison. Memory is concerned 
with the past - and simply because the past is past it cannot therefore 
be held up for present comparison. It is as if some object lay on the 
other side of a high wall and we could see it only with the aid of 
a mirror held aloft. We may complain that the mirror reverses what 
we see, and overcome this difficulty by using two mirrors periscope 
fashion. We may suspect that part of what we see is a fault in the 
mirror itself and demand a better mirror, or a whole battery of 
mirrors to enable us to compare the reflections. But if we ask how 
we can know that the mirrors do in fact show us what is on the other 
side of the wall, no amount of improved mirrors will help us.
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Nov, suppose all the mirrors were slightly distorted and each 
showed a slightly different picture; and suppose also that they were 
flexible and liable therefore to change the nature of their distortions 
when directed to a new object, thus making it impossible to check them 
by comparing the reflections they showed with any visible object.
#e might well feel then that we could never know exactly how the thing 
on the other side of the wall looked. The only really satisfactory 
course would be to climb the wall and see for ourselves the thing as 
it actually is. But the 'wall* we are concerned with is time, and 
this by its nature can be ’climbed* only from one side, 
d. The need to remember the remembering. There is a further diffi­
culty which is not always fully realised. Not only is it impossible 
to compare our memories with the events of which they are the memories; 
but because the present is, as it were, always slipping away from us 
into the past we cannot even compare our memories with what purport 
to be the effects of the original events (or, more properly, with 
our inferences from those ’effects'). For what I am comparing must 
always be, not the memory itself, by my memory of that memory.
Suppose that today I remember building, a short while ago, a 
castle in the sand. Tomorrow I go to the beach and there it is. I 
say, 'Yes, just as I remembered it yesterday'. But how do I then 
know it is just as I remembered it yesterday? The sight of the sand 
castle itself may well influence my memory of my previous remembering. 
Again, suppose I ’hear* for my children a poem they are committing to
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memory and notice that they make a number of errors and omissions. 
When they are finished I say nothing; I just hand the book back to 
them and they read it again for themselves. They may well be quite 
satisfied that they got it exactly right. Of course, if they had 
written the poem instead of just saying it their errors would have 
been there to be seen, and in any case they generally believe me when 
I assure them that they did say this or that wrong. But in most 
cases when we wish to confirm a memory we have neither record of, nor 
independent witness to, our actual 'act of remembering*, 
vii. The apparent impossibility of 'credentials'.
It seems that at every stage a further question can be asked, 
a further doubt raised. It is not merely that no memory carries 
within itself its own credentials; it does not even seem possible to 
know what such credentials would be like.
What if a true memory always felt different from a false one?
But then there would just not be any false ones. Nothing could then 
count as a 'false memory' since, being false, it would be seen not 
to be a memory. (We can, of course, distinguish remembering from 
imagining - however hard it may be to describe the difference in 
terms of experience itself - but do we want to call imagining false 
remembering? And what would have to count as one memory? How could 
we separate the true part from the false part if, say, I remembered 
a pair of black brogue shoes instead of a pair of brown brogue shoes.
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The only sort of ’feeling different' we seem able to conceive 
is in our own degree of confidence - the initial authority of the 
memory itself. And this, as we have seen, far from preventing errors 
of memory, is the very thing which promotes them,
4. Being unable to doubt a memory
Nevertheless, we say, there must be some memories which we 
simply cannot doubt; the sceptic, after all, is just a device, not 
a real man. Our task now is to discover what, in view of all that 
we have said, this inability to doubt can amount to. Initially 
there are two quite distinct possibilities: 'I cannot doubt' could 
refer simply to an empirical or psychological fact, or it could mean 
that it would be logically self-contradictory to doubt, 
a) Psychological indubitability
It is simply a matter of fact that I cannot seriously doubt,
(which means that 1 cannot doubt), that I am now in Canberra, that 
I had bacon and eggs and tomatoes for lunch today, that I have a wife 
and two children. I could be misremembering - I could be dreaming - 
but 1 happen to know that I am not. These are plain facts, and, 
however hard they may be to reconcile with some philosophical theories, 
to deny them is to be guilty either of frivolity or of blatant false­
hood. Nor do I need to justify, in any ordinary sense of that word, 
these and other similarly certain beliefs.
But our concern is not to justify particular memories but to 
examine memory itself in the hope of discovering why certain memories
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are self-justifying. And if we reject the 'beneficial stupidity1 
thesis, we seem bound to allow that the psychological certainty we 
are aware of must rest in some way upon logical certainty or at least 
strong logical probability - else what can ’rational grounds for 
believing' mean? 
b) Logical indubitability
We may say that it is logically demonstrable that some memories 
are true - for otherwise the question of the truth of falsity of any 
given memory could not arise at all. Our only grounds for doubting 
one memory are, or at least include, our assumption of the reliability 
of others. Here it may be protested that the incompatibility of two 
’memories' proves only that at least one is false - not that the 
other is true. But the very notion of incompatibility can derive only 
from the assumption that memory is reliable. If our experience were 
other than it is we should not hold the same pairs of instances incom­
patible, but wnen we say that our experience is such and sucn we are 
presupposing that we remember it (in general) correctly.*
But it is not enough to establish that there are true memories? 
we must also be able to identify them, to distinguish them from false 
ones as they arise. And, as we have seen, every attempt to achieve
1
H.H. Brice makes this point at length in nis contribution to the 
Symposium: Memory-Knowledge - ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY Supplementary 
Volume XV - 'What can Philosophy Determine' - 1936, p.lbff. I am 
only claiming, however, that the truth of some memories is presupposed 
by our questioning the authority of memory. I make no claim that the 
infallibility of any memory is presupposed.
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this distinction by logical demonstration must fail since the demon­
stration always assumes part of what it seeks to prove.
There is, however, another possibility. To say that in the case 
of a particular class of memories it is logically indubitable that what 
I remember actually occurred may mean that this particular class of 
memories is of the wrong logical type for doubt to apply to,
I cannot climb Everest; I am neither trained nor fit enough, I 
cannot at once both climb and descend (except perhaps by walking up 
the 'down* escalator;; this is logically contradictory. And I 
cannot climb the floor; this is simply inapplicable - floors are not 
things to be climbed. Now, propositions, judgments and inferences are 
the sort of things it makes sense to doubt. Events, entities, 
qualities, are not the sort of things it makes sense to doubt; we can 
only doubt something about them. The categorical difference between 
those things we can doubt, in the normal sense of that word, and those 
things we simply cannot, may be made plainer by the following distinction.
When we say a proposition is false we are saying something about 
the proposition itself. But, when we apply the term 'false', as in 
common speech we often do, to such things as teeth and hair and the 
bottoms of suitcases, we are really saying that these things are 
designed (or simply happen) to make us think that they are something 
other than they are and so lead us to formulate false propositions, 
to make false inferences; we are saying that they are, in some way, 
misleading. Now, nothing is intrinsically misleading. Whether and
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to what extent anything is misleading is a contingent empirical 
question - whether and to what extent it does in fact mislead somebody. 
It is important also to realise that a thing is not necessarily mis­
leading because it is false. The message on the old man’s placard - 
’The end of the world is at hand1, is almost certainly false; but it 
is misleading only if somebody takes it seriously and starts repenting.
There is another way in which this could be misleading and that 
is if the natural inference that the old man bearing it is a religious 
crank is in fact not true - he may be a spy or a detective. The 
placard is tuen a sign for most of us of something which is not the case 
it is a misleading sign. And, conversely, a true statement at the 
literal level can be grossly misleading, as Macbeth discovered to his 
cost.* If I say ’I didn’t give the chocolate to the baby' when in fact 
1 had put it on the table and watched him take it, then I am being both 
truthful and misleading at the same time. This is why inflections 
play so large a part in everyday speech.
The importance of this distinction is that, whereas what is false 
is simply false and that is all there is to it, that anything is 
misleading is contingent upon someone’s being misled by it. A sign 
is always of something for somebody. It is always possible therefore 
that some other person will be ’rightly led' by the same sign, or that
1
'And be these juggling fiends no more believed,
That palter with us in a double sense;
That keep the word of promise to our ear,
And break it to our hope.' Act V, Sc. VIII
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the one originally misled will correct his error although the object 
wnich operated as a sign remains unaltered. Examination may show 
that a great deal of what we call ’remembering1 lies at the sub- 
inferential level. Therein we may find the warrant we are looking 
for to justify tne psychological certainty we do in fact achieve about 
most of our memories. Our task now is to discover what kinds or 
parts of memory, if any, can be properly said to be true or false, 
and what kinds or parts, if any, can properly be said, at worst, to 
be misleading.
Chapter II
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY ' RSM&i BERING' ?
1. Various attempts to frame a definition
Before going any further we must try to decide just what is to 
count as memory. We must remember, however, that we are discovering, 
not legislating about, what memory is, and give an equal hearing, 
therefore, to every claimant that seems to be an instance of remem­
bering. Various 'definitions of memory' have been advanced by 
philosophers but they all seem to be either too restrictive, begging 
the point at issue by an arbitrary dismissal of inconvenient facts 
and awkward experiences, or too wide, embracing a good deal that does 
not even seem to be memory - and thus failing to define, 
a) The standard restrictive definition
William James defines^ 'memory' thus: 'It is the knowledge of an 
event or fact, of which meantime we have not been thinking, with the 
additional consciousness that we have thought or experienced it before'. 
He is very definite in his view that the mere occurrence of an image 
in the mind without this additional consciousness does not constitute 
a memory, even though the image may be a faithful representation of 
some previous experience. 'Such a revival is obviously not a memory, 
whatever else it may be; it is simply a duplicate, a second event,
T
Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, p.648. (His italics).
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hav ing  a b s o lu t e ly  no co n n ec tio n  w ith  th e  f i r s t  even t excep t t h a t  i t  
happens t o  resem ble  i t . ’ The same view -  t h a t  t o  be remembering we 
must know we a r e  remembering -  seems t o  be i m p l i c i t  in  B e r t ra n d  
R u s s e l l ' s  c l a im :* ' I f  we a re  t o  know -  a s  i t  i s  supposed we do -  t h a t  
images a r e  " c o p ie s " ,  a c c u r a te  o r  i n a c c u r a t e ,  of p a s t  e v e n t s ,  something 
more th an  th e  mere occu rren ce  of images must go to  c o n s t i t u t e  t h i s  
knowledge. For th e  mere o c c u r re n c e ,  by i t s e l f ,  would n o t  su g g es t  
any co n n ec t io n  w ith  a n y th in g  t h a t  had happened b e f o r e ' • The id e a  t h a t  
to  remember i s  always to  r e f e r  back , c o n s c io u s ly ,  to  th e  p a s t  commends 
i t s e l f  to  common sense  and seems g e n e r a l ly  to  accord  w ith  common u sag e .  
But i t  r a i s e s  c e r t a i n  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  
i . ' Memories' and 'rem em bering*
I f e e l  t h a t  we must d i s t i n g u i s h  th e  memories which we have from th e  
remembering which we do. I f  I speak o f  a memory I am having th e n  
c l e a r l y  I  must be c o n s c io u s ly  aware o f  some happening as  be long ing  to  
th e  p a s t .  Jfet i t  does make s e n s e ,  I b e l i e v e ,  t o  say of some o th e r  man 
t h a t  he i s  remembering c e r t a i n  p a s t  e v e n ts  even though t h a t  man i s  n o t  
th e n  co n sc io u s  of th e s e  e v en ts  a s  p a s t .  I t  i s  enough t h a t  he i s  ab le  
to  r e l a t e ,  r e c o g n i s e ,  perform  or v e r i f y  because  he h as  in  f a c t  had a 
c e r t a i n  e x p e r ie n c e  in  th e  p a s t ,  w hether o r  n o t  he i s  aware a t  th e  tim e 
of th e  co n n ec tio n  between t h a t  p a s t  e x p e r ien ce  and h i s  p r e s e n t  a c t i v i t y .  
Thus Jam es ' d e f i n i t i o n ,  w h i l s t  i t  may w ell  be a p p l i c a b l e  t o  th o s e
1
The A n a ly s is  o f  Mind, p.160
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particulars we call memories, cannot be applied to remembering as an 
activity. We can speak, quite properly and normally, after the event 
of having remembered, even though the particular memories in question 
were not recognised as such. I may, for instance, make an assertion 
of fact and, when I am asked how I know, reply, after some consideration, 
that I remember it. Under these circumstances it would seem very odd 
to say that i started to remember it only when replying to the question - 
especially as my reply shows that, since my knowledge is based upon my 
own past experience, 1 must have been remembering it already, 
ii, The assumption of reflexiveness
Prima-facie, remembering is one way of knowing things. It has 
been strenuously denied by some writers1 that remembering is a way 
of getting to know things, but it would seem simply perverse to deny 
that it is a way of actually knowing something here and now.
Now, if 1 could not know that a bird is sitting on that chimney 
pot without also knowing that I know that a bird is sitting there, then 
I could not know this without knowing that I know it - and so on ad 
infinitum. It follows that I need not be (though I may be; aware 
that I know something in order to know it.
And if the 'knowing* in question is remembering, whereas I might 
know that I am remembering a certain event, I could remember it 
perfectly well without any 'additional consciousness' at all. Russell
E.g. G. Ryle - Cf. The Concept of Mind, p.274ff.
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is quite right when he says that something more than the mere occurrence 
of an image is necessary; it is also necessary that we recognise it, 
that is, see it as> something. But it is a further, and usually quite 
unnecessary, step to see ourselves as seeing it as something.
iii. Real memory - imagined imagining
One of the problems we considered in chapter I* is simply ruled 
out by the present definition. If to remember is to know that we 
remember, we could not remember something and think ourselves to be 
only imagining it. To preserve the definition we should have to say that 
remembering commences only when we realise that we are remembering, 
notwithstanding that nothing else is changed thereby. And if, as is 
certainly possible, we never do realise this, we should never have re­
membered the event at all. We should have imagined it, even though 
every detail is in fact a representation to us of our own past 
experience.
iv. Intermediate stages of remembering and discarded candidates*
Whether we are deliberately trying to remember something or simply
allowing our memories to ’wander', the arrival at a particular piece of
remembered information may be the culmination of quite a long process,
2involving, as we saw in the previous chapter, the consideration and 
rejection of various propositions and images. Suppose, for example, that
—
1
See p.ll.
See pp.13 and 14.
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an old wartime colleague telephones to say that he is in Canberra and 
asks me to meet him. As I try to remember his appearance a number of 
images arise in my mind. Each one is quickly replaced by another - I 
know that they are not of the man in question - until at last I have 
an image which I know immediately i_s the one I want.
But who are these other gentlemen in Naval uniform whose images 
appeared to me? They are not the man I was 'looking for', so I did 
not stop to enquire - yet it seems highly likely that each was a real 
person, not just a figment of my imagination and, if so, can we say 
anything but that I must have been remembering them? The same thing 
applies when we remember the face but not the name; the names which 
suggest themselves to us are usually real names, names we have actually 
encountered, though not the name we want. And if, instead of simply 
discarding the 'unsuccessful applicants', we take the trouble to try 
to identify them, we are often successful. It is when we are 
interested only in who they are not, rather than in who they are, that 
they must remain anonymous. I do not need to maintain that we can 
always identify or 'place' these 'intermediate stages of memory'. If 
we can sometimes do so this shows that those 'identified' are in fact 
memory-images; but they are made memory-images, according to this 
definition, only by our stopping to consider them. And there is every 
reason to suppose that most of such passing images are in fact 
identifiable i_f we pause to consider them. The definition seems to 
demand a third group of experiences, neither memory nor imagination
35
yet in some way of the same ’kind' as these, a sort of 'potential 
memory’, and I can see no justification for the postulation of such 
an additional class. If we wanted to call anything ’potential 
memory’ surely it would be those experiences we have had and might 
remember.
Now, I have been talking as if these ’discarded candidates' were 
something quite extraneous to, and in no way connected with, the event 
or individual finally remembered, but this is not so. These images may 
play a vital part in the remembering of that event. The man whose image 
occurs to me probably served in the same ship as my friend, or performed 
the same duties at another time, or looked rather like him, or was his 
close associate. The image, although it is itself the wrong one for my 
present purpose, somehow helps to produce the right one. I may perhaps 
pause in my pursuit to say - 'No, that's old Jim. He joined us later’ - 
but my doing does not seem to make any difference to the fact that 
it i_s old Jim, and that I am remembering him. 
b) Knowledge of the past>
We have found our first 'definition' too narrow. We now consider 
one which is also too wide, it is tempting to define 'memory' as 
'Our knowledge of the past', or, less incautiously, 'Our knowledge 
of our own past experience', because this seems to be straightforward 
and clear-cut and to embrace everything we might want to call memory.
But as a definition it fails on both counts.
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i• It is too wide
As we saw in chapter I,1 knowing the pust is not necessarily the 
same thing as remembering the past, even when the past in question is 
our own. it may be suggested, therefore, that in order to make the 
’definition' function as a definition we rephrase it as - Direct 
knowledge of our own past experience. But what does the word 'direct' 
mean here? We cannot say 'intuitive'. This would not make it any 
clearer and would put memory on a par with clairvoyance, which we cer­
tainly do not want. It must be knowledge of the past in a particular 
though quite ordinary way. But the only description we can give of 
this particular and ordinary way is - remembering.
Perhaps we can give a negative definitions Remembering is being 
certain about past facts without the aid of testimony and inference.
This is, in effecn, the position adopted by Sir hoy Harrod. 'A memory', 
he says, 'is an imaginative structure to which the truth symbol adheres 
without there being any apparent grounds for the adherence. Memories,
in fine, are memners of the class of wholly irrational beliefs re-
2cognised as such Idefmition)'. He argues that the irrationality 
of the beliefs does not render it irrational to hold them. But even 
if we accept this argument the definition is hardly satisfactory.
It is difficult to see how it can exclude articles of faith and mere
1
p,15ff.
Foundations of Inducive Logic, p.187.
2
37
prejudices. We might extend the definition to exclude these speci­
fically but then I cannot but feel that we would be defining memory 
by what it is not - making it a mere residue after the more specific 
kinds of belief have been extracted.
There is also a more formal objection. The definition accepts as 
memory whatever commends itself to us as memory, and it makes no 
provision for memory which is not recognised as such, memory to which 
the 'truth symbol' does not adhere. Unless, that is, we take the 
'truth symbol' to be nothing more than our failure to judge ’this is 
false' .
ii. It is too narrow
As a definition ’Knowledge of our past experience' is at once too 
wide and too narrow. By adhering to the factual criterion it abandons 
the psychological criterion altogether. If it isn't true it isn't 
remembered. This may be a quite reasonable stand (though, as we shall 
see shortly, it involves serious difficulties). But this is not all. 
'Knowledge of_ my past' is not the same thing as 'knowledge that this is 
my past' yet how are we to make clear the distinction and so avoid the 
charge of the assumption of reflexiveness made against the first 
definition? tie seem obliged to resurrect the distinction between 
factual knowledge and mere acquaintance, so that we can deal with those 
cases where I in fact remember my past experience without registering 
that it is my past experience by saying that I am acquainted with my 
past. We would then reformulate the definition as 'Acquaintance with
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our own past experience’. But the knowledge/acquaintance distinction 
is a very shaky one to say the least. Whether, and if so how, it can 
properly be made we shall consider later in the essay. In any case 
'acquaintance with our own past' seems to serve as a description rather 
than as a definition of memory. For there is about it a strong 
suspicion of circularity.
If we define 'remembering' as 'knowing the past' how do we define 
'the past'? The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives 'gone by in time'.
But our concept of temporal sequence seems, prima-facie at least, to 
rest heavily upon our ability to distinguish the perception of events 
from the memory of events by the natures of the experiences involved. 
There have been several different attempts to free the concept of the 
past from that of remembering, some of wüich we shall be examining in 
the final chapter of this essay, but unless and until this is con­
vincingly achieved our present definition is useless. In order to make 
the * pastness' of the event contemplated the criterion of our 
remembering that event, we must first show how our concept of the 
past is derived without reference to any 'memory-experience', 
iii. 'Memory' and 'knowledge*
There is obviously a strong case for insisting that 'remember', 
like 'know', should apply only to what is in fact the case (or was 
the case). And it may seem that we are tacitly following this rule 
whenever we say 'I seem to remember*. For it may be argued that there 
would be no point in saying 'seem' unless we felt that something over
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and above the present experience itself were needed to qualify the 
event as a memory. Thus ’seem to remember’ may stand to ’remember’ 
much as ’believe’ stands to ’know’.
But at what point, then, would we be justified in dropping the 
’seem to’? Only when ’independent evidence' is produced? ’I seem to 
remember’ usually denotes a low degree of 'initial authority’ -'Don't 
put too much weight upon this recollection, it may be wrong'. Cer­
tainly there is not the same prima-facie absurdity in saying 'I seem 
to remember it clearly, yet it could not have happened' as there is in 
saying 'I believe it, but it is not so’. The two cases are not really 
parallel. For when I say *1 know' I am saying 'I believe and I have 
adequate grounds for believing', but when I say 'I remember' am I 
saying 'I seem to remember and...' and what? Does it make sense to 
talk of adequate grounds for seeming to remember? This is a question 
which must come up again when we consider the relation of memories 
to claims,* but it is certainly not a question to which we can provide 
a quick answer. ’Knowledge of our past' provides us with neither an 
exclusive definition of memory nor an effective criterion by which we 
can identify instances of memory when they occur. All the examples 
in the previous chapter show very clearly that n<3 memory has ' its 
truth stamped upon its face'. So that our only means of establishing 
that some event did in fact occur is by more remembering of the same
T
Chapter IV.
40
kind. Therefore, to say that a seeniing memory is really a memory 
only if it is true, though it tells us something about how we 
normally use the word ‘memory', provides no means of identifying our 
memories as such, 
c) Learnt and not forgotten
A fairly recent attempt to cut away the aura of mystery from 
memory is the claim that 'remembered' means simply 'learnt and not 
forgotten'.* The advantage of this move is that it seems to give clear 
rules for deciding what is remembered and what is not: - Did 1 learn 
this by instruction, perception, practice? Have I retained what 1 
learnt, i.e. am I now capable of relating, recalling, performing, 
properly? - Then I remember. And if it be objected that I may not be 
remembering that I ever learnt the thing, the advocates of this view 
are generally prepared to say that this is of no importance, that it 
is sufficient that it is the kind of thing which would have to be 
learnt. The only valid test for memory is the ability to perform 
appropriately when called upon to do so.
This definition, like the previous one, limits memory to 'true 
memory’ and must encounter the same difficulties. I may consider that 
I am performing appropriately, i.e. according to what I have learnt, 
whilst someone else considers that I am not. How could the issue be 
decided except by reference to the learning process remembered in
Principally associated with G. Kyle - Cf. The Concept of Mind. p.272ff.
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some other way? But, as a definition, it suffers from the more serious 
defect that it attempts to define the 'genus1 in terms of the 
'differentia'. This is apparent when we consider the assertion 'I 
remember his face'. I certainly never 'learnt his face'. And though 
1 may perhaps have learnt to describe his face, a moment's reflection 
will show that 'I remember his face' not only is not equivalent to 'I 
can describe his face', it does not even entail that 1 have even 
attempted (let alone learnt) to do so. The failure of the definition 
is even more evident when we ask two pertinent questions: 
i• What does 'learnt' mean?
We know well enough what we are doing when we are learning 
something - a part in a play, or how to swim, or the order of colours 
in the rainbow, or our twelve-times tables - we are committing some­
thing to memory, or, if you prefer, acquiring a skill. But when we 
ask what it is for that something to have been learnt, what can we say 
but that, as a result of past efforts, we can do, or do know, the 
sometning in question? Learning is one kind of remembering: remem­
bering directed to the acquisition of some particular talent. For, 
when we consider how we learn anything, what the 'efforts' in question 
amount to, we find thut, insofar as they effect the issue at all, 
these efforts are themselves simply 'little rememberings'. The 
observation of anyone learning a part in a play, or going through the 
early stages of learning to drive, will show this very clearly. What
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could learning be except piecemeal remembering? 1 can see a 
rainbow a thousand times but unless I remember which colour joins 
which I shall never learn the order of the colours. Learning entails 
remembering - having learnt entails having remembered, and going on 
remembering. Now, what of not forgetting? 
ii. What is the criterion for 'not forgotten1?
It is notorious that things we cannot remember today may come 
back to us as clear as ever tomorrow. Sometimes events from long ago 
come back to us with surprising clarity, and some psychologists believe 
that nothing we have experienced is ever totally lost to us, a belief 
which is supported in some measure by the 'unearthing* of lost memories 
under hypnosis. At what stage, then, can we say we have forgotten 
something? I often enough do say this, but all that 1 mean is that at 
this moment 1 am unable to recall it. If the matter is important I 
may be urged to try harder to remember, and 1 may be successful. Or 
1 may adopt the tecnnique of thinking about something else in the hope 
that the recollection will 'come to me of its own accord'.
Clearly the only meaning of ’forgotten* which permits verification 
is 'not recalled or recognised now1. Asking which memories are 'quite 
forgotten* is like asking which of the young men at the university will 
live to be octogenarians. The only possible answer is 'Wait and see'.
1
Or the 'drilling1 of the physical faculties in some set way. This 
is discussed more fully in chapter V.
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Wittgenstein asks the question^ — If I knew something yesterday but 
do not know it today, at what time did I stop knowing it? - There just 
does not seeni to be any answer.
Thus if 1 say 'I have not forgotten what I once learned' it is 
not entirely clear what I am claiming. If I simply mean 'I am now 
doing something which I once learnt how to do' then this is certainly 
good evidence that I remember something - something which, as we have 
seen, is itself a complex of earlier rememberings. But this only 
instantiates the concept of remembering, it cannot serve to define it.
In the same way ’I see the meadow as a green expanse' shows that I have 
colour vision but does not provide a definition of the concept of 
colour.
d) 'Neo-ostensive definition' - how the term is used
i. 'Open-texture', closed, and vague concepts
Friedrich Waismann attributed much of the misunderstanding in
philosophy to - 'something of great significance, the fact, namely, that
language is never complete for the expression of all ideas, on the
2contrary, that it has an essential openness'. And he introduces the 
term 'open texture concept' in his article 'Verifiability' for those of 
our empirical concepts which are elastic in their coverage. 'Open 
texture is a very fundamental characteristic of most, though not of all,
T
'Philosophical Investigations', pt.l, para. 182ff, p.73eff.
Analytic and Synthetic. Pt. vi. Analysis. March 1953, p.82.
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empirical concepts, and it is this texture which prevents us from 
verifying conclusively most of our empirical statements'. * The 
distinction between 'closed' and 'open texture’ is fairly straight­
forward. Whereas there are exact rules for determining whether or 
not a given poem is a sonnet, there are no such exact rules for 
determining on every occasion whether a given animal is a cat. If 
the poem has one line too many or one rhyme out of place it is not a 
sonnet. But the cat may have no tail, or have three legs, or bark 
like a dog; the point at which we stop calling it a cat is a matter 
of decision. A term may be introduced into the language to refer to 
a closed concept - closed in the sense that all possibilities are 
already catered for; but when a term is evolved to refer to a group 
of similar instances even though no exact rules are laid down for its 
use, we have an open-texture concept. In the first case we have a set 
of absolute rules, in the second a set of descriptions which must be 
met with to a substantial degree.
We can saiely assert that memory is a 'natural' rather than a 
'formal' concept. We have applied the name to certain known experi­
ences, not created it as a technical term to assist us in discussing 
those experiences. By the criteria given above, therefore, it is 
an open-texture concept. It does not follow, however, that it is 
also a vague concept. To use Waismann's examples, 'heap' and 'pink'
tteprinted in Logic and Language, 1951 (A.G.N. Flew), p.120.
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are vague terms whereas 'gold* is a quite precise term, notwith­
standing that if some novel material were to be found which met almost, 
though not quite, all the tests for gold, we should be obliged to 
decide whether to call it gold or to invent some new name for it.
It is just a fortunate fact that such novel experiences occur 
comparatively rarely. In the case of most ’natural kinds' ostensive 
and formal definitions do in fact coincide in practice. Therefore 
when ’novel experiences* do occur we are in a position to deal with 
them.
Now, if it were the case that some definition could be formed 
to embrace every instance that we in fact accept as memory, and 
exclude every instance that we do not, then the inadequacy of such a 
definition to deal with a totally novel experience which might occur 
need cause us no more distress than does the inadequacy of the 
definition of ’horse’ to meet such an eventuality. 'Memory* would 
be an open-texture, but not a vague, concept. But the various attempts 
at definition we have considered seem to demonstrate that this is not 
the case. Our problem, then, is not simply that our definition may 
have to be revised at some future date, but that no single definition 
can meet our present needs, can provide us with an effective criterion 
for all occasions.
ii. Is there a common factor in all uses of the term?
We may still hope, however, to find some essential characteristic 
which 'binds together' all our uses of the term. 'Game' is decidely
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an open texture concept, and may fairly be regarded as a vague one, 
yet we may well feel that our application of the term to some new 
instance that we encounter occurs because we attribute to this new 
instance some feature that we have found common to all instances 
of games - even if we are not quite clear what it is. Similarly, there 
is a family resemblance between all the instances we call •remembering'. 
Perhaps it is possible that we can be aware of similarities without 
being able to tell exactly in what respect things are similar, and 
that when we think of some performance as one of remembering this is 
because we recognise in it some such 'unspecified common feature'.
But a family resemblance is quite compatible with one member of 
the family bearing no obvious resemblance to some other member. It is 
only when we meet tiae rest of the family that we see the 'connecting 
links'; as the appearance of a child will often 'connect' the appear­
ance of his two brothers. So that the fact that it is reasonable 
and intelligible to apply a single term to all instances of the 
concept does not entail the existence of any single 'essential charac­
teristic', identified or otherwise, 
iii. The three criteria
Perhaps the ideal memory, the perfect exemplar, to use H.H.
Price's term,* is that which both feels like a memory to ourselves 
and 'behaves' like a memory to other people. I remember that Aston
I
l
Cf. Thinking and Experience, p.20.
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Villa won the football match: I have a visual image of the winning 
goal being scored and I remember being delighted by the victory. I 
am able to tell everyone quite confidently who won and how they won, 
and to check my pools coupon. The people I speak to saw me go into 
the stadium and come away from it after the game was over. They also 
saw others coming away with Villa rosettes and happy smiles. Here is 
a memory which nobody but a professional sceptic would ever query. 
Three distinct characteristics are involved:
a. The experience has the initial authority of memory - the feeling 
of belief about a past event.
b. There is strong independent evidence that: (i) what is claimed 
did in fact happen and (ii) I was in a position to perceive its 
happening and subsequently remember it.
c. I am able, as the result of my memory, to proceed with certain 
activities dependent for their execution upon a knowledge of the past 
event.
Where any of these conditions holds we are inclined to speak of 
remembering. To my mind, however, by far the most persistent factor 
is the ’initial authority*. Since this is often referred to as a 
feeling of familiarity it may be well, at this juncture, to consider 
briefly what might be meant by this expression, 
iv. Familiarity
Hume held memories to be subjectively distinguishable from mere
\
imaginings because they are more vivid. But Hume himself was forced
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to admit that on occasions mere imaginings may be more vivid, in any 
ordinary sense of that term, than memory-images. To preserve the 
notion of an intrinsic memory-indicator - the truth-symbol as Harrod calls 
it - empiricists have cast about for some other description which is 
not open to this objection. William James was perhaps the first to 
speak of a feeling of familiarity which accompanies, or arises out 
of, the memory, and obliges us to accept it as an account of our own 
past experience. Unfortunately however, although the term ’familiar', 
largely through the writings of Bertrand Russell, has become almost 
a standard expression, it is, like the term 'vivid', something of a 
raakesnift. As R.F. Holland has pointed out,* a thing normally becomes 
familiar through long usage, and there is therefore no reason why our 
imaginings, since they may be repeatedly entertained by us, should not 
become more familiar than actual experiences we have had only once.
I hope that as we proceed we shall discover what it is that makes 
a memory 'feel familiar'. But for the present all that I mean by 
'initial authority', whatever the explanation of it may be, is the 
feeling of belief manifested in our readiness to base our expectations, 
reasonings and testimony on the memory in question, 
v. Truth-status an open question
Any attempt at rigid definition forces us to decide between a 
psycnological, and private, criterion and a factual, and public,
The Empiricist Theory of Memory. MINI), Vol. LXIII, 1954, p.4b6fl.
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one. Our alternatives are to treat remembering as we treat knowing, 
making our criterion wnat was the case, and basing it upon the way we 
generally use the word 'remember1 in discourse) or to treat it as we 
treat believing, making our criterion a particular state of mind) 
and basing it upon the experience we refer to when we speak of remem­
bering. If we were to take past fact as our sole criterion, then we 
would have to include many instances where there is no 'memory-feeling* 
at all, and which we, therefore, may not wish to call memories. Nor 
would we be able to distinguish between memory-knowledge and knowledge 
about the past from other sources. If we were to take the present 
belief about the past as our sole criterion, then we would have to 
include beliefs which are in fact unjustified, and which, therefore, 
we would not wish to call memories, furthermore, we would be obliged 
to maintain that no independent evidence about the past, however well 
established, could overthrow a memory-claim provided the belief were 
strongly held. We would be obliged to admit 'mnemic hallucinations' 
as memories.
Of course, what we want to say is that remembering is holding 
a true belief about the past as a result of having experienced the 
past in question. But we must recognise that we know it to be 'as 
a result of past experience'only by virtue of the present memory- 
experience, and that in most cases we do in fact know the belief to 
1
Cf. 'Remembering* chapter IY - Von Leyden distinguishes what he calls 
the 'present approach' and the 'past approach* to memory.
50
be true by virtue of thut 'memory-experience* alone. We must, 
therefore, consider, not the thing, but the things, we mean by 
'remember', must recognise that the term is quite properly used in 
different ways, and concentrate on discovering the relationship 
between these. First, however, we must decide what these different 
ways are.
2. Remembering: distinctions and classifications
a) Memories and remembering
The first distinction which springs to my mind within the field of 
memory is the one I have made some use of already - between the memories 
we have and the remembering we perform. We may well feel that a totally 
different classificatory system must apply to what we remember from that 
which applies to how we remember. It may seem comparable with the way 
in which different classificatory systems would apply if we were asked 
’What did you run? The hundred yards, the egg and spoon race, or the 
all-Australia championship?' and if we were asked 'How did you run?
Fast, bowlegged, or with increasing pace? Certainly there are 
differences in the granmar which is applicable to memory and to remem­
bering. I can remember quickly, or efficiently, or effortlessly, but 
I cannot have quick or efficient or effortless memories. On the other 
hand I can remember clearly, and this i^s having a clear memory of 
some event.
We must allow then, that there are things we can say about 
remembering that we cannot say about memories, but are they, from our
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point of view, the important things? To preserve the analogy with 
running the subjects of memory would have to be such things as ’that 
farm', 'the man next door', 'yesterday's breakfast'; or perhaps, farms, 
people, breakfasts. But these are not the 'kinds' we are interested 
in. Rather we are interested in distinguishing between memories ofs 
things, skills, states of mind, appearances, propositions, The more 
pertinent analogy would therefore be with running a race or running a 
lottery or running for Parliament - where what we do and how we do it 
are closely interwoven. Thus:
Remembering the appearance or the sound or the smell of something 
seems simply to be imaging. Perhaps it is not; perhaps I can remember
exactly how something looked or felt without any image at all and
perhaps I can have images without remembering at all. I shall dispute 
these possibilities in a later chapter* but for the present we must 
allow it. Nevertheless, to say that my memory takes tne form of images
seems to say as much about what 1 am remembering as about how I am
remembering. It is very hard to imagine, for instance, how I could 
have an image of a proposition.
Remembering a skill, i.e. how to do something, may simply be doing
it. Whether this 'really is* remembering or not need not concern us 
ohere. All that is relevant is that, insofar as we do treat it as 
1
Chapter VII.
This question is taken up in Chapter V.
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remembering, our reason for saying that what is remembered is a skill 
is that our manner of remembering is a skilled performance.
Again we must be careful not to prejudge the issue. It may prove 
that remembering is quite distinct from performing, but it is evident 
that there is a strong connection.
It could pernaps be held that the remembering of a factual 
relationship could only be the stating of a proposition. This is at 
least arguable. And it seems to be analytic to say that when the mode 
of remembering i_s the stating of a proposition (assuming that there be 
such a mode of remembering), the subject of the memory must be a certain 
relationship which held, or is claimed to have held, between certain 
events, or proceedings, or situations.
We cannot remember without remembering something. 1 am suggesting 
further that we cannot remember in this or that way without remembering 
something of this or that kind. If this is a mere tautology then it is 
one which has frequently been overlooked by those who have sought to 
treat what we remember and how we remember as two distinct categories.
On the other hand it would be confusing and misleading to ignore 
completely, as some philosophers have done, the differences between 
what can appropriately be said of remembering (as an activity) and 
what can appropriately be said only of memories (as the 'products’ 
of that activity). In the next chapter I propose to avoid both dangers 
by approaching the classification of memory from the viewpoints of 
memories and remembering alternately. But first I want to make an
53
initial distinction, a distinction we might say, between distinc­
tions.
b) Primary and secondary distinctions 
i. Descriptions and sub-divisions
We have, on the one hand, the different sorts of things we can 
say about remembering because it is one kind of activity, and on the 
other hand, the different kinds of things that count as memories. An 
analogy may help to make the distinction clear. Discussing a colour 
we can say that it is bright or dull, clear or opaque, cheerful or 
gloomy, and we can argue as to whether it ‘belongs* to the surface 
of an object or is ’dependent' upon a mind. Or quite differently, 
we can classify it as green or red or blue or orangey-red or biuey- 
green. Whilst the first list is of real enough distinctions, and 
these clearly are applicable to colours, they are also equally 
applicable to other things as well. The weather can be bright or 
dull, the fireside can be cheerful or gloomy, and the arguments 
about ontological status can be carried on about sounds or flavours. 
But tne second list of alternatives lies within colour itself; it 
is the possible classes into which colours, and only colours, can 
fall. For convenience 1 shall call these primary and secondary 
distinctions respectively, and the two important points to note are: 
The 'primary distinctions' are applicable irrespective of the 
'kind' (the 'secondary' classification) in question.
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'Secondary distinctions' apply only within the class under 
consideration. Primary distinctions apply to members of that and 
other classes.
An example of a primary distinction is that given in Section 1 
of this chapter, between memories which are specifically believed and 
memories which are merely accepted in passing. This distinction, 
though applicable to memory, is by no means peculiar to memory; it 
applies equally to perception and prediction as well, 
ii. Retention and recall
In the case of memory one primary distinction is of the utmost 
importance, that between dispositional memory and memory occurrence.
As we shall need to be conscious of this distinction at every stage of 
our enquiry I propose to make a preliminary investigation of it before 
going on to consider the 'kinds of memory' - the secondary distinctions.
Whilst we can talk of remembering something either in the disposi­
tional sense of being able to remember, or in the occurrent sense of 
actually remembering now, our being entitled to talk of remembering a 
given event in either sense entails that, on some occasions, we must be 
entitled to talk of remembering that event in the other sense. The fact 
that an event occurred yesterday and I recall it today is all the proof 
needed that I have retained that event in my memory. Furthermore it is 
the only proof possible that I have done so. A memory disposition can 
be known to exist only because memory occurrences actualise it.^
1
This does not mean that it can be known not to exist if no memory 
occurrence is actualising it. Cf. p.42 above.
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Thus, whilst 'Do you remember...?' is a different kind of 
question from 'Are you rememoering...?', it does not need a different 
kind of experience to enable us to answer it. Asking a man on his 
Golden Wedding day 'Do you remember your wedding day?' is quite diffe­
rent in intention from asking him 'Are you remembering your wedding 
day?’. But though he may answer 'Yes' to the first question and 'No' 
to the second, there is an obvious sense in which he must, to be 
entitled to answer ’Yes' to the first question, be fulfilling at least 
some of the conditions required for answering 'Yes' to the second 
question also. A memory disposition or capacity can be claimed only 
on the evidence of some memory occurrence, and .justly claimed only 
on the evidence of a memory-occurrence directly related to the event 
claimed as remembered. This is the fact which people overlook when 
they claim to remember some event they have in fact long since for­
gotten. What they remember is simply the fact that they did once 
remember it, as when an old man starts to relate some incident from 
his youth and finds, to his astonishment, that he is unable to do so. 
Memory dispositions or capacities are not personal characteristics 
like the colour of hair. Nor do we carry them about with us like the 
watch which must still be in my pocket because 1 put it there and have 
not taken it out.
'Does he remember this?', then, means ‘iias he ever remembered this
and can he be expected to remember it again?’. And 'Do you remember
\
this?' generally means ’Can you remember this?’ and is often used to
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ask us to try to remember. Or, if the object be particularly compli­
cated - like a proof in geometry for instance - the question may 
mean ’Can you remember ever remembering this and if so could you do so 
again if you tried?'.
There is, however, a problem here, one which gives some plausibility 
to our third definition, 'Learnt and not forgotten'. It is very hard to 
deny that quite often we seem to know things without tninking about them 
at all. We take the right action, give the right answer, select the 
right book, without experiencing anything that feels like an occurrent 
memory. Often these performances are quite complex; they are the kind 
of things we should say need to be remembered. It may be possible to 
explain such spontaneous right actions wholly in terms of physiological 
conditioning. There seems no doubt that a great deal of spontaneous 
action must be so explained. But there is also another possibility at 
least worthy of consideration.
What we discover by perception is retained by memory. Ten seconds 
after an event there seems no doubt that we are remembering not per­
ceiving. The question of how and when this change occurs, if indeed 
there be any actual change, will exercise us in my final chapter.
But, even allowing that such a change has occurred, the memory we 
now have is not, properly speaking, a recollection. It has not been 
recalled into consciousness, for it has never left consciousness.
Suppose I see a quite perfect rose and this makes such a strong impression 
upon me that when I turn away its beauty remains in my mind - in the
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popular phrase 'it is still clearly before me'. I may have a con­
tinuous image of that rose for five minutes following my actually 
seeing it, during which time I may appear to be giving my full attention 
to a host of other matters. So there does not seem to be any logical 
reason why we could not continually remember something (without ever 
recollecting it in the ordinary sense of that word) for an indefinite 
period.
Thus, whilst the disposition/occurrence distinction is possible 
only where there are in fact periodical occurrences, and we might 
therefore say that a memory disposition is 'nothing more than' its 
occurrences, there could be cases of remembering wiiere the distinction 
simply does not apply. There may be some memories which are constantly, 
as people say, at the back of our minds. And in such cases we could 
equally well regard the memory as occurrent or as dispositional. It 
would be a mistake, I think, to draw too rigid a distinction between 
what is and what is not being specifically remembered at any given 
moment.
iii. Secondary distinctions
We now turn our attention to the secondary distinctions. Immediately 
a host of questions spring to mind. Must events be remembered either in 
words or in images? What is the connection between a remembered event, 
a remembered fact, and the proposition in which the memories are 
expressed? Can we simply remember a proposition? How is this different 
from remembering a sentence? How is remembering a person or place
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connected with remembering the qualities of that person or place?
Can remembering now to do something be in imagery? What is the 
relation between habit and memory? Is recognition a kind of recall?
Or is recall a kind of recognition?
These are the kind of questions we now have to consider. From 
them emerge various candidates for consideration as 'kinds of remem­
bering’ or ’classes of memories'. Images, remembering sense experience, 
remembering in words and propositions, remembered events, remembered 
qualities, remembering how to, remembered facts, recognition - all 
these have their places, their particular functions, in the general 
scheme of what we call memory. Our task is to decide what these 
particular functions are.
Something else emerges from our list of questions, the fact that 
the 'kinds' are not simple alternatives. I can contrast remembering 
how to swim with remembering that I had eggs lor breakfast or remem­
bering what my home looks like; but in each case the remembering may 
take the form of, or include, uttering words, framing propositions, 
or having images. I can contrast remembering a man’s behaviour with 
remembering his appearance; but the remembering in either case may 
take the form of either recall or recognition. A memory-image seems 
to be a totally different sort of thing from a remembered proposition,
though both may be means of remembering the same event. And recog-
\
nising something in front of us seems quite different from recalling 
something from another time and place. Yet it seems to make sense 
to talk of recognising an image.
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The upshot of all this is that before we can start to answer the 
question ’What kind of memory is this?' we have to ask 'What kind of 
question is this?'. Just as when I am asked 'What kind of soldier 
is he?' the question could mean 'Is he a Corporal or a Colonel?', 
or 'Is he an infantryman or a cavalryman?', or simply 'Is he a good 
soldier or a bad one?'. (The last is a primary distinction but the 
first two are secondary). Of course, in practice, I should avoid 
this difficulty by replying 'He's an infantry Corporal and a very 
good one'. It does no harm to throw in a little gratuitious infor­
mation. But with memory this manoeuvre is not so easy. We know well 
enough that 'cavalryman' excludes 'infantryman', and 'Corporal' 
excludes 'Colonel'. But which 'kind of memory' excludes which other 
kind seems to vary with the point of view of the question, and it is 
quite vital therefore to know what the questioner is 'getting at'.
For instance I might ask a man who is describing his friend to me,
'Do you have a visual image of him, or do you simply remember a 
number of facts about what he looks like?'. The question seems 
reasonable enough but it could be that to him the 'alternatives' may 
seem to amount to exactly the same thing, for he may be thinking only 
in terms of what he can state, and not, like myself, in terms of the 
mode of remembering which enables him to state it. And I cannot 
point out an image to him as I could point out a Corporal.
Nevertheless, for most of us such questions as these do make 
sense: 'Do you actually remember how he looked or just that he looked
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like Napoleon?' and 'When you say you remember how to drive are you 
saying that you remember what you did on some previous occasion, or 
that you can now think through the rules of driving, or simply that 
given a car you could drive it?' and 'Is the actual group of words 
the subject of your memory, or simply the way of expressing it'?.
They make sense once we are in tune, as it were, with our questioner. 
It is only because this is so that we are able to talk intelligibly 
of kinds of memories at all. There are genuine alternatives within 
certain contexts of enquiry, and 1 hope that in the course of the 
next chapter it will become clearer what these contexts are, and what 
are the alternatives appropriate to them.
Chapter III
KINDS OF MEMORY
1• Classification by subjects of memory 
a ) Memories of events and memories of individuals 
i. Broad's distinction and reduction
To claim ’I remember my grandfather’ may be to claim more or less 
than to claim 'I remember my grandfather visiting us in Birmingham'.
I could remember the man without remembering tue visit. And I could 
remember the visit, in the sense of remembering things about it, with­
out actually remembering the man at all. I could, for instance, recall 
certain outings at which someone, presumably my grandfather, was 
present. I might perhaps say 'I remember my grandfather' and mean 
nothing more than 'I could recognise a portrait of my grandfather if 
I saw one', but this would be a rather extended use of 'remember'; it 
is natural to feel that to remember someone must always be to be able 
to recall something about him, and to recall it from personal 
experience. My ability to recognise his portrait could hardly consti­
tute remembering him if he had died before 1 was born. My claim to 
remember my grandfather would be very hollow indeed if I were unable 
from direct memory, to relate a single incident which involved him, 
or to give any description of him. In this case all that I would be
) I
entitled to say is that I remember certain events that occurred at a 
time when (so I am told) my grandfather was visiting.
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Such considerations led C.D. Broad^ to reduce the memory of 
individuals to one way of talking about the memory of events. 'All 
perceptual situations' he says 'refer beyond themseives to pnysical 
tnings: if we confine ourselves to saying that we perceive a certain 
physical event we simply leave the further reference more vague than 
when we say that we perceive a certain physical thing. Now the same 
is true of perceptual memory. I say that I remember the Master of 
Trinity, and I say that I remember dining with him. But, on the one 
hand, I remember him only insofar as I remember the events in which 
he was concerned. And, on the other hand, when I remember any physical 
event I, ipso-facto, remember to some extent the thing in which I 
believe this to have occurred'.
ii. Remembering classifications and descriptions
But is it true that I can remember an individual only in remem­
bering some event in which he was concerned? I have agreed that it 
would be hollow for me to claim to remember my grandfather if I were 
unable to relate anything about him; but surely I could describe him 
from memory without remembering any event in which he was concerned. 
Perhaps Broad includes in 'events' such things as 'having white 
whiskers'; it is noticeable that he says 'the thing in which I believe 
this to have occurred', not 'to which1. But once we allow the tradi­
tional distinction between internal and external properties - and the
'The Mind and Its Place in Nature', p.224.
1
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question of remembering individuals could hardly arise at ail if we 
do not allow it - then 'having white whiskers1 does not refer to an 
event in the way that 'coming to dinner on Christmas Day 1936* refers 
to an event. There seems no reason why I could not remember him by 
means of memories of the former kind without any assistance from 
memories of the latter kind. Nor need my memory of him be in the form 
of an image. I could remember that he had blue eyes and white whiskers 
and a Scottish accent without any image of him at all. But I can 
remember this kind of detail about people who I certainly do not 
remember - Oliver Cromwell for instance - and if this were all that 
constituted my memory of my grandfather, then, when I was asked ’Do 
you remember your grandfather?' I would be inclined to reply 'No, not 
really'. For I would have neither a mental picture of him (unless it 
were a purely imaginative one built up from verbal descriptions) nor 
any direct memory of his actions. The ability to describe and classify 
a person does not, of itself, constitute a memory of that person, 
though clearly, it does constitute a memory of something.
The claim 'I remember grandfather' is justified then if:
a. I remember events in which grandfather was personally involved in 
such a way that the memories of those events would have been quite 
different had he not been present; or
b. I have certain images (usually visual though not necessarily so) 
of him which I know to originate from my actual past perception of 
him; or
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c. I remember certain facts about his personal appearance or his 
doings which are directly traceable to judgments made in his presence, 
i.e., I can remember the occasions of making the judgments in question.
Since c. would be merely a case of remembering propositions about 
him (as in the Oliver Cromwell case) unless 1 in fact remembered some 
event in which he was involved, we can regard a. and b. as the only 
real alternatives. As a rule both these conditions hold, but either 
will suffice. I can have clear memories of people's participation in 
certain events, their doings and their sayings, and the way I felt 
about them at the time, without any imagery of those people. Thus even 
my failure to recognise a man does not entail that 1 do not remember 
him. Failing to recognise people we do in fact remember, in the other 
sense of the term, is quite a common experience. And, on the other 
hand, I can have a clear image which I know to be the image of a 
particular individual, and know to originate from my perception of 
that individual, without being aware that I am remembering any 
particular event. Nevertheless, the fact that 1 can be sure that the 
imagery derives from my own past perception shows that I am in fact 
remembering an event (or number of events) whether I am conscious of 
this or not. To this extent we must allow that Broad is right. The 
distinction between events and individuals is only within what 1^ 
regard myself as remembering.
: \
iii. Remembering qualities as qualities
It may be suggested that, when we remember an individual as 
distinct from remembering an event, what we are actually remembering
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is the group of sensible characteristics which for us make up the 
appearance of the individual in question. And in a sense this is 
quite correct; we are attributing a continuity and an identity to a 
group of sensible characteristics. In the same sense as we see a 
group of such characteristics a£ an individual we remember a group of 
them ajs an individual. But this does not mean that what we ‘really 
see* is not a man at all but just a pattern of colours; as the English 
language is used what we see, and what we remember, is a particular 
individual. I can see no objection, however, to saying that I see a 
man because a pattern of colours is presented to my sight. And, at a 
particular time wiien our attention is focussed on the colours them­
selves, as a painter’s might be, it is quite possible to see the 
colours and shapes as such. I could, for instance, observe the white 
patch which is an old man’s moustache without otherwise noticing the 
old man at all. And, if I can notice a sensible quality without 
noticing the individual whose quality it is, then I can also remember 
it as so distinct.
To remember an individual by way of imagery, then, ijB to remember 
a group of sensible qualities; but it is to do more than this, it is 
to remember that group of sensible qualities a£ that individual. Nor 
is the memory-image of an individual necessarily derived from any 
single perceptual occasion; it may have been developed throughout a 
series of different perceptual experiences with a consequent vagueness 
of detail. If you think of someone you know well; and tnen, after you
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are satisfied that you have a clear visual memory-image of his 
appearance, you ask yourself whether üe is wearing a waistcoat or not, 
the chances are that you will be quite unable to say. Yet the image 
did not seem to be incomplete in the way that a picture which did not 
include such details would certainly be incomplete. If the man or his 
photograph were before you instead of just ‘before your memory' such 
vagueness would hardly be possible, 
iv. Remembering the unnoticed
This distinction between remembering individuals as such and 
remembering their sensible qualities, i.e., their sensed appearances, 
carries with it a corresponding distinction in the ways in which 
individuals and events can be remembered. In the strict sense we can 
remember only those events which occurred within our own experience - 
this seems to be unquestionable. But it is often assumed that 
experiencing an event means perceiving it to be an event of a parti­
cular description, the description we finally decide to give of it, 
and this assumption is not justified. Suppose, for example, that I ask 
my son 'Do you remember the coalman delivering today?' and he replies 
'No', but later adds 'I do remember hearing a big truck and a lot of 
crashing downstairs, and shortly after that I saw a very dusty man 
go past the window, though I did not, at the time, connect the two 
things'. Are we to say that he does, or does not, remember the event 
describable as the coal's being delivered? He cannot remember thinking 
'That is the coal being delivered' because he never thought it, but
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are we concerned with nis past thoughts or with a past physical event? 
From his memories alone it is possible for nim to reclassify the event, 
to think 'That was the coalman' where he earlier failed to think 
'That ijs the coalman'. And since he could have made this reconstruction 
even if his attention had not been specifically drawn to the question, 
there seems to be every reason to allow that he is remembering the 
event itself.
Now, a similar reconstruction is possible at a quite different 
level: not from events into other events, but from 'remembered 
appearances' into events and things. 1 have claimed that we see events 
and things because we 'see' certain sensible qualities in certain 
relationships. Sometimes, however, we fail at the time to notice 
certain of the relationships, though these may subsequently prove to 
be very important ones. And sometimes we do notice the relationships 
without noticing what sensible qualities are related by them. For 
example, in a strange town I may look at the Town Hall clock, observe 
the time correctly, and yet be quite unable to say whether the hands 
of the clock were thick or thin, black or white. Al 1 I looked for, 
and all I saw, was the relative positions of the hands. And at other 
times I have been so foolish as to look up from my work to see the 
time, return to my work and then realise that I have not noticed the 
time. I have seen the clock, including the hands and numbers upon it, 
but I have seen them only as a certain pattern of coloured shapes, and 
have failed to take note of those particular relationships between
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these coloured shapes which indicate the time to me. Yet when the 
circumstances are such that I cannot look again - perhaps I have just 
driven past the clock in the car - then sometimes I can read the time 
from my memory of the clock just as 1 should have read it from the 
clock itself. Notice how often an absent-minded clock-looker, when he 
is asked 'Well, what is it?', will pause a moment as if gathering his 
thoughts and then give the time quite correctly without looking again. 
What is happening is that he is remembering a group of sensible 
qualities which he recalls as related in a certain way - once it occurs 
to him to pay attention to that relationship.
Now, in most of our perceptions we observe both the 'clock' and 
the 'time', more or less exactly, and accordingly our memories of an 
event include both imagery and understanding of that event. But the 
memories of those events where only the 'time' is observed must 
necessarily be imageless (unless images are supplied subsequently by 
imagination). For we could not have a visual image of the clock-face 
and yet not know what it looked like. And the memories of those events 
where only the 'clock' is observed must remain a kind of uninterpreted 
imagery until such time as an interpretation is made from the imagery 
itself.
v. The augmentation and refinement of memories
These, however, would be extreme cases. Such performances as 
'telling the time from a memory—image' are by no means frequent. It is 
in ‘filling out' the memory of an event, supplying and correcting
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d e t a i l s ,  t h a t  memories of ap p ea ran ces  p la y  t h e i r  main p a r t .  Suppose, 
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  I  have been in v o lv e d  in  a road  a c c id e n t .  I remember 
th e  even t -  hour cou ld  I f o r g e t  i t ?  -  b u t  I was to o  a g i t a t e d  a t  th e  
t im e  to  ta k e  in  much o f  what was go ing  on. So t h a t  l a t e r ,  when I  am 
q u e s t io n e d ,  in  a d d i t i o n  to  my p r o p o s i t i o n a l  memories -  t h a t  t h i s  
happened and t h a t  I  saw so -an d -so  -  I  must r e l y  on my memories o f  th e  
app ea ran ces  p r e s e n te d  to  me by th e  e v e n t .  I  f in d  t h a t  t h i n g s  which
d id  n o t  mean a n y th in g  t o  me a t  th e  t im e  beg in  t o  make s e n s e .  I  r e a l i s e
t h a t  th e  v i s u a l  image I have i s  ’o f ’ th e  t r a y  o f  a l o r r y  p r o j e c t in g  
th ro u g h  th e  f r o n t  window column of my c a r ,  and t h a t  th e  a u d i to r y  image 
I have i s  ' o f '  th e  squea l  o f  sk id d in g  t y r e s .  Thus I am a b le  t o  
conclude t h a t  I must have braked hard  and run in to  th e  t a i l  o f  a l o r r y .
I  do no t wish to  g iv e  th e  im p res s io n  t h a t  I t h i n k  of images as  
' in s p e c ta b J .e s '  which we produce to  look  a t  or l i s t e n  t o ,  l i k e  photo­
g rap h s  and gramaphone r e c o r d s .  In  a l a t e r  chap te r*  I hope to  show why
th e  fu n c t io n  o f  memory-images I have d e s c r ib e d  h e re  does n o t  e n t a i l  
th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  any such ' i n s p e c t a b l e s ' . 
v i . P la c in g  in  t im e
I t  i s  a p p a re n t  t h a t  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between remembered e v e n ts ,  
remembered i n d i v id u a l s  and remembered q u a l i t i e s  a re  ex trem ely  com pli­
c a t e d ,  and some l i g h t  may be shed upon t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  by our 
c o n s id e r in g  c e r t a i n  tem pora l f e a t u r e s  of e v e n t s ,  i n d i v id u a l s  and 
q u a l i t i e s .
See c h a p te r  V I I .
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a. Events. Although we speak of the 'same thing' occurring on 
successive occasions, any event is necessarily located at some specific 
time; anything occurring at a different time is a different event. 
Nevertheless I can remember an event very clearly and wonder when it 
happened. Remembering when an event occurred seems to be a quite 
separate achievement from remembering that event. But the important 
point here is that it always does make sense to wonder when it occurred
b. Individuals. I have claimed tnat we can remember an individual 
either as a participant in some remembered event, or by imagery, which 
could be either precise imagery arising from one particular perception, 
or vague imagery arising from a series of perceptions.
The event in which the individual participated occurred at some 
specific time, and may be remembered as doing so. But, when what we 
regard ourselves as remembering is the individual and not the event, 
no specific temporal location seems applicable. And frequently 
individuals are remembered as participants in, not one event, but a 
series of events, the whole series giving rise to the memory of the 
one individual. The essential feature of any memory of an individual 
is the assumption that there is a single continuous identity. Even in 
remembering an axeman I saw from a passing car, I make the implicit 
assumption that he may have gone on to chop other trees after 1 passed
by.
) I
It is possible, however, for an individual to be bounded, as it 
were, by one single event. The particularly striking pattern once made
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for me by a kaleidoscope is, as a particular pattern of coloured chips, 
an individual entity to which a proper name could be attached, just as 
military operations and tornadoes are frequently known by proper names 
nowadays, but it has neither a past nor a future. In this case the 
individual has no being outside of one single event, and to remember 
that individual is, therefore, always to remember a particular event 
which occurred at a particular time.
We now consider the image-memories. The subject of a vague image 
based upon a series of perceptions can have no fixed temporal location 
except insofar as the series itself has 'outer limits', liven with this 
kind of image we can say 'This is as he appeared between the wars, as 
distinct from the way he has appeared since the last war'. But in such 
cases our right to say this may well depend upon the comparison of the 
image with another image of the same individual on a known occasion, 
or upon remembered propositions about him which have specific time- 
reference. It is difficult to see how else we could make such 
judgments.*
When an image derives from one particular occurrence in an 
individual's life, the subject of that image is, ipso—facto, locatable 
in time. The question 'When was this?' would always be appropriate.
It might be argued that a series of visual presentations which were 
very closely similar could give rise to an image which, so far as its
This question is taken up at length in chapter VIlI. See p. 303ff.
; \
I
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intrinsic properties were concerned, could equally well be of any one 
of those visual presentations or all of them. I might, for instance, 
always park my car in tne same place and have an image of it so parked. 
But whether I can ascribe a particular date to the subject imaged must 
then depend upon such minor details as whether the windows are up or 
down or whether there is a bicycle propped alongside. If such details 
form an essential part of the image, then what is being remembered is 
a particular instance which occurred at a particular time; if they do 
not then what is being remembered is simply the continuous existent, 
my car.
c. Qualities. I have claimed* that we can remember qualities as 
distinct from remembering the things they are the qualities of. This 
may suggest that to remember a quality is always to abstract, that the 
subject of the memory is always a universal. But this would be quite 
wrong. I could remember the particular blue shade of a certain 
evening sky simply as a shade of blue, and yet, in fact, my image 
would have arisen from the particular occasion when I noticed that 
particular evening sky. If we agree with Hume (and here I cannot 
disagree with him) that every image must have its origin in an 
impression or a number of impressions, then it seems possible, in 
principle at least, to locate in time the particular impression or 
impressions from which each image derives. If we avoid the term
____________________ t
1
See p. 65.
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’quality', a term suggestive of abstractions and universals, and 
talk instead of appearance, then it is plainly not only possible but 
necessary that the subject of the memory should be locatable in time.
We can remember an appearance simply as an appearance, and this is, in 
effect, to remember a group of related sensible qualities. The possi­
bility of our becoming aware, when we remember, of the relationship 
between these qualities, i.e., seeing them for the first time as some 
thing, rests upon their being the particular group that they are with 
the particular relationship that they have. There is an obvious sense, 
then, in which the appearance in question is^  an event, the occurrence of 
a particular group of coloured shapes and/or particular sounds, smells, 
and so on, in a particular relationship to each other from a given stand­
point, and as such it is locatable in time like any other event.* 
b ) Memories of events and memories of propositions 
i. Do we remember facts?
Such claims as 'The world is the totality of facts' suggest to
us that a fact is in some way substantial, the same sort of thing as
an event. We use expressions like 'physical fact' when what we
really mean is a fact about physical entities. We cannot point to
2facts, we can only assert them. The fact itself is neither physical 
nor mental. Neither can it be true or false; though the assertion 
1
The 'remembered appearance' is in effect what Russell calls a 
'perspective'. See 'Our Knowledge of the External World', p.94 ff.
2
I can assert that a man is running and draw attention to this fact 
by pointing at the man. But I am not thereby pointing at the fact that 
he is running any more than I am now sitting on a fact because it is a 
fact that there is a chair under me.
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of it is ipso-i'acto true. A fact is simply whatever is asserted by 
a true proposition. If yesterday it rained and tomorrow it will be 
fine, then it is now a fact that yesterday, 6th December, it rained 
and tomorrow, 8th December, it will be fine. And six months hence 
I shall still be correct in saying 'It is a fact that on 6th December 
it rained and on 8th December it was fine. Particular facts are 
timeless, notwithstanding that a specific temporal location may be 
built into the relationship which constitutes the fact. ‘It is a 
fact that the sun is shining now1 means 'It is a fact that the sun 
is shining at 11 a.m. on 7th December 1961', and this must remain a 
fact for all time.
Since a fact is timeless it cannot be past, and cannot, therefore, 
be remembered. We do not need to go into the difficult question of 
whether all facts are necessarily particular or whether there are 
universal facts. For if, for example, 'Lying is immoral' is a fact 
and not simply a directive for the use of English words, then no 
variation of the occasion of uttering 'Lying is immoral* can effect 
the truth of the assertion. I feel, therefore, that it would be 
better not to speak of remembering facts. We may remember the events 
which gave rise to our knowing these facts, and we may also remember 
that we knew certain facts at some past time, but this is to 
remember events, not facts. Our previous knowledge of the facts 
was itself an event, though it was a separate mental event, not the 
physical event which gave rise to our knowledge of the fact in
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question. And, lest it be objected here that we may not recall 
any occasion of such awareness, I hasten to point out that, as I have 
argued above,* the temporal location of an event is not an essential 
part of remembering that event, 
ii. Facts and Propositions
But though facts are not the kind of things we can remember, we 
can and do know them because we remember; and usually what we remember 
are propositions. By remembering propositions we can remember a great 
deal about events without actually recalling the events themselves.
I may be asked 'Do you recall your first day at school?1 and reply 
'No, but I remember that it was raining'. It is here beside the point 
how I came to know that it was raining. We shall assume that it i_s 
a fact that it was raining. The point we are concerned with here is 
that my present knowledge of the fact may simply be my present memory 
of the proposition 'On my first day at school it rained', in this case 
I might have known the fact by other means, I might have remembered 
the event itself, but our knowledge of facts concerning events we did 
not experience must depend upon remembered propositions. When I 
remember that Brutus stabbed Caesar I am not remembering Brutus or 
Caesar or the event; I am remembering the proposition 'Brutus stabbed 
Caesar', and possibly, though not necessarily, the occasion on which 
I learned this fact.
\
1
See p. 70of this chapter
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ill* Inference from events
Frequently, when we assert facts, or alleged facts, i.e., when 
we frame propositions to ourselves or to other people, we are making 
inferences from what we perceive. I assert ’The Professor is leaving' 
because I see what I take to be the event, the Professor driving away, 
though in fact all that I see is his car disappearing. And many 
different inferences can be made from the same perceptual experience, 
some forming part of that experience itself, some occurring later from 
the memory of that experience.
When we perceive we always, to some extent, go beyond 'presented 
appearances'. I visually sense a patch of reddish colour, but I see 
a chimney pot, with three dimensions, a hard surface, and a definite 
function. So that when I remember this experience I can remember both 
tne appearance presented to me and the perceptual judgments I made 
when that appearance was presented to me. In this way a memory is 
frequently a mixture of images and propositions, though, as pointed 
out earlier (the 'clock' and the 'time'), it need not be so.
We not uncommonly change our minds about what we saw, even though 
the 'presented appearance' remains the same. What we took to be a 
menacing figure we later see as merely a busn at tne road side. And 
to change our minds in tnis way it is not essential that we have 
another look at the object. The change may be made 'from memory'. 
Suppose, for example, that i remember a police patrolman waiting at the 
side of the road to pounce on speeding motorists. But, even in my
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memory of him, there is something stiff about this policeman. And 
when, a little further on, I see another exactly similar police 
patrolman and, looking closer, I see that it is only a plywood dummy 
put out by the authorities to frighten motorists into obeying the law,
I realise that my earlier perceptual judgment was wrong - the first 
'policeman’ was also only a dummy. And since 1 was able to make this 
correction on the strength of the memory I had of my earlier perceptual 
experience, 1 might have made it even if I had never encountered the 
second dummy. The point I am making is that the remembered propositions 
are separable from the remembered event. I can still remember the 
proposition 'There is a policeman' but I now realise that it was a 
conclusion to which I 'jumped', and, as it turned out, a wrong 
conclusion. But it is possible for me to realise this only because 
something else, the appearance actually presented to me, is separately 
and correctly remembered. The fact that the second 'policeman' was a 
dummy does not, of itself, show that the first was a dummy also, 
iv. The relationship of proposition to event
If my memory of an event were wholly dependent upon the memories 
of propositions I formed at the time of witnessing that event, then 
nothing in my own memory of that event could prompt me to correct or 
modify those propositions. Therefore we must be careful to distinguish 
between propositions which are themselves remembered and propositions 
made subsequently about what is remembered, bearing in mind that the
latter may themselves be remembered as propositions on a subsequent
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occasion. If yesterday afternoon I saw Jones shake his fist menac­
ingly at Jenkins, then the event I remember is simply Jones shaking his 
fist at Jenkins - whether I saw it as a threat or as a piece of play­
acting. I may remember the proposition (and report the event accordingly) 
either that Jones threatened Jenkins or that Jones joked with Jenkins.
At least one of these propositions would be false, but, as we have 
just seen, remembering a false proposition which reports, or claims 
to report, an event is not necessarily mis-remembering that event.
The'lesser claim' - 'Jones shook his fist at Jenkins' - is still, as 
it were, included in the remembered proposition, and is still correct.
But here we strike a real difficulty. If we say that remembering 
an event just is having an image - remembering an uninterpreted sensory 
intake - and all other, propositional, memory is in some way incidental, 
not memory of the event itself, then we must explain how anything 
wholly uninterpreted could constitute the memory of an event for us.
The only alternative is to allow that some proposition, some inference, 
is an essential part of the memory of the event. And then the problem 
is: where can we draw the line? For it might well be objected at this 
point: wny stop at whether or not the fist-shaking was a threat? That 
what Jones shook was his fist is itself an assumption I made from my 
observation of certain coloured shapes in a certain relationship. Does 
it not follow that no error, however gross, in the reporting of an 
event can ever prove that the event itself is not correctly remembered? 
Once we separate the remembering of propositions from the remembering
; •
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of events which they purport to be about, we can always attribute the 
error to the proposition. Logically no amount of error in reporting a 
past event can prove that the actual memory of that event is 
inaccurate.*
In practice, however, there are perfectly adequate ways of 
deciding in any given case the point at which we must stand firm. For, 
though I may nave the clearest possible memory of uones shaking his 
fist at Jenkins, unless this is augmented by some additional knowledge 
of, say, a long standing dispute between them, it is still reasonable 
for me to say ‘Perhaps he was not really angry, only pretending'• 
Whereas, only if my memory were very vague indeed - perhaps a memory 
of something witnessed in the half-light - would it be reasonable to 
say 'Perhaps it was not his fist at all, it only looked like it'.
If it is allowed, as surely it must be, that a physical event 
always involves physical things, not qualities or appearances, then 
those who insist on regarding the naming and classifying of all 
appearances as inferences are driven to also allow that no event can 
be witnessed in the full sense of that word until some inference has 
been made. I do not wish to suggest that there are two different kinds 
of inference, nor yet two rigid 'levels of inference*; clearly there 
are not. We could come to recognise anger behaviour before being 
able to recognise fists. What I do suggest is that we are all aware
) i
I
Compare the 'sceptic's argument' in the first paragraph of 
chapter I.
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of a difference, on any given occasion, between the things and events 
we ’see straight off', even though we realise that logically we could 
be mistaken in these, and the things and events we infer from those we 
’see straight off’. Both may be framed in propositions which, when 
later remembered, may be regarded by us as belonging to our memory of 
the event. But, whilst we are at liberty to abandon the inferences 
without also abandoning our claims to remember the event, we cannot so 
abandon the initial assumptions from which those inferences were made. 
For instance, in one case I could say 'Yes, I do remember him shaking 
his fist, but I realise now that it was only in fun'. But in the other 
case I would have to say 'I thought I remembered him shaking his fist, 
but apparently he did not do so, and so I must have imagined it1. 
v. Propositions and sentences
It is important, at this point, to make it clear that remembering 
a proposition is not the same thing as remembering a sentence. A 
sentence which could be used to express a proposition might in fact 
be used to express nothing at all. Children often learn and remember 
poems without having the remotest idea what they are about; my daughter 
would recite poems in French (which she certainly did not understand) 
when she was five years old. And it may well be that even in later 
life, in the case of much of the remembering that is manifested only 
in the ability to make appropriate verbal responses, what is being 
remembered is neither the event itself, nor a proposition made about 
it, but simply a sentence, a group of words.
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On the other hand the same proposition can be remembered in a 
variety of sentences. 'My father's brother gave me the price of a 
bicycle on my tenth birthday1 and 'My Uncle Jim gave me five pounds 
the day I turned ten years old’ may well express exactly the same 
proposition, that is, they may well refer to the same remembered event 
and report that event quite correctly - though, clearly, they could 
refer to two quite separate events. We shall consider later* the 
question whether propositions are necessarily jjn language, but whether 
they are or not, they are certainly not necessarily in any particular 
phrasing of language. Those European-born Australians who have 
forgotten how to use their native tongues have not thereby forgotten 
the propositions they formulated in those tongues - but now they 
remember them in English, 
vi. What is being remembered?
It is not easy to decide, however, on every occasion, what it is 
we are rememberings the events themselves, propositions about those 
events, or sentences previously used to express those propositions.
I now remember, together with appropriate images, an event I once 
witnessed, a lion-taming act. Suppose I utter the proposition 'One 
lion jumped over the trainer's back whilst the other remained on the 
stool'. How is it possible for me to know whether this is a 
judgment I am making now based upon my memory-image, or a memory
See p.88 of this chapter.
1
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I am having now of a judgment I made at the time of the event? We 
might be tempted to say that if the details described are actually 
being imaged the former is the case, and if they are not the latter 
is the case. But this will not do. There is no reason why I should not 
remember correctly both the propositions I formed and the appearance 
presented to me. Furthermore, if my imagination is fertile and I am a 
'good visualizer', then the memory of the proposition may well prompt 
me to form an image of the lion jumping over the trainer even though I 
do not have an actual memory-image of the event.
And when we recite to ourselves 'Thirty days hath September...' 
are we remembering a sentence or a proposition or both? It is such 
problems as these which make introspection so suspect as a means of 
investigating memory. Yet, if we are not satisfied with a purely 
behaviourist account, it is the only means we have, or ever can have. 
Even though introspection may not show us on every occasion whether 
what we are remembering is an event or a proposition or a sentence, or 
all of these, it can and does show us that these are all things we can 
remember, and that the remembering of each of them is in principle 
distinguishable.
2• Classification by modes of remembering
a) Images, thoughts and words
We have considered what it is that we remember; we must now 
consider how it is that we remember it. If I say that I am remembering 
the prizegiving and I am asked what form my memory of it takes, I may 
reply that I am having images of it, or that I am 'telling myself
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about it’, or simply tnat I am thinking about it. These seem to be 
the three possible ways of remembering an event: in imagery, in 
words, or in concepts. But this is altogether too tidy. Apart from 
the fact that remembering an event will most probably involve a 
combination of all three ’modes’, the term ’words', as we have seen, 
can refer either to propositions or to sentences; and it may be felt 
that the term 'concepts’ refers to either words or images, rather than 
that it is an alternative ’mode' to them. We must, therefore, examine 
the relationships between these ’alternative modes' more closely, 
i• Words as images
We have decided that when we remember in words we may be 
remembering propositions or we may simply be remembering particular 
expressions.
If what we remember i^s the proposition - as when I remember the 
proposition that my grandfather had white whiskers - it seems tnat we 
are remembering a certain factual relationship perceived in the past, 
but now free, as it were, of the particular perceptual experience in 
which our knowledge of it originated. The memory that my grandfather 
had white whiskers, though quite correct, does not of itself enable me 
to draw a picture of those whiskers. What we are remembering is simply 
a judgment we once made; and we are remembering it in words, though 
not necessarily the same words as we employed to make the original 
judgment.
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But if we are not remembering propositions as such, but forming 
propositions about what we remember» then although the remembering is 
conducted in words, there must be some kind of occurrent memory for 
those words to refer to (or be stimulated by); and since this occurrent 
memory is not £f propositions, the only remaining candidates seem to 
be images or imageless, wordless concepts. Anyone who argues that the 
words refer to, or are stimulated by, simply the remembered physical 
event itself, must explain how it is that sometimes what I saw as A
1 subsequently remember as b /  how it is possible for me to revise or 
modify assertions made from memory without the intervention of any 
'additional evidence'.
When what we remember is simply the words themselves, at least
one of two things must be happening. Either we are simply having images
of words, or we are making appropriate physical responses to a given
2stimulus. The second possibility I shall consider shortly. Here I 
shall try only to substantiate the claim that remembering a sentence as 
such, if it is anything more than a physiological response to a 
stimulus, must be in imagery.
Any symbol must have some sensible characteristics of its own.
To function as a symbol it has to be something visible or audible or 
otherwise experiencable through the senses. Thus to remember symbols,
1
This question is taken up at length in chapter IV.
2
See p. 91ff.
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as distinct from remembering their significance, is to remember sights, 
sounds, bodily feelings and so forth. So to remember words is either 
to have visual or auditory or kinaesthetic images, or else to remember 
propositions about the words themselves. This last is possible. We 
could, for instance, remember that the word ’place* begins with the 
same sound as the word 'please' and ends with the same sound as the 
word 'race*. There is little doubt that linguists often do remember 
words in this way, but such memories can be of use to them only if they 
do have some memory-images of words, the words they are using for 
comparison. Unless, of course, they always spoke these words out loud 
to themselves. But we couiü not. reasonably suggest that a child 
reciting a poem or a man giving an immediate verbal response to a 
question is remembering words in this way. It is true that often, 
having once uttered words, we are immediately aware of their usual 
meanings, as when a child 'parrots' x.he answer to a question asked 
him, and then realises what the words he has used actually mean.
But in this case the words, as such, have already been remembered.
We understand them in the same way as we would have done if they had 
been uttered by somebody else, 
ii. Images and concepts
There is a danger that such words as 'concept', 'thought* and 
'idea* came to mean whatever we want them to mean. Hume used the word 
'idea' as though it were synonymous with 'image', but he allowed it to 
’spread' so as to take in relational properties which are clearly not
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imageable in the ordinary sense. In this way he was able to sidestep 
the problem of 'something in the mind which was not previously in the 
senses'. Others have maintained that to have a concept is simply to be 
able to use the concept word properly. Abstract ideas have been a con­
stant source of embarrassment to philosophers who, whilst paying 
lip-service to Berkeley's dictum that any idea must be the idea of 
something specific, have been uncomfortably aware that we .just do know 
what 'above' and 'after' and 'greater than' mean in a way that is 
something more than just being able to put them in the right places 
in sentences, when there is no instance of them before us, and without 
the necessity of specifically remembering any such instance.
Once it is allowed that it is possible to have a concept without 
also having an occurrent image, the question arises: Are images just 
one kind of concept; or is remembering and imagining in images an 
alternative to remembering and imagining in concepts?
Let us take the ability to recognise instances as coming under a 
particular concept, not as a definition, but simply as a test, of the 
possession of the concept. Then, since by virtue of having an image of 
a wombat I can recognise a wombat when I visit the zoo, the possession 
of an image does seem to meet the test for the possession of a 
concept. But the image itself is not the concept - for I can recognise 
a wombat by virtue of the image I have only if I can also frame the 
proposition about it 'This is an image of a wombat'. We might say then 
that to have an image and identify it as the image of something is to
have a concept of that thing.
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But it would not follow that the possession of a concept must 
always involve the identification of an image. For we also have con­
cepts of relationships - above, below, greater and so on - but we 
cannot have images which could be identified as of these, only images 
wnich exemplify them, provided we already have the concepts. I can 
have an image of a red patch above a blue patch, but not an image of 
aboveness. Aboveness is not even an ingredient of the image in the way 
that the red and blue patches may be said to be.
Further, to possess a concept is at least to be able to recognise 
instances of it. Even if we speak of the concept of a particular 
individual we can do so only because we treat the individual as a 
continuous existent and assert that various manifestations at different 
times are instances of a single concept. Thus a concept must always 
extend beyond any particular instance, involving thereby at least one 
relationship, similarity or continuity, which is itself not even 
exemplified by the image. That is why the judgment ’This is an image 
of a wombat' is required to provide a concept (or establish the exis­
tence of the concept^ where there is already an image. Thus, whereas 
an image may exemplify a concept, and the existence of an image may be 
a prerequisite for a certain kind of concept,* an image, as such is 
neither an alternative to, nor a kind of, concept. Simply having an 
image is not a cognitive act.
I
E.g. particular shades of colour. This question is taken up in 
chapter VII.
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iii. Remembering without words or images
We must now consider the possibility oi* remembering without 
either imagery or language, a possibility which has often been denied 
by members of both Benaviourist and Empiricist schools. I suggest that 
we might in fact be doing this in any of three cases: when we are 
remembering 'by doing’, as when my remembering the way home is mani­
fested simply in ray going Home; when we recognise a presented instance 
without naming it to ourselves, as when I return a greeting though I 
am deep in conversation; and wiien we classify instances in memory, i.e., 
remember similarities, without the help of either names of images.
To my mind the three cases are so strongly connected that to accept 
one of them is to be committed to accepting them at all. Behaviourists 
must accept the first, and most Empiricists would, I think, accept the 
second. This being so, I shall try to show that they have no justifi­
cation for rejecting the third.
a. Remembering by doing. When I simply 'go straight home' this is 
prima-facie evidence that I remember the way, but it is most unlikely 
that 1 have any images of the route, re-presenting x-o me previous 
journeys home, or that 1 formulate propositions to myself about what I 
am doing. Nevertheless going straight home is not a wholly automatic 
performance; I could not do it blindfolded without the aid of images 
and/or remembered propositions. It is essential at least that I 
recognise the route 1 am following. 'Remembering by doing' thus seems 
to reduce to recognising, that is, to one special case of our second 
possibility, recognising presented instances.
' )»
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b. Recognition of particulars and recognition of kinds. Firstly I 
would make the point that it is immaterial to our present argument 
whether the recognition is of kinds or of individuals. Recognition 
always is, or involves, the noting of a similarity. When the similarity 
is sufficiently great and we are also prepared to assume spatio-temporal 
continuity then we speak of 'identity*; but this spatio-temporal 
continuity is always assumed, not observed, or there could be no ques­
tion of recognition. The streets I walk through on my way home are 
the same streets, but they are the same streets at different times, 
and the appearances they present are unlikely to be exactly the same 
on each occasion. Thus the recognition of individuals is simply the 
recognition of kinds with the additional assumption of continuity, and 
it is in no essential way different from that employed by a craftsman, 
a book-binder say, in plying his craft. He also remembers what to do 
without the aid of words or images, though the materials he works with 
are certainly not numerically the same on different occasions, nor 
are they always qualitatively the same. Unless we are prepared to say 
that his skill is only the exercise of a physiologically conditioned 
reflex, we seem obliged to say either that he must be having images or 
forming propositions or else that he does recognise kinds, register 
the similarities of past and present instances, without the aid of 
words or images.*
I
This is not to discount the possibility that his action could be 
purely automatic. See also chapter V, p.176, and chapter VIII, p.235.
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c» Remembering concepts« If it. is possible to recognise instances 
of a concept without the aid of language, and without images for 
comparison, then, insofar as any classification presupposes the com­
parison of present and absent instances, we must have the concept 
in order to recognise the instance. The onus is upon those who deny 
the existence of unnamed concepts to show how classification is 
possible without comparison. I find it difficult to take seriously 
the current view that thinking .just is using language. Tne sponsors 
of this view have never really faced up to the question ’How could we 
ever come to relate concept words to experienced instances unless we 
already had the concepts which these words signify?1. Talk about 
words and concepts evolving 'hand in hand1 is more poetic than 
informative. Nor yet have they explained how it is that dumb 
animals ^and deaf and dumb people) appear to think and remember in 
the normal sense of those terms.
If it is possible to have concepts without names for them, then 
there is no reason why we should not remember having such nameless 
concepts, and also remember in nameless concepts. The refusal to admit, 
and take account of, wordless thinking and remembering is, I believe, 
one of ^he greatest sources of confusion in the consideration of 
memory. All of us are sometimes unable to express ourselves; we fumble 
for words when we 'know very well what it is we want to say'. How
) i
could we know this unless we were already in possession of the concept 
we seek to name? iiven the most fluent language users occasionally find
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that their thoughts have got ahead of their command of language. We 
would not need the aid of a vocabulary to feel surprise at the sight 
of a man walking on the ceiling - but we would need a concept of human 
behaviour.
b) Public and private remembering
i. Overt performances
There are occasions when I have memories wnich I can, if I wish, 
’keep to myself’, and there seem also to be occasions when other 
people could point out to me that I am remembering something though I 
might not myself have realised this fact. In the first case I may 
avow ’I remember - ' because I feel myself competent to relate some 
event, describe some past situation or thing, or perform some task; 
in the second case I may be told that I am remembering because I am 
in fact relating some event, describing some past situation or thing, 
or performing some task, in a way that indicates that I must be 
remembering.
But to say that I must be remembering is to suggest that my 
overt performance is really a clue to something else, to the presence 
of some kind of mental act, and that it is the occurrence of this act 
which entitles me to say 'I remember’. But I do not always say, or 
even think, ’I remember'; this mental act may be inferred, but it is 
by no means always experienced. Why then should an onlooker say 'You 
must be remembering because you are performing learned tasks or 
relating past experiences'? If it is assumed that what is going on
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is an exercise of memory, then, since all that is going on is there 
for him to see, is he not entitled to say 'This (your present per­
formance or speech) is^  your remembering'? Now it should be clear from 
my earlier arguments that I do not hold the extreme view that all 
remembering either is public or could be public, in the sense that its 
privacy is the result only of our talking to ourselves instead of 
out loud. But though remembering can be private, it does not follow 
that all remembering must be private. If ray only reason for saying 
'I remember Jones' were the fact that I found myself describing him, 
or my only reason for saying that I remember how to navigate were 
the fact that I found myself using a sextant efficiently,* then there 
would be at least a prima-facie case for holding that remembering need 
not be private, that the onlooker is sometimes entitled to attest to 
my memory at the same time, and by the same authority, as I am myself, 
ii. habit and memory
There is a tendency to write off a great deal of what I have 
called 'public remembering' as mere habit, or habit-memory. We come 
in time to give certain overt performances seemingly quite automati­
cally. in general, we do not want to say that we remember how to walk, 
and we do want to say that we remember how to cycle. Yet the child who 
'lives on a bicycle' is probably no more conscious of his actions when 
he is cycling than when he is walking. The rationale for the
In chapter V, I give reasons for denying this possibility.
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distinction seems to rest only in the fact that to the question 'Can 
you cycle?', but not to the question 'Can you walk?', it seems 
reasonable to reply 'I used to be able to once - but now I may not 
remember how to'. But a man who has been laid up in hospital for a 
year could make this reply to the question about walking. It may be 
dangerous, therefore, to attribute any performance which might be 
called ‘skilled' to 'pure habit'.
At the same time, what we are here calling habit may well be a 
factor in nearly all our performances. Even in a more complicated case 
like navigation, gripping the sextant correctly and opening the 
Nautical Almanac at exactly the right page are 'habitual' actions.
And the vocal cords, no less than the hands, are susceptable to 'habit'. 
The child reciting a nursery rhyme may be going through the same kind 
of performance in this sense as the habitual cyclist. In the case of 
these vocal performances the distinction I have made between remember­
ing propositions and remembering sentences is plainly important. But 
we cannot simply equate the former with memory-knowledge and the latter 
with habit. As we have seen, remembering sentences is, in many cases, 
simply having images. V/hereas when wre remember propositions it could 
be held that we are remembering past mental events, the fact that our 
reporting of an event is always in propositions does not prove that 
there is any additional mental process going on. The ability to use 
words meaningfully may be itself 'habitual'.
\
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iii. Is habit ever a cause?
The fundamental objection to the whole notion of ’habit-memory' 
is the extreme slipperiness of the term ’habit'. There is a constant 
temptation to equate 'habit' with 'automatic response' whilst still 
using such phrases as 'he was in the habit of choosing his clothes very 
carefully' which suggest that habit is simply characteristic behaviour, 
the often repeated.
If I were to part my hair on opposite sides on alternate days, 
then in the course of a year I should have parted it one hundred and 
eighty-two times on the left side. But that I am in the habit of 
parting my hair on the left side is exactly what we would not say under 
these circumstances. We would say that I am in the habit of alter­
nating my parting. The assertion that an act is habitual is more 
often taken to report the way it is performed than the number of times 
it is performed. Yet we must be careful not to allow 'habitual' to 
become identified with 'automatic' or 'easy'. There is something very 
unsatisfactory about the way that Broaa simply identifies habit-memory 
with ease of remembering. He says: 'Repetition is not essential, 
though it is helpful, for the establishment of a habit-memory-power.
A man, like Lord Macaulay, with a very quick and retentive verbal 
memory, may be able to repeat sentences or sets of nonsense syllables 
which he has met with only once'.1 Surely if this man's memory of
— — ............
’The Mind and Its Place in Nature', p.225.
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these sentences is not, in the first place, dependent upon repetition, 
then there is no reason why it should be classed as a 'habit-memory- 
power' however often it may be repeated.
The same problems apply to performances which are not overt, 
imaging for example. The fact that I now have an image of my father as 
I saw him eighteen months ago does not entail that I have had a similar 
image at any time during the intervening period; nor need we suppose 
that the image in question would be any different if I had. Yet if I 
had the same image regularly we might well say that I am in the habit 
of having it. Now, when 1 have a certain image habitually, is the 
latest occurrence of it causally dependent in some way upon the origi­
nal perceptual experience, or upon the previous occurrence of it, or 
upon the whole series of occurrences of it to date? I do not see what 
grounds we could possibly have for answering this question one way or 
another. I am an habitual smoker in that I smoke cigarettes at very 
short intervals, and it seems reasonable to suppose that the fact that 
I have done so for many years will increase the likelihood of my con­
tinuing to do so. Similarly I may assume that my having a series of 
images of a particular appearance of my father may make it more likely 
that I shall have that image again. But surely this only means that I 
have reason to believe that whatever it is that prompts me to have that 
image is a persistent factor, just as whatever it is that prompts me 
to smoke is presumably a persistent factor. To the question 'Why do you 
smoke?' the answer 'Because it is a habit* is just one way of saying
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'I don't know'; an habitual smoker is simply one who smokes often and 
regularly. Thus ’I smoke because it is a habit’ reduces to ’I smoke 
because I smoke’.
To say that something is done from habit is not wholly uninform­
ative in certain contexts. We may be saying in effect ’There is no 
special or peculiar reason in this case - it is just what 1 always do'. 
But any attempt to give a causal explanation in terms of habit is 
bound to be circular. I could say that it is my habit to have a certain 
image on receiving a stimulus of a certain kind. But the cause of the 
image is the stimulus, not the habit.
What I have said of imaging seems to be equally true of remembering 
in general. 1 may remember the same event in the same way any number of 
times, so that 1 can fairly be said to be in the habit of remembering 
that event. But this seems to have no effect upon the way I remember it. 
We are particularly prone to think of many of our overt skilled per­
formances as ’habit-memories' simply because we assume tnem to be the 
kind of automatic responses which could only arise out of long 
repetition. But if the assumption is correct here, then the proper 
way t,o explain them is in terms, not of habits, but of motor-responses 
to physiological stimuli. And this raises the question whether they 
should be regarded as memories. It is much safer, therefore, to avoid 
the term 'habit-memory' altogether, and concentrate on the question 
whether, and to what extent, overt skilled performances are mere
V I yf
motor-responses, physiological rather than intelligent performances.
9T
We are then faced with such questions as whether, when we 'remember 
how to swim' by actually swinging, as opposed, say, to renearsing 
tne movements on land, we are in fact remembering at all. We may 
be simply allowing our bodies to react to a physical stimulus. But 
this question we must defer to a later chapter.1 
c) Recall and recognition
1. Remembering in presence and remembering in absence
We shall now consider the distinction between recognition and
recall, a distinction which H.H. Price has treated as fundamental to
2the whole analysis of memory. When I recall an individual or an event, 
that individual or event was experienced by me at some earlier time, 
and its only representative, as it were, in the present experience is 
my memory of it. When I recognise something, that something is actually 
present to me; so that I cannot truly be said to be remembering ijb, for
1 am actually experiencing it^ . Therefore what I remember must be 
something about it. Thus there is a sense in which to recognise is 
always to classify.
When I recognise a No. 18 bus I am classifying what is before me as 
one of those buses which take such and such a route, and when I recog­
nise my dog I am classifying what is before me as an episode, if I may 
so put it, in the life of a particular creature. But I do not generally
__________ \1
Chapter V.
2
See 'Thinking and Experience' chapters II and III.
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seem to be remembering specifically any other members of the class of 
No.18 buses or other episodes in my dog’s life. At most 1 seem to be 
remembering that there were such other buses and episodes, 
ii. Recognition as ’public remembering1
I might think to myself ’Here is the No.18 bus’, but on the other 
hand I might simply board the bus 'without thinking at all’. And when 
I reach out to take a book from the shelf I do not always seem to be 
consciously selecting the one I want; sometimes my hand just 'goes out 
to it'. iret, in some sense, I must have associated the bus with other 
similarly routed buses, the book with other uses of it - otherwise why 
do I not constantly board wrong buses and select wrong books? 'The 
right bus', we might say, simply means 'the one that goes the same way 
as that one went’, 'the right book’ simply means 'the one that I used 
last time'. I grant that I do not go through life saying to myself 
such things as 'There is my wife; these are my feet; those are the 
stairs; here is the bannister', each utterance being accompanied by a 
set of memories of former experiences. I simply grasp the bannister 
and run downstairs to where my wife is waiting. Yet I can do this 
only because I do, in some way, recognise all these things for what they 
are - and know, therefore, what to expect of them. So that although 
my behaviour may be the only indication, even to myself, that I am 
recognising things, there would be something misleading about saying 
tiiat the recognition is identical with the behaviour. There is still 
a difference between doing things intentionally and simply doing them
by chance
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iii. Kinds of recognition
There are, of course, different kinds of recognition, but it is 
important to remember that the differences are only of what I have 
called the ’primary’ kind. The main distinction is that between what 
is 'consciously known' and what is merely ’accepted in passing*. 
Recognition i^s recognition always by virtue of the same feature: the 
acceptance of a presented instance as a member of some particular 
class (which may be the class of appearances of a particular individual). 
We cannot, therefore make 'secondary distinctions' in how we recognise, 
only in what we recognise on different occasions.
To recognise a particular person, place or thing is to accept 
what is presented as a manifestation of, or phase in, a particular 
continuous identity. Usually it is to identify the present experience 
with a series of past experiences. For me to recognise my desk is for 
me to accept it as the same desk I have used on a number of previous 
occasions, though these previous occasions need not be separately 
specified in my recognition. It is sometimes claimed that we can recog­
nise individuals we have never seen before. For example, I might say 
’I recognised you immediately from your father's description' or 'I 
recognised the boat from the picture in the brocnure'. But what may 
actually be recognised in such cases is a particular shape or a
particular 'look' which has been seen, or imagined, before. Where I
\
simply accept something is the thing which has been described to me, 
this is not recognition of that thing in any ordinary sense.
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Sometimes what we recogn ise  i s  simply a p a r t ic u la r  q u a lity  in a 
th in g .  When I look at  a p assing  car and see th a t  i t  i s  blue I am 
reco g n is in g  the colour of th a t  car . Probably I do not recognise  the  
car i t s e l f  -  I may have never seen i t  before -  but la t e r  I can d escr ibe  
the car only because I did rec o g n ise  cer ta in  of i t s  q u a l i t i e s .  We do 
not g e n e r a l ly  speak of recogn is in g  q u a l i t i e s ,  only of n o t ic in g  them.
Yet we must do more than n o t ic e  them -  we must n o t ic e  what they are ,  
i . e . ,  c l a s s i f y  them (and g e n e r a l ly ,  though not n e c e s s a r i ly ,  name them); 
and t h i s  is  ^ r e c o g n it io n .  In ordinary speech we are in c l in ed  to  say 
such th in g s  as ’ I n o t iced  th a t  the car was blue -  and recognised the  
shade as a r c t i c  b l u e ' • But t h i s  i s  only because being a r c t i c  blue  
seems to  be the so r t  of th ing  we need to  recogn ise  (reco g n it io n  having  
somehow a suggestion  of d e l ib e r a t io n  about i t ) ,  w h i ls t  being blue does 
not;  i t  i s  too fa m il ia r  to  u s .
C learly  th ere  i s  no f ix e d  ’ l i n e  o f  d is t in c t io n *  between q u a l i t i e s  
we recogn ise  and q u a l i t i e s  we simply n o t ic e .  The p r in c ip le  d if fe r e n c e  
in our use of the  two terms i s  th a t  ’n o t ic e '  does not n e c e s s a r i ly  imply 
th a t  the ob ject  has been seen b e fo r e .  N ev e r th e le ss ,  as soon as we 
name th e  ob ject  n o t ic e d ,  there  i s  an implied assumption th a t  a t  l e a s t  
some of i t s  c h a r a c te r i s t ic s  are being recogn ised .
R ecognition  need not be of p a r t ic u la r  o b je c ts  or q u a l i t i e s .  I can 
rec o g n ise  the  approaching creature as dog or simply as a, dog, and in 
both cases  I am noting  s i m i l a r i t i e s ;  in  the one case between what I 
regard as  ep isod es  in the h is to r y  o f  a s in g le  in d iv id u a l ,  in the other
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case between what 1 regard as a series of different individuals. It 
might be felt tnat recognising my dog is always a more specific 
recognition - that it must already be recognised as a dog before it 
can be specified as nr£ dog. But this is really not so. An infant can 
often recognise his own dog before he even knows of the existence of 
other dogs.
We also can, and often do, recognise the rules which govern our 
behaviour, though simply to obey such rules it not, of itself, to 
recognise them; there seems no reason to believe that brutes ever 
reflect upon the rules according to which they behave. It is when we 
wish to give a causal explanation of any event that we must recognise, 
not only the cause and the effect, but also the cause/effect sequence.
My claim that the china cup smashed because it fell on the stone floor 
rests upon my recognition of the china cup, tne stone floor, and also 
the usual effect upon china cups of being dropped on stone floors.
As I claimed earlier,* 'remembering by doing* involves recognition. 
But, in this case, not only do we have to recognise individuals, rules, 
qualities and kinds, we need also to recognise our performances as 
tnose leading to certain desired ends. Here also, we are recognising a 
rule, but it is a rule which involves our own intentional behaviour. We 
must, in the popular phrase, know what we are doing.
1
See p. 88 of this chapter
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iv. Can there be recognition in absence?
I said earlier tnat the essential difference between recall and 
recognition is that the subject recalled belongs to some former time, 
whilst the subject recognised is actually present to us. But, although 
the thing we recognise is present to us, the recognition must refer 
always beyond the present experience. As 1 put it in reference to the 
recognition of qualities, we must notice what it is. To recognise is 
to note a similarity, so that, although what 1 recognise is the thing 
now before me, my recognising it is my noting of its similarity to 
other things not now before me* The question arises, therefore, 'How 
does seeing an object and judging "That is my dog" differ from remem­
bering an object and judging "That was my dog"?'. Do 1 recognise what 
is 'before my mind' in the same way as I recognise what is before my 
eyes?
We can, if we wisn, simply decide that the term 'recognition' 
shall stand for only one type of classification: the classification of 
present events, things, qualities and relations, and that any other use 
of the term is metaphorical. Such a decision is in any case wise in 
that it avoids possible misunderstandings. But this does not answer 
the questions, it simply avoids them. The real point at issue is 
whether it makes sense at all to talk of recognising objects 'before 
the mind'•
.)
Certainly my present state of mind is something 1 am now experi­
encing and can, therefore, recognise in the ordinary sense - assuming
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that it is classifiable and that I have experienced similar states of 
mind before. 1 can, for instance, usually recognise misery when I 
experience it. And it might be argued that my state of mind when 1 am 
remembering an event includes the event remembered. Out the belief 
which I hold about some thing does not include that thing in any ordi­
nary sense, Clem Atlee is not included in my belief that he is a great
statesman in the way that he was included in the British War Cabinet, 
nor yet in the way that he is included in the denotation of 'British 
Brime Ministers' . And if I remember Clem Atlee my memory does not 
include him. it is of him or about him, and this is quite different.
The sense in which, and the extent to which, we may be recognising 
events and individuals when we are remembering them seem to depend 
upon two questions: whether the event actually remembered is the 
physical event which occurred or the mental event which was our percep­
tion of it, a question we shall take up in the next chapter, and
whether memory-images are in some sense 'before us' in a way that
permits us to scrutinise, and recognise or fail to recognise, them.
This question we shall deal with in chapter VII.
C h a p t e r  IV
MEMORIES AND MEMORY-CLAIMS
1 .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw e e n  re m e m b e r in g  an d  c l a i m i n g  t o  rem em ber 
a )  The p u b l i c  u s e  o f  ’m em ory*
We h a v e  s e e n  t h a t  i t  i s  q u i t e  p o s s i b l e  t o  h a v e  an d  t o  e x p r e s s  
k n o w le d g e  o f  a  p a s t  e v e n t  w h ich  i s  n o t  d e p e n d e n t  upon  any  a c t u a l  
memory o f  t h e  e v e n t  i n  q u e s t i o n .  I  now w an t  t o  make t h e  p o i n t  t h a t ,  
e v e n  when t h e  k n o w le d g e  i s  d e p e n d e n t  upon  an  a c t u a l  memory o f  t h e  
e v e n t ,  t h e  c l a im  t o  t h a t  k n o w le d g e ,  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  p u r p o r t i n g  t o  
r e l a t e  t h a t  e v e n t ,  i s  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  f ro m  t h e  memory by v i r t u e  o f  
w h ic h  I  make t h a t  c l a i m .  My m e m o ry -c la im  ' I  h a d  f i s h  f o r  lu n ch *  may 
be  made b e c a u s e  o f  c e r t a i n  im ag es  I  now h a v e  o f  my l u n c h  a n d / o r  my 
re m e m b e r in g  c e r t a i n  p r o p o s i t i o n s  s u c h  a s  ’T h i s  i s  go o d  f i s h ' ,  an d  
c l e a r l y  i t  w o u ld  be  q u i t e  p o s s i b l e  f o r  u s  t o  h a v e  t h o s e  im a g e s  a n d  
t o  rem em ber t h o s e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  w i t h o u t ,  so  t o  s p e a k ,  a d v a n c i n g  f ro m  
them  t o  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  m e m o ry -c la im ,  ' I  had  f i s h  f o r  l u n c h * .  N e v e r ­
t h e l e s s ,  a s  W i t t g e n s t e i n  h a s  p o i n t e d  o u t , *  a  w ord i n  a  p u b l i c  l a n g u a g e  
m u s t  h a v e  a  p u b l i c  m e a n in g ,  an d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  u s a g e  o f  t h e  w o rd s  
'memory* an d  'rem em ber*  a r i s e s  t h e r e f o r e  f ro m  o u r  m e m o ry -c la im s  
r a t h e r  t h a n  fro m  any  p r i v a t e  s t a t e s  o r  h a p p e n in g s  i n  o u r  m in d s .
1
' I n v e s t i g a t i o n s ' ,  P t . l ,  p a r a . 2 4 2 f f ,  p . 8 8 e .  S ee  a l s o  p a r a . 2 5 7 f f ,  
p . 9 2 e .  B u t  n o t e  t h a t  I  am n o t  c o m m it te d  t o ,  n o r  do I  i n  f a c t  
s u p p o r t ,  W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s  g e n e r a l  v ie w  t h a t  a l l  l a n g u a g e s  a r e  n e c e s s a r i l y  
p u b l i c .
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Thus, the p u b lic  use o f  th e  words ’memory1 and ’ remembering’ must 
r e s t  upon the memory—claim s we make rather than upon what we might 
c a l l  p r iv a te  remembering. By ’private*  here I mean e s s e n t ia l ly  
p r iv a te  in  th e  sen se  o f  being below th e le v e l  o f communication, not 
sim ply in  fa c t  not communicated; my a s se r t io n  about a past occurrence  
i s  as much a memory-claim i f  i t  i s  made to  m yself as i f  i t  i s  made out 
loud to  an au d ien ce . I t  i s  by memory-claims th a t  we o ften  plan our 
conduct and ex p la in  our conduct to  o u r se lv e s . Suppose th a t 1 en ter  
a bar and, r ec o g n is in g  a man I d i s l i k e ,  I avoid m eeting him. My 
a c tio n  may be no more considered  than my avoid in g  walking in to  the  
g a tep o st as I lea v e  my house. But i f  I say to  m yself 'That chap 
cornered me la s t  week and bored me s t i f f  then I am making a d e f in it e  
memory-claim. I t  could have been made to  anybody and would have 
conveyed the same in form ation , 
b ) What does a memory-claim r e fe r  to?
Does my memory—claim  r e fe r  to  a present mental s t a t e ,  a past 
mental s t a t e ,  a past public  ev en t, or a com bination o f a l l  o f th ese  -  
my p resen t mental s ta t e  as r e la te d  to  past even ts?  Before we answer 
‘a l l  o f t h e s e ’ i t  as w e ll to  con sid er  th a t ,  u n le ss  I am d e lib e r a te ly  
in tr o sp e c t in g  fo r  th e  purpose o f examining my own 'remembering 
p ro ced u re ', th ere  seems to  be no reason whatever why I should make 
a claim  about anything but the past p h y sica l event i t s e l f .  This 
i s  what in t e r e s t s  e ith e r  m yself or my l i s t e n e r  i f  th ere  be one. 
N eith er  my l i s t e n e r  nor m yself need be concerned about my mental 
s t a t e s  in  order to  understand the c la im .
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Certainly if I were to say to a friend 'There was a riot here 
last week* he might be interested to know whether I in fact remem­
bered this event or haa simply been told about it. To this extent 
'I remember the riot here last week’ gives him more information than 
does 'There was a riot here last week'. But it is information not 
directly connected with the actual event - the first statement does 
not usually give me (the speaker) any information that the second 
does not. It may be protested here that neither assertion can give 
me any information since I am the one who is making it. But in 
making tbe claim I may be, so to speak, drawing together a group of 
otherwise disconnected recollections, not in order to draw a 
conclusion - I most probably drew the conclusion when I witnessed 
the event - but to provide premises from which to draw further con­
clusions. And for this purpose the addition of 'I remember' is quite 
superfluous. We can fairly conclude, then, that memory-claims refer, 
in normal cases, to the event remembered, not to the particular 
mental state which is the remembering of it. And since it is our 
memory-claims that are of public interest, the reliability of our 
memories must be judged by the accuracy with which our memory-claims 
report past events.
2. The accuracy of memories and memory-claims 
a) The relationship between memory and claim
I have maintained that a memory-claim is a report about a past
event, dependent upon a present mental event, or mental state. But
\
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what is this relationship of dependence? It clearly cannot be 
logical dependence since there is no reason why a true memory-claim 
should not occur without any 'act of remembering' at all, so long 
as we regard the memory-claims simply as a proposition. It must,
JI
therefore, be causal dependence. But even here we can say only 
tnat the memory is a causally necessary condition of the memory- 
claim; it is not both necessary and sufficient since the memory-claim 
may not be made at all, or it may be made wrongly. Nevertheless, 
when a true memory-claim is made there are causal (tnough not logical) 
grounds for supposing that there exists a memory or a group of 
memories which is itself in some sense 'correct'* We must, there­
fore, consider what sense of 'correct' is applicable to the 
actual memories.
It would be a gross mistake to assume that, because my memory- 
claim refers directly to a past event, my present mental state is 
not relevant to it. It is according to historical facts that a 
memory-claim is finally accepted or rejected, but it is by virtue of a 
present mental state that it is made at all. My present memory- 
claim that the film 1 saw was about Don Quixote refers to that film, 
not to the images and propositions now forming in my mind. Yet I do 
in fact make tiiat claim only because those images and propositions 
are now in my mind. A remembered proposition is something quite 
distinct from any particular form of words which might express it.
And an image cannot be expressed in words, only at best described by
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however small its scope, is in fact complete is very difficult, if 
not impossible, to decide* Furlong draws an analogy with the exact
to the clearly focussed object...? I do not think we do. Will 
anyone claim that he has ever had a memory which he could not con­
ceive of being more vivid and realistic?' We may feel that there 
must be some level of particularity at which memories are 'complete' — 
it is hard, for instance, to think what it would be like to have an 
incomplete memory of the colour of my car (it happens to be black), 
yet even here, we may claim that there are different 'shades of 
biack' in different lights, and, be this as it may, to be 'complete' 
is not necessarily to be adequate.
iii. Adequacy of a memory for some specific purpose
If I were to claim that I have a complete memory of my dog this 
would surely amount to my claiming the ability to give a complete or 
full description of my dog by virtue of the memory - and what could 
possibly count as a full description? It is safer, therefore, to 
assess our memories solely in terms of their adequacy for some 
specific purposes. To decide whether my dog was a bull terrier or 
a fox terrier the sketchiest memory of it may serve my purpose, whereas 
if I am trying to decide whether it is ray dog or my neighbour's that
focussing of a telescope and says^ 'But do we ever reach a term in 
increasingly detailed memories] that will correspond
1
'A Study in Memory', p.25.
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the postman is complaining about a most detailed memory of my dog 
may prove inadequate. The adequacy of memory is something quite 
distinct from it3 completeness, its degree of detail.
This does not mean, however, that it is indifferent to the 
degree of detail. The memory, however vague it may be as compared 
with some other memory of the same event, must at least be detailed 
and precise enough to support the memory-claim made, 
iv, Vague memories and faint memories
We must be careful not to confuse what I am calling a vague 
memory with what might be called a faint memory. A memory, like a 
picture or a description, is more or less precise, less or more 
vague, according to the extent that it includes or lacks detail. An 
outline sketch of a building is more vague than a detailed sketch 
or a photograph of the same building - tnough it may serve as well, 
or even better, to identify the building. An outline sketch of the 
Tower of Fisa, for instance, may direct our attention immediately 
to those features by which we have come to recognise it, whilst the 
detail included in a photograph may draw our attention away from 
them. In the same way a wealth of detail in the memory of an event 
may distract our attention from the very feature of the event with 
which we are most concerned. In his book 'Defeat Into Victory’
Field Marshall Sir William Slim relates how, by having in his mind 
the sketchiest possible map of the area under his command, he was 
able to conduct his campaign in Burma unfettered by trifling
no
detail and to keep his appraisal of the situation constantly in 
perspective.
It is important to note that vagueness (which is in any case a 
matter of degree) is not essentially correlated with faintness. The 
figure in a brightly lit room is more vague seen through frosted 
glass than seen through clear glass, but it is not necessarily more 
faint. In the case of clear and faint memories the analogy which 
naturally springs to mind is with things seen in good and bad lights, 
but we must be careful not to take tnis too literally. We do not see 
memories in general though we do sometimes talk of seeing memory- 
images. It may be better, to describe faint memories as those which 
are elusive in the sense that we cannot fix them. They seem to 
flicker through our minds and remain just 'beyond our grasp', as 
when I have a name 'on the tip of my tongue'. But the elusiveness 
of such memories does not prevent their being detailed and precise. 
The image I now have of a childhood friend and which 1 have such 
difficulty in 'holding' seem3 to be, in itself, a most comprehensive 
image•
v. Vagueness and inaccuracy
I want now to consider the relevance of vagueness of memories 
and of memory-claims respectively to the accuracy of memory-claims.
On this question Bertrand Russell has some most interesting things 
to say. He points out that a memory is no less precise because it is 
in fact wrong - 'provided some very definite occurrence would have
Ill
been required to make it true'.* And allowing the distinction I 
have made, what he says is equally true of both actual memories and 
memory-claims. He continues ’It follows from what has been said 
that a vague thougnt has more likelihood of being true than a precise 
one. To try to hit an object with a vague thought is like trying to 
hit a bullseye with a lump of putty: when the putty reaches the 
target it flattens out all over it, and probably covers the bullseye 
along with the rest. To try to hit an object with a precise thought 
is like trying to hit a bullseye with a bullet.’ This is a good 
analogy; it brings out very well the inverse relationship between 
precision, or wealth of detail, and probable accuracy. But it is 
important to note that for the purposes of our first question - the 
effect of vagueness or precision in the actual memory itself upon the 
memory-claim - we are ^to adhere to his analogy) throwing the target 
at the putty, not the putty at the target. At tnis level we are not 
concerned with whether the memory-claim is in fact true or false, 
only with whether or not it truly reports the 'remembering state of 
mind'• There is a greater danger of error in reporting a complex 
and highly detailed 'remembering state of mind' than in reporting a 
vague and sketchy one. The danger is that some of the details,
possibly important and relevant refinements, will be left out of
; \
the memory claim or misreported as a result of its complexity.
'The Analysis of Mind', p.182.
1
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On the other hand, whilst a vague memory properly reported is 
comparatively immune from the risk of error, it may well be that 
such a memory is inadequate for the claim I want to make i.e. for 
the premiss I need for my current train of thinking. And when this 
happens there is an obvious tendency to supply the missing detail 
from imagination. This gives rise to the quite different point - the 
point which Russell is in fact making in the passage quoted above 
(though he does not use the expression ’memory-claim') - that the 
degree of precision of a memory-claim is inversely proportionate to 
the likelihood of its own factual accuracy.
Thus we have two quite distinct ’risks’ here: (l) that the 
memory-claim will fail to report properly the remembering state 
of mind because of the detailed complexity of that state of mind, 
and (2) that the memory-claim will misreport the actual event due 
to the poverty of detail in the memory itself. However, although we 
can separate these two 'risks’ in principle we must consider them 
together. For the ’actual memory' is not inspectable, only at 
best introspectable; the only discrepancy we can demonstrate is 
that between the actual event and the memory-claim about it. Let us 
regard this as the 'total area of possible error' and try to find 
and eliminate the specific points of possible breakdown within it.
As this enquiry must hinge very largely on the question of vagueness 
and precision, our first task is to consider in greater detail just 
what it is for a memory to be vague.
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b) Determinateness oi memories*
Any memory-claim, whether publicly or privately made, tends to 
give rise to further questions, i claim to remember entering a public 
bar and talking to a man there. I am then asked, or ’ask myself’ 
'Which public house? ivhat kind of man?’, ana so on. Now, it may be 
that 1 am unable to supply answers to these questions at all. In 
this case my memory is comparatively indeterminate and my memory-claim 
cannot (legitimately) be augmented. But if I am able to’ reply - 'He 
was a tall chap with a foreign accent in the King's Arms’ further 
questions will arises 'What kind of foreign accent? What did you 
talk about? What did he actually say?'. It is always possible to 
ask for more precise details which a more detailed memory of the 
actual experience could furnish, and sooner or later we must find our­
selves unable to reply. Whatever may be the position at a ’retention' 
or 'dispositional' level - this is a question for psychologists and 
physiologists to decide - it seems certain that, as far as occurrent
memory goes, we never can remember every detail of every experience.
2As Stout has said, 'How is it that I can recall in a few minutes 
experiences which occupied twelve hours? Only by omission. We 
simply make an outline sketch, in which the salient characteristics 
of things and events and actions appear, without their individualising 
1
I am using the term 'determinate' throughout in the manner exempli­
fied by H.H. Price in 'Thinking and Experience,'chapter 1.
2
'A Manual of Psychology', p.143.
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details. Mere forgetfulness in part nelps to make this possible...’. 
And it is important to note that tne omissions are not generally of 
'whole incidents' so much as of precise detail from all the incidents.
It must be borne in mind, of course, that something at least 
analogous occurs in direct perception. We cannot notice every detail 
and we are obliged, even with what is actually before us, to schematise 
and classify comparatively indeterminately. What I see as simply a 
group of people is in fact ten men, four women and eight children.
But the point here is that the omissions of memory are further imposed, 
as it were, upon the perceptual experience; we cannot remember what 
we did not in some sense notice, but also do not remember a great deal 
that we did notice. So that, although the memory of some small 
specific event, some particular action or a person's appearance, may 
be highly determinate; every memory will tend to fall short to some 
extent of what in the physical circumstances it could have been.
Now, any memory—claim which is more determinate than the claim 
on which it is nased is in obvious danger of being false. Suppose 
for example that a man claims to remember meeting three Norwegians 
in the pub when in fact he had met three Danes. There are several 
possible explanations: (l) he actually remembers meeting three 
Scandinavians and says 'three Norwegians' simply from carelessness 
or for the sake of simplicity, (2) he actually has a memory of meeting 
three Scandinavians but at the time of making his memory—claim he 
took his memory to be one of meeting three Norwegians, or (3) at the
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time of the encounter he judged them (wrongly) to be Norwegians, 
and correctly remembered this false judgment.
Y/hichever of these explanations applies these facts are the
: )
same: he actually had a meeting with three big blond men with foreign 
accents, whom he rightly took to be Scandinavians, and at some stage 
he has increased the determinateness of his claim by moving from 
’Scandinavian’ to ’Norwegian' - as it happens, wrongly.
There is an obvious similarity here to ray earlier example1 of 
the boy who remembered an event without realising that he remembered 
it. This I held to be possible because every physical event can 
be described, correctly, in an almost limitless number of different 
ways. In that case the noises the boy heard were in fact made by an 
event which could have been described as the delivery of the coal, 
though, as it happened, he gave a description which was less deter­
minate within the frame of reference in question. Remembering loud 
noises is less determinate than remembering coal-delivery noises - 
the latter is a sub-species of the former. I say 'within the frame 
of reference' because for a different purpose or from a different 
viewpoint quite different considerations could apply. Remembering 
the exact number of bumps, for instance, is more determinate than 
simply remembering a bumping noise, but for the question in hand it 
happens to be irrelevant. In the case we considered the memory-claim
1
See p.66.
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'I heard the coal being delivered’ would have been justified if it 
had been made because the noises would have been correctly identified 
as members of the more determinate class, coal delivery noises. Yet 
the only difference between this and the 'Norwegians’ case is that in 
the latter the determination of the 'tall blond men with Scandinavian 
accents' as 'Norwegians' is not justified by the facts.
It is true that we could ask ourselves 'What else could they 
have been?' hut, by the same token we could ask ourselves what else 
the coal-noises could have been - and could find alternative answers. 
The difference between the two cases seems to be simply in the facts, 
and if we always had independent evidence of the facts we should 
not need to trouble ourselves about justifying memory-claims at all.
As it is the determination of our memory-claims must be justified, on 
most occasions, by the nature of the memories themselves. The 
question is 'What degree of probability can ever justify a greater 
determination in our memory-claims than in our actual memories or 
our original perceptual judgments, and in what sense justify it? Now, 
this would be an idle question if such over-determination were in any 
case both illicit and unnecessary. But if it is found to be necessary 
the question of its being illicit simply cannot arise - and conside­
ration shows that it is_ necessary. We are constantly obliged by mere 
pressure of time and the conduct of our affairs to 'take a chance' to 
some extent, in the choice of classification words in both our 
perception and our memory claims. I pass in the street a man wearing
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a grey airforce-ish uniform with what looks like a Polish insignia, 
and later, when I am trying to recall what sort of people were 
about, I claim to remember passing a Polish Airman. 1 wake in the 
morning and I hear twittering noises outside my window. Later, when 
1 am trying to remember what sort of morning it was, I claim to 
remember that there were birds twittering outside my window. And my 
memory-claims would be the same whether or not I had said to myself 
at the time 'This is a Polish Airman1 or 'There are birds about'. 
When we 'take a chance' in determining any experience we usually do 
so in the light of what we might reasonably expect to be the case.
My identification of the twitterings as bird noises arises very 
largely from my awareness of the likelihood of there being birds 
about. Probably our man's assumption that the Scandinavians were 
Norwegians arose from his knowledge that there were Norwegians in 
that town. And just as the Scandinavians were in fact Danes, the 
twitterings could have come from a squeaky mangle and the uniformed 
man could have been an elaborately dressed taxi-driver. Yet how 
hard it would be to protect ourselves against these possibilities 
of error in our memory-claims. If, at every stage, we confined our 
reports to what we actually were remembering - the sounds, the 
sights, the judgments made on the spot - the effect would be quite 
stultifying; we could never make any effective pronouncement without 
a full-blown enquiry beforehand.
(
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But the saving factor - and this is terribly important - is that 
it is always open to us on any given occasion to say ’Wait - what am 
I actually remembering?’ We can then exercise the care necessary to 
avoid over-determining the memory-claim, by focussing our attention 
upon the points at which it is likely to be over-determined and, 
therefore, in need of further supporting evidence.
3. Public and private objects of memory 
a ) States of mind and states of affairs
The question asked in the preceding section, ’What am I actually 
remembering?', would include in its answer, as we saw, 'judgments 
made on the spot' - but what if these judgments were in any case 
wrong? Is there no way of getting past them, as it were, to the event 
itself? And so we come to the question, foreshadowed in the previous 
chapter, whether the event we remember is the actual physical event 
itself or the mental event which was our perception of that physical 
event - whether we recall the state of affairs or the state of mind 
engendered by that state of affairs. We have already decided that the 
memory-claim normally refers to a past event, not to the present 
remembering of it. And, except in those cases where the subject of 
memory is specifically a state of mind, e.g. 'I remember feeling 
depressed yesterday', it refers to a past physical event - a state 
of affairs. But this decision arose out of the distinction between 
memory and memory—claim. It does not follow, therefore, that the 
memory itself is £f the state of affairs. It may well be that when
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1 claim ’There was a riot here last week* what I am actually remem­
bering is my own past perceptions of certain people, my judgments 
about those perceptions, and my feelings of apprehension.
This question is raised by Von Leyden who seems to be in no doubt
that the 'real object* of a memory of an event is what we could
broadly call our state of mind on perceiving that event. He says
’In the case of memory we can never even attempt to recall anything
but the way in which we happened to perceive an event in the past;
and by the time we remember our past perception of the event it
has become something incorrigible, final and irrevocable'.* Now, I
have argued at length in chapter III that such judgments are neither final
nor irrevocable, the fact is tnat we frequently d£ amend in memory the
errors made in perception. Hut this does not alter the fact that
nothing can recur to our minds that has not previously entered our
minds. I have heard it argued that there is an equally good case for
2claiming that what we perceive is always a state of our own minds, 
but this argument overlooks the 'second event* nature of memory.
Our perceiving it is a state of our own minds, that is, a mental event, 
but what we perceive is there before us. To put it rather crudely:
T
'Remembering', p.bl - Von Leyden is not, however, wholly consistent 
in m s  position. He says, e.g. (p.36) 'For instance we can remember 
one event resembling another event without having been previously 
aware of their resemblance'.
2
E.g. This argument is put forward by M. Deutscher in his review of 
'Remembering* in MIND Vol. LXXI, 1902, p.278.
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if we allow that there are minds and there is a physical reality 
known to them, then perception is a relationship between the raind 
and that physical reality. But, that relationship having once been 
established at a present level, remembering can then occur as a 
relationship between past and present mental events. The present 
mental event (the remembering) is connected to the past physical event 
through the agency of the directly remembered past mental event which 
was the perception of it. Certainly it is difficult to see what 
remembering an event could be other than remembering our perceiving 
that event. And, since the memory-claim refers always to the public 
event, there is a relationship between claim and physical event 
parallel to that between memory and mental event. We could set this 
out in a simple diagram (figure l).
Mental (private) Physical (public) Mental (private) Physical (public)
Perception and^ State of Perception and^_____ State of
judgment ^ affairs judgment Affairs
'ymemory ---------- f memory-claim'
_____________ ' Figure 1___________
s/memory U ' -----^ memory-claim
Figure 2___________
It may well be objected here that, despite Von Leyden's 
assertion to the contrary, we can and do revise our perceptual judg­
ments, as shown in Chapter III, and that there must therefore be at 
least some direct connection between the physical events themselves 
and our memories, there must be some part of those memories untainted
i
by attitudes or judgments. How else, it may be asked, can we justify
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such revisions, even to ourselves? Surely t-he diagram ought to be 
modified as shown in figure 2«
But, whilst I shall in fact argue for such a modification, this 
objection, as it stands, is not conclusive. We can make any number 
of judgments about the same event, some of which may be found at the 
memory level to be incompatible with each other in the light of facts 
we know otherwise (i.e. of other remembered propositions). Suppose, 
for example, that on passing a football ground I make, inter-alia, the 
following observations: This is Old St. School football ground; two 
teams are playing each other; one side is wearing black and yellow 
jerseys; the other side is wearing red and blue jerseys; black and 
yellow are the New St. School colours. Old St. School is playing New 
St. School at football. And subsequently I make the memory-claim 
'I saw Old St. playing New St. at football on Old St. ground’. But 
i*' only then occurs to me that Old St. School wear green football 
jerseys. I must therefore amend my claim to the less determinate 
one 'I saw New St. School playing another team on Old St. School 
ground' . My reason here for amending a remembered judgment is simply 
my remembering a set of other judgments.
Von Leyden's view would commit us, nevertheless, to a conclusion, 
which is very hard to accept. For if he is right, then even apart from 
the possibility of misremembering, we could never be sure that a 
memory-claim is a t»rue report of an actual past event. The certainty 
we feel about our perceptions arises very largely from the fact that,
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though we can and do make mistakes, we can always look again. The 
very similar certainty I feel about my considered memories suggests 
very strongly that in memory also I can ’look again' at least at some 
element or feature of the remembered event; that within the memory, 
or as part of the remembering, there can be re-manifested some element 
of this physical event itself, something below the level of interpreta­
tion, to provide a basis of actual contact with the past ’state of 
affairs’. I shall argue later that this ’physical element' is our 
'brute sensory intake’ as retained and reproduced in imagery. But I 
think we must allow that, insofar as what is remembered is a perceptual 
judgment, however indeterminate it may be, the direct object of a 
memory is a mental, not a physical, event, 
b) Mental and Physical referents of memory
i. Propositions about facts and propositions about attitudes
It should, of course, be kept in mind that the events which are 
the proper subjects of memory—claims — let us call them the referents 
of memories - though usually physical, public events, may in many 
cases include — and quite properly so — much that was mental and 
private. If what is being recalled is actually a past state of mind 
then clearly not only the perception of past physical events, but 
also attitudes towards them and conjectures about them must enter 
into the memory. 1 could, for instance, make the memory-claim ’When 
I realised what had happened I was just horrified'.
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Consider these passages from Furlong: ‘When I compare these two 
events, the original event and the remembering of it, wnat strikes me 
is not the difference but rather the resemblance. My state of mind when 
remembering is extraordinarily like the state of mind I am recalling1 2.* 
And a little later, 'On the occasion of recall, there is the sensory, 
or quasi-sensory, element, but there is also, and this is the important 
point, the propositional element. I am aware of imaged watchface, and
1 respond to this datum by thinking, That was my watch. Tne proposi­
tion is there, though its tense has changed. Similarly as I recall 
the ticking, I also recall tnat I wonaered whether cleaning was 
needed. In other words, when we remember a past occasion we do not 
merely reproduce the sensory data in imaged form, we reproduce or 
image, more or less completely, our whole state of mind on the remem­
bered occasion'.“
These passages draw attention to what we might call the subjective 
element within the remembered state of mind, but they do not make 
clear the quite important difference between propositions about states 
of affairs in the world, such as 'This is my watch', and propositions 
about mental states, such as 'I wonder if it needs cleaning'. Both 
propositions may belong, as it were, to the state of mind, but, as 
propositions, they are concerned with quite different sorts of things.
1
'A Study in Memory’, p.74.
2
'A Study in Memory', p.?5 (his italics).
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ii. Memory-images and imagination images
A simple way of differentiating remembered propositions which 
purport to refer to physical events from remembered propositions which 
do not so purport is to consider whether what is claimed is imageabie 
in the ordinary sense; whether or not it is in fact imaged does not 
matter. I could have an image of a watch held in my hand, but I do 
not know what it would be like to have an image of wondering whether 
it needs cleaning - nor yet of thinking it a handsome watch. Furlong's 
rather odd phrase 'Image the whole state of mind' obscures this 
distinction.
But this ’imageability test* will not serve to distinguish a 
proposition which correctly reports the physical event from one which 
reports a mere assumption made about it. Suppose I see a group of men 
enter a public meeting, perceive (quite correctly) that they look like 
ruffians, and conjecture that their intention is to break up the 
meeting. This conjecture may in fact be quite wrong; these men may 
be supporters of the speaker; but, assuming that I leave the meeting 
without learning this fact, I may well subsequently claim to remember 
that a group of ruffians came in to heckle and break up the meeting. 
And the proposition 'There were hecklers present' lends itself just 
as well to imagery as the proposition 'There were rough-looking men 
present’. The fact that in the latter case the images would (or 
could) be memory-images whereas in t.he former they must be imagination 
images can help us only if we have some way of distinguishing between
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these. Even assuming that we have such a means, quite apart from 
the fact that we have now shifted from 'imageability' to 'memory- 
imageabiiity1, the test could never be conclusive. For there could 
well be propositions which were in fact formed according to the 
event as actually presented to us, but wdiich, when remembered, were 
accompanied by imagination images - or were not accompanied by images 
at all.
At this stage, then, we must be content to distinguish those 
remembered propositions which purport to refer to physical events 
from those concerned with other matters, such as how we felt and what 
we wondered. By subjecting the former group to a careful scrutiny 
in the light of what we take to be our memory-images and the coherence 
of the remembered propositions themselves, we can achieve at least 
some measure of security against confusing remembered conjectures with 
remembered perceptions.
iii. Applicability to non-event memories
Before leaving this question it should be pointed out that 
wnat 1 have said applies equally to memories of individuals and of 
qualities. I may 'remember' the presence of Jones at a particular 
gathering because in fact i supposed at the time that he was there. 
And the decision I made that a car standing under a greenish street 
lamp would look pale blue in normal daylight can all too easily be 
remembered subsequently as my seeing the car to look pale blue, 
l'hose parts of the remembered state of mind concerned with what
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tn in g s  were l i k e ,  can a s  e a s i l y  g iv e  r i s e  t o  t h i s  ty p e  of e r r o r  in  
th e  memory-claim as  th o se  p a r t s  of th e  remembered s t a t e  of mind con­
cerned  w ith  now th i n g s  were behav ing .  I f  I had to  g iv e  a name to  th e  
e r r o r  o f  remembering c o n je c tu r e s  as  p e rc e p tu a l  judgm ents , 1 would 
c a l l  i t  ' s u b j e c t i v e  n a i f - t ru x » n /obj e c t i v e  f a l s i t y ' .  W hils t  th e  
memory-claim i s  f a l s e ,  th e  memory i t s e l f  i s  a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  t r u e ;  
what i s  remembered was p a r t  o f  th e  e a r l i e r  s t a t e  o f  mind, bu t i t  
was c o n je c tu r e ,  n o t  c o n c lu s io n ,  about th e  p e rc e iv e d  e v e n t .  And i t  
i s  n e c e s s a ry  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h i s  c a se  from th o s e  c a se s  where a 
genu ine  p e r c e p tu a l  e r r o r  i s  p e rp e tu a te d  in  memory, and which we might 
c a l l  ' s u b j e c t i v e  t r u t h / o b je c t iv e  f a l s i t y '  o f  memory. Both ' s u b j e c t i v e  
t r u t h ' ,  and ' s u b j e c t i v e  h a l f - t r u t h '  k in d s  o f  e r r o r  seem to  be 
always p o s s ib le  i n  th e  memory-claim r e l a t i n g  to  an e v e n t .  In 
s e c t io n  5 I s h a l l  c o n s id e r  how, and to  what e x t e n t ,  th e y  can be 
guarded  a g a i n s t .  But i t  i s  as  well t o  n o te  a t  t h i s  p o in t  t h a t  th e s e  
e r r o r s  a re  s im ply n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  to  memory-imagery as  such .  Only 
when a judgment o r  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  has been made can t h e r e  be a m is­
ta k en  judgment o r  m i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
4 .  N ega tive  remembering o r  remembering by d e f a u l t  
a) The d i f f i c u l t y  of s e p a r a t in g  memory from c la im
I now want t o  c o n s id e r  a c l a s s  o f  memories in  which, on th e  
face  of i t  a t  l e a s t ,  th e  memory seems to  be i d e n t i c a l  w ith  th e  memory- 
c la im . A memory-claim i s  n o t  simply a c la im  to  be remembering some­
th in g ;  i t  i s  a c la im  to  know something th ro u g h  th e  agency o f  memory
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alone. The memory-claim refers to a past state of affairs, not a 
present state of oiind. I am therefore making a memory—claim when I 
attend an identification parade and claim 'The man I saw yesterday is 
not here'. Perhaps I am remembering the man I saw yesterday, but this 
does not seem to be necessary. All I need know to make the claim is 
that he is not any of these people before me. Thus my memory seems to 
just be my claim 'He is not here'.
Again, if someone asserts 'Fred's house had a green roof' I may 
deny this either because I in fact remember that it had a red roof or 
because I simply remember that whatever colour roof it may have had, 
it did not have a green one. My memory-claim may be the same in both 
cases - 'It was not green' - but in one case it is supported by an 
actual memory, the memory of a red roof on Fred's house, in the other 
case it does not seem to be supported at all; the remembering seems to 
consist wholly in the framing of the proposition which is the memory- 
claim.
b) Remembering what is not the case 
i. As recognition
The ’identification parade' situation is perhaps the commonest 
case of negative remembering, and it might be felt that this is simply 
a case of recognising what i_s present as other than what we are 
seeking. Yet, to recognise that something is not the one we want, 
either we must actually recognise the presented article, as when I 
identify and reject my wife's comb in searching for my own, or we
128
remember the sought article, and fail to find it amongst those 
offered, as when I reject a number of nondescript and unfamiliar 
combs in searching for my own. There does not seem to be anything we 
could properly call 'negative recognition*• On the one hand there is 
positive recognition, on the other hand failure to recognise. If I 
wanted to return to a house I had once seen but about which I could 
recollect little or nothing, I may well walk along the street hoping 
that when I did come to the right house 1 could recognise it. But 
if I v/ere successful this would surely mean only that on seeing the 
house I then recollected things I had earlier failed to recollect. So 
long as something is actually presented for our perception either it 
is, or it is not, recognised as what it is. 
ü • As recollection
In recollection of the past, however, the question is much 
more difficult. Nothing is being 'presented to us' independently of 
our own minds. What I am remembering as not tne case is in some way 
an idea in my own mind; but where does it arise from and what kind 
of idea can it be? IIow can I remember that Fred’s roof is not green 
or that I did not go to the theatre last Saturday unless I remember 
what colour Fred's roof is^  and what I did do last Saturday? In some 
way I must be entertaining the idea and rejecting it, but it is by no 
means easy to see how I entertain it nor why I reject it. Perhaps 
I am able to 'picture' Fred's house and 'try out' a green roof in my 
’picture’. But I may be quite competent to make the memory-claim,
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’Fred's  roof i s  not g r e e n ' ,  without being ab le  to  'p ic tu r e '  Fred's  
house at a l l .  And even i f  1 can 'p ic tu r e '  i t ,  th ere  are lo t s  of  
d if f e r e n t  greens; how can I be sure th a t  I have ' t r i e d  out' a l l  o f  
them? In the ' th e a tr e '  case t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  even more obvious.
I might be able to  'p ic tu r e '  a v i s i t  to  the  th e a tr e ,  though I do not 
qu ite  know what t h i s  would be l i k e ,  hut i t  would be qu ite  h op e less  
to tr y  to  run through 'p ic tu r e s '  of a l l  the p o s s ib le  v a r ia t io n s  o f  
such a v i s i t .
In some c a se s ,  of course , we may simply be remembering a n eg a t iv e  
judgment made in the  p a s t .  I might for  in s ta n ce  observe th a t  the  
Regal cinema i s  not showing 'H e l l ' s  A ngels' w ithout observing what 
i t  i s  showing, and subsequently make the memory-claim 'The Regal was 
not showing " H ell 's  Angels" l a s t  n i g h t ' .  But 1 do not th ink  we can 
account for  a l l  our n eg a t iv e  memories t h i s  way. I do not go around 
making such judgments as 'That roof  i s  not green' except in very rare  
circum stances.
He seem, then, to  have two problems with n eg a t iv e  r e c o l le c t io n :
( l )  Except in an ' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  parade' s i t u a t io n ,  where we are  
d e l ib e r a te ly  try in g  to  render an indeterm inate memory more determ inate ,  
where do memories o f  'what i s  not the case ' a r i s e  from? (2) How can 
we a s s e r t  'This was not the case ' except on the au th o r ity  o f  a 
memory of what was the case?
130
c) The positive element in negative memories 
i. The presentation of the hypothesis
To the first question the only answer I can give is that negative 
memories do not arise except in some kind of 'identification parade' 
situation. I am satisfied that when we make a negative memory—claim 
this is always in the course of attempting to answer some positive 
question, even though we may not consciously have posed that question 
to ourselves* Always something has reminded us of a past situation 
and sent our memories in search of details of it*
It may be unwise, however, to be too precise about just how 
this occurs. Bertrand Russell considers the well-known case of 
entering a familiar room where a new picture has been hung on the wall 
and being conscious of a sense of unfamiliarity. He says* 'In this 
case it is fairly clear what happens. The other objects in the room 
are associated, through the former occasion, with a blank space on 
the wall where now there is a picture. They call up an image of a 
blank wall which clashes with the perception of the picture'. Whilst 
this account is no doubt feasible, I am afraid I find it far from 
convincing. There is something rather odd in the suggestion that the 
objects in the room 'call up an image of a blank wall' and I personally 
have never been conscious of such an image on such an occasion. The 
simpler explanation is that the picture itself is unfamiliar to us
r
'The Analysis of Mind', p.178.
131
whereas the rest of the room is not, and we are therefore surprised 
by our failure to recognise it.
I think Russell's explanation would be more plausible if the 
room had simply been rearranged and the picture moved. For then 
the separate items of furniture would all be equally familiar and the 
sense of unfamiliarity could attach only to the room as a whole, 
and we might well feel that some image or memory of the room as it 
had been must exist to account for the sense of unfamiliarity. But, 
even here, it could be maintained that no separate memory of the 
past situation is needed. The recognition of the individual items 
is not accompanied by the recognition of the room as a whole, and 
once more there is a clash of the familiar and the unfamiliar. Our 
recognition of what was and still is the case, the appearance of 
the individual items of furniture, forces our attention to what was 
not the case, the present appearance of the whole room. We then 
speculate in a vague sort of way about how the furniture used to be 
arranged, and in doing so set up a series of hypotheses which we 
can accept or reject.
Or to take a quite different case: suppose I am reminded by 
an overheard conversation both of the way people talk in South 
Wales and of the way a former colleague of mine talked. What could 
be more natural under these circumstances than to remember that my 
former colleague was not a Welshman, whetner I do remember where he
came from or not? Our thoughts of things and events experienced in
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the past are usually stimulated by present perceptions or by present 
trains of thought. It is quite natural, therefore, that these thoughts 
should include some hypotheses which are disconfirmed, as well as 
those that are confirmed, by memory. I think it is safe to say that 
on those occasions (if there be any) when a memory comes to us com­
pletely out of the blue, it must be a positive memory, 
ii• The right of rejection
The second question - How we are able to reject these hypo- 
tneses?' - is already partially answered. In remembering that my 
colleague was not a Welshman 1 am not necessarily remembering what 
nationality he was, but I am certainly remembering him in some way.
And similarly within the memory-claim 'Fred's house did not have a 
green roof' is the covert memory-claim that Fred did have a house, 
and the implication that, in some way, I am remembering Fred's house.
It is apparent, therefore, that negative memory situations can 
be explained very largely in terms of levels of determinations. The 
negative memory—claim arises because we are seeking to further 
determine our memories. The relatively undetermined memory provides 
the basis for the 'identification parade'; the 'probabilities’ 
arising from our current perceptions and their associations provide 
the 'candidates’. Thus, even when no successful candidate is forth­
coming, there is some positive remembering, however, indeterminate, 
which enables us to say 'No, it was not like that'.
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Thus whenever I am remembering how or what a thing was not, I 
am also remembering, at a lower level of determinateness, how or 
what it was. And so, even in the case of negative remembering, the 
memory-claim is not wholly unsupported by an existent ’remembering 
state of mind'. My memory-claims about what was not the case, refer, 
like any other memory-claims, to the actual event, what was the case«
5. Testing memory-claims
a) The possibility of testing by introspection
In this chapter I have claimed that: (l) Whether what is being 
remembered is an event, an individual or a characteristic of an 
individual, a distinction can be made between the memory-claim and 
the memory occurrence on which it is based, and (2) It is the memory- 
claim which establishes the knowledge of past occurrences which enables 
us to pursue our remembering and reasoning; these develop, as it were, 
according to the statements we make to ourselves, not according to our 
evidence for making those statements. Our chief concern, therefore, is 
how the truth of memory-claims can be established - what is to count 
for and against them.
It must be emphasised here that I am speaking of claims arising 
from current remembering. Dispositional claims, e.g., that I can 
remember a poem, or remember how to tie a clovehitch, do not entail 
that I am remembering anything except the propositions,’I can 
recite...’ or ’I can tie a clovehitch'. In these cases I am simply
claiming to have a certain dispositional ability; that my having it
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is rendered possible by memory is an additional, and for our present 
purposes irrelevant, assumption*
Let us consider a memory-claim - 'There was a rose growing 
beside the door'. Clearly the simplest and most obvious test of 
this is to actually perceive the door and the rose. But if there has 
been a lapse of time the rose may have withered away or been pulled 
up; so its absence from the doorway will not falsify the claim. And 
if there has not been a lapse of time the question hardly arises. We 
do not trouble about remembering what is still there to be perceived 
unless we are playing some sort of memory game.*
It does not follow frooi this, however, that memory-claims can 
be tested, confirmed, or disconfirmed, only in very rare cases. A 
memory-claim refers to a past public event, and even though the subject 
of the claim may have perished we can find evidence for its having 
existed both in what we can reasonably assume to be its physical 
effects - a bomb crater is pretty fair confirmation of the memory- 
claim that a bomb fell - and in the testimony of other people who 
also experienced it.
But this is not enough. In many cases our memory-claims simply 
do not admit of any such external confirmation yet it is still vital 
to us to be quite sure that they are true. My memory-claim ’I 
arranged to meet the professor at ten o'clock* may be extremely
Like 'Kim's Game', which used to be popular in tne Boy Scouts.
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important to me, but, since i do not keep a diary it is doubtful 
whether I can check it by anything but a careful reconsideration of 
the memories which support it. The fact that memory-claims refer 
directly to public events does not mean that they can be checked only 
by public events. We can and do satisfy ourselves that our memory- 
claims are correct simply by reference to our memories. We saw that 
one way of confirming memory-claims is by discovering the present 
events which we believe to be probable effects of the remembered 
events. And physical events may have non-physical effects. There 
is an obvious sense in which my judgments about an event are effects 
of that event - the judgments could not have occurred without the 
event - and in which my memories are effects of those judgments. This 
being so, my claim to remember any event is at least prima-facie 
evidence that it did occur. And it is evidence which I can accept 
confidently once 1 have satisfied myself of three things: (l) that 
my original judgments were well made, i.e. accorded with what any 
careful observer could have perceived. (2) That my present remembering 
represents faithfully my judgments and perceptions at the time of 
the event. ^3) That the present memory is adequate to support the 
claim made.
We must now consider how we might go about satisfying ourselves 
of these conditions, 
b) Checking our memory-claims
i. Memory-claims about events
Let us take a concrete case. I make the following memory-claims:
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On my way to work today I was attacked by a magpie. Now, suppose 
that this claim is challenged by a bird-lover who is opposing a 
scheme to get rid of these creatures. It becomes necessary for me, 
if not to substantiate my claim (this rnay not be possible), at 
least to be very sure in my own mind that it is a true account of a 
past event. We shall assume that there were no witnesses, that I 
was not in fact injured, and that my only means of checking my claim 
is by introspection. 1 therefore ask myself:
a. What am I actually remembering? Is my ’remembering state of 
mind' in full accord with, i.e. ample warrant for, the claim made, 
according to the normal usage of the words and sentences employed in 
that claim? Perhaps I can satisfy myself that I am actually remem­
bering the following judgments made at the time of the occurrence: 
’Something whizzed past ray head from behind; there was a snapping 
noise close to my ear; there it is, it’s a magpie; the snapping noise 
must have been its beak; it deliberately attacked me. I may also 
be actually remembering the fright I got and the apprehension I 
felt at the time.
In this case, notwithstanding the comparative weakness of the 
'must have been', I can reasonably assure myself that no error 
has occurred between the 'remembering state of mind' and the memory- 
claim. But 1 would not have felt so sure had I discovered that my 
actual remembering included only being frightened by something flying 
past me with a snapping noise as it passed, and that I had worked
out later that it must have been a magpie attacking me
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However, so far so good; I am satisfied that my memory—claim 
is in accordance with my remembered judgments. I must now consider 
those judgments themselves.
b. On what evidence did I make the judgments I remember? Consider 
these questions: (1) How did I know it was a magpie? (2) How did I 
know it was the same bird that had flown past my head? (3) Why did 
I assume it was attacking me? To answer these questions 1 must dig 
further into my memory to find supporting judgments, or memory-images 
of the event itself.
If I am able quite sincerely to answer thus: (l) It was a large 
black and white bird of the kind I call ’magpie’, and I am (and was 
at the time) good at identifying such birds (2) Its direction and 
speed when 1 saw it correlated well with thedirection and speed of 
whatever passed my head (3) It is notorious that magpies are 
vicious at this time of year and I have been attacked before and 
recognised the snap of a beak as it passed, then I believe that the 
more I consider the memory tne more certain I shall become that the 
memory-claim was in fact true. If, on the other hand, my actual 
memory is found to consist solely in propositions, the original 
evidence for which is quite lost, then the more I think about it the 
greater will my dounts become - even though the memory-claim may 
in fact be quite true.
In practice, of course, we do not hold long courts of enquiry 
on our memory-claims. We become very adept at singling out the
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vital features of our recollections which justify those claims, and 
we merely say 'Yes, I am quite certain that 1 was attacked by a 
magpie - go ahead and shoot them'. But 'I am certain' is significant 
only if 1 know what it is like to be uncertain. My confidence is 
justified only by my realisation that a careful reconsideration of 
my memory-claim could have shown me that I had assumed more in my 
perceptual judgments than tue evidence of my senses could reasonably 
justify.
ii. Non-event memory-claims
The case we have considered is a straightforward 'memory of an 
event'. Now, I have claimed that the memory/claim distinction can 
be made whether the memory is of an event, an individual, a quality 
or even a skill. But in the case of 'remembering qualities as 
such' and 'remembering skills as such' it does not seem possible to 
differentiate between error in making the original judgment and error 
in making the memory—claim. Wnen I make tne claim 'I remember his 
face was flushed’, it is important that what I am actually remembering 
justifies the normal usage of the word 'flushed'. The claim may well 
be misleading, for instance, if it were made about someone who simply 
happens always to have a red face. But, as the memory of a quality, 
the redness of the face - not of an event, the reddening of the face, 
there does not seem to be anything which could constitute the actual 
memory except a memory-image. And with images either we have them or 
we do not. The only explanations we can give of them are causal.
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The question 'What was the evidence which gave rise to the memory- 
image?' cannot be asked. The imagery i_s the evidence.
When we consider remembering a skill as such the case may be 
further complicated by a doubt as to whether what is claimed is that 
we are remembering something or simply that we possess a dispositional 
ability to perform something. Let us assume that my claim 'I remem­
ber how to make paper boats' is actually based upon some specific 
occurrent memory. Simply taking up a piece of paper and making a 
bo^t of it certainly confirms the dispositional claim. But does it 
prove anything about occurrent memories? Now, clearly there is a 
sense in which we can be remembering how to do something without actu­
ally doing it, but it is hard to see how we could confirm this kind 
of memory except by actually imaging every stage of the proceedings. 
The mere ability to remember a series of propositions - rules for the 
successful performance of a task - does not of itself provide any very 
great assurance that we can in fact perform that task, as those of us 
who have waited outside examination rooms know. Of course, even my 
having a complete set of images of the stages involved in making a 
paper boat does not guarantee that I shall succeed in making one when 
1 try. My fingers may be too stiff and awkward. But this fact 
accounts for the perfectly intelligible difference between remembering 
how to do something and being able to do it.*
This distinction is dealt with at length in chapter V.
I
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c) The intention of memory-claims
Considerable doubt may be felt, not without justification,
about my use of the expression 'normal usage of the terms employed
in memory-claims'. What constitutes 'normal usage' is itself always
somewhat arbitrary and indecisive. I must therefore make it
clear that by 'normal usage' 1 mean only non-misleading usage within
2a particular context and for a particular purpose. We must also 
bear in mind that what I am calling a memory-claim is not simply, or 
even primarily, a claim for the edification of other people. It is 
primarily a claim about the past made to myself in words - because 
I do in fact think in words - and used as the basis of further 
remembering and reasoning. Part of my reason, then, for checking 
my memory-claim against my actual occurrent memory is to prevent 
myself from making a tacit assumption that I actually remember more 
than I do in fact remember as a result of ambiguities in the words 
I am using. I am not concerned, therefore, with normal usage in any 
formal or 'dictionary' sense, but with the appropriateness of the 
terms in the memory-claim to report my memory within my current train 
of thought and reasoning. To take a very simple example: I may 
remember a play I once saw and 'sum up' my memory of it in the claim 
'It was thrilling*. This claim may, henceforward, 'stand in for' my 
memory. If my sole purpose in remembering is to decide whether or 
1
I frankly admit here that I am committed to the view that words do 
not mean things; people mean things when they use words.
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not to go to see another play by the same writer for an evening’s 
entertainment, then the memory-claim ’It was thrilling' is a good 
enough guide for me. If, on the other hand, I am making a study of 
melodrama as a dramatic form, the claim ’It was thrilling' could well 
be misleading without some augmentation by actual memories to show 
wherein and how it was thrilling. It is always possible for the dis­
positional memory of a proposition to be replaced, in the course of 
time, by a dispositional memory of mere words, and for those mere 
words, when remembered, to be ’taken for’ the original proposition, 
d) The actual remembering
I have specified three potential 'breakdown points' between the 
event and the memory-claim. And 1 have shown how introspective 
checking, by securing us against the first and the last of these, can 
narrow the field of possible error. But to eliminate the field of 
possible error we must have some means of guarding against the second 
'breakdown point', tbe fallibility of memory itself. We are back 
once more with the basic problem with which I commenced this essay. 
And, as we discovered then, introspections cannot help at this point. 
If we are to give an adequate explanation of the certainty we in fact 
feel about our memory beliefs, an explanation which fully justifies 
that certainty, then we must show that, in some way, there is within 
the memory an actual recurrence of some element of the remembered 
event itself. Since this would not admit of error, it could serve 
as a basis for checking all our remembered judgments. It is
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noticeable that in all our attempts to find greater security in our 
memories of events, of individuals and their characteristics, and even 
of skills, we have come back sooner or later to memory-images. These 
have always represented the terminal point of checking. There is a 
strong suggestion, therefore, that the 'physical element in memory' 
will be found, if at all, in our imagery, and it is my intention now 
to consider in detail the nature of imagery and the role which it plays 
in our memories of events.
First, however, because so much recent writing has centered upon 
them, I shall consider that class of memories which I have been 
referring to as 'remembering skills' and have found to be a somewhat 
confusing mixture of remembering in images and propositions, recog­
nition, and mere dispositional capacities. I hope to show that when, 
and insofar as, public performances are remembering at all, they are 
simply one variety of memory of events and, hence, subject to the
same analysis
Chapter V
REMaiBERING HOW TO
)
1. The caae against the existence of a 'mental directive*
It is commonly thought, by quite unsophisticated people as well 
as by ’traditional philosophers', that when we perform some skilled 
action which we have learnt to perform we are in fact doing two 
distinct things: making certain effective physical movements, and 
remembering past experiences in a way that enables us to make those 
movements effectively. It is commonly thought that exercising a 
skill is making our bodies follow the dictates of a mental directive 
composed very largely of memories of past events and performances.
But strong arguments have been produced to challenge this belief 
both on empirical and on rational grounds, and we must now consider 
these arguments.
a ) The dispensibility of recollections 
i. Skill and lack of skill
When we say that someone performs a task well or skilfully, we 
generally mean that he can be relied upon to achieve what we take 
to be his desired end smoothly, efficiently, without hesitation 
or deliberation, as though it were an automatic process. In fact, 
the more closely our overt behaviour assimilates that of a well- 
regulated machine, the further it gets from the fumblings and ponderings 
we associate with learning, the greater is our skill held to be. As
143
144
Ä.J. Ayer puts it,* 'Remembering how to swim or how to write, 
remembering how to set a compass or add up a column of figures, is 
in every case a matter of being able to do these things, more or less 
efficiently, when the need arises. It can indeed happen in cases of 
this sort, that people are assisted by actually recalling some 
previous occasion on which they did the thing in question, or saw 
it done, but it is by no means necessary that they should be. On 
the contrary, the better they remember, the less likely is it that 
they will have any such events in mind: it is only when one is in 
difficulties that one tries as it were to use one's recollections as 
a manual. To have learnt a thing properly is to be able to dispense 
with them'•
Certainly it would be very strange to say that the man who dives 
into the pool and swims faultlessly to the other side does not remember 
how to swim - simply because his mind throughout the performance is 
wholly occupied with what he intends to have for dinner. In due 
course we must consider whether it is equally strange to say that he 
is not remembering how to swim.
ii• Knowing what we are doing - and 'catching ourselves'
We might say that he is certainly aware - whatever else may be 
occupying his thoughts - that he is swimming; and that to be aware 
of what \/e are doing is, in a sense, to be remembering previous
'The Problem of Knowledge' p.150.
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occasions since it is to classify this (the present performance) with 
that (some past performance or group of performances).
But, though we can be fairly certain that our swiuaner knows that 
he is swimming, we cannot be so certain that he knows that he is 
swimming sidestroke. We frequently ’catch ourselves' performing tasks 
quite efficiently, and a swimmer may be surprised to discover that he 
is swimming sidestroke after he has been doing so for quite some time. 
But, assuming that he has just learnt the stroke, his performance 
seems to qualify just as well as an example of remembering how* as 
it would have done if he had been giving it his undivided attention.
We may wish to deny that a fish remembers how to swim, but a human 
swimmer is not a fish; he had to learn the skill he is now exhibiting. 
It could be claimed, therefore, that whether or not he is concen­
trating upon what he is doing is quite irrelevant. His exercise of 
that skill i_s his remembering how to swim sidestroke. 
iii. Acting at will
Against this we may argue that such efficient actions are simply 
things we do, things which, because their successful completion is 
dependent upon our having had some past experience, are analogous to 
remembering. But they are not, we may claim, a species of remembering, 
any more than boxing is a species of ballet because it happens to 
involve considerable grace of movement. I do not want simply to
1
Throughout this chapter 'remembering how' will mean 'remembering 
how to do something' not 'remembering how a thing looked, felt, etc.'.
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dismiss this argument. Indeed, subject to some modifications, I 
intend ultimately to support it. But, at this stage we must not 
blind ourselves to the fact that swimming, when we have learnt to 
swim, is much more like remembering an event, when we have witnessed 
that event, than boxing is like ballet. In one case there is a 
superficial resemblance in the performance itself; in the other case 
there is a formal resemblance in the relationship of past and present 
events and the application of the retention of past events to our 
present requirements.
In ’The Mind and Its Place in Nature' C.D. Broad writes 'We 
may* acquire by practice the power of performing at will certain 
characteristic sets of bodily movements, such as those that are 
used in swimming. If we find that we can still swim when we get 
into the water after an interval, we should commonly say that we 
"remember how to swim" or "remember the movements of swimming".
There is nothing cognitive about "memory" in this sense. To say we 
remember how to swim is merely to state (a) that we can perform the 
proper movements after an interval, and (b) that we believe, or 
the speaker who observes us believes, that this is due to our having 
performed them in the past. It would be better to call memory in 
this sense, "retention of an acquired motor-capacity".'
'The Mind and Its Place in Nature', p.269.
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But even allowing that our arras and legs can, as it were, look 
after themselves, they do so as the result of prior training and in a 
way that is conducive to the end we seek. There is a sense in which 
we are both deliberately setting in motion and deliberately keeping 
in motion the performance in question when clearly it is open to us, 
as intelligent beings, to behave otherwise. If a fish is dropped into 
water it simply commences swimming; we do not think of it as deciding 
to swim, how to swim, or where to swim to. If a man is suddenly 
dropped into water (assuming that he can swim) he may to some extent 
react in the same way as the fish - simply commence swimming. Yet 
in adapting this mode of swimming to the condition of the water and 
directing his course to the nearest safe landing place his reactions 
(if ‘reactions' is the right word here) are quite different from those 
of the fish. His first struggle to the surface may well be governed 
solely by motor-response, but thereafter his performance is always 
to some extent deliberate and purposeful and preconceived. To what 
extent will vary from man to man. 
iv. The apparent absence of recollection
The question is - IIow are we to characterise this deliberateness 
and purposefulness in our skilled performance? In most cases they 
do not seem to be accompanied by any mental events of the kind we 
normally call remembering. When I swim across a pool I do not 
generally recollect any previous occasion of swimming nor yet any 
propositions or maxims about how to swim, nor am I generally aware of
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any images of what my arms and legs should be doing. And on such 
occasions as I do have recollections - perhaps I am reminded of 
some previous occasion of swimming - those recollections are more 
distraction from than directive to my present performance. Normally, 
so far as I am conscious of anything to do with my present performance 
it is of what I am doing now - and, when I 1know what I am doing’, 
what I am doing now .just happens to be what I have done many times 
before.
Yet, as I pointed out in chapter II,* although we do not seem 
to be remembering anything on these occasions, our performances are 
of the kind we feel would have to be remembered, which suggests that 
in some way we have a constant memory-disposition always, so to 
speak, directing our activities so that no specific recollection, 
either of event or of proposition, is needed for the successful com­
pletion of the task. It is something of this sort, I believe, that 
philosophers have had in mind when they have spoken of memories 
as 'present in power' though not in fact. They have been driven to 
making such mystical-sounding assertions because although we are 
able to discover retrospectively that we were in fact performing 
in accord with certain learnt skills and performing to some specific 
end, after the initial learning period we rarely seem to be 
conscious in performing of any recollections of events or rules with
1
See p.56
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which we compare, or any directives by which we guide, our performance. 
Although the performance seems to exemplify ’remembering how' - 
clearly it is intentional, skilled, and in some way dependent upon 
past mental as well as physical performances - those past performances, 
mental or physical, do not seem to be specifically recalled or in any 
way ’presented to us’ as directives of our present efforts, 
b) Some supporting arguments
We have considered the empirical grounds for holding that to be 
remembering how to do something is simply to be performing approp­
riately. Now we turn to certain arguments designed to show that it 
must be so, that remembering how could not be reduced to a variety 
or aspect of remembering that, 
i . The time factor
If, in every instance, the performance of a skilled act were 
dependent upon the prior remembering of how to perform it, our lives 
would be a series of alternate thinkings and doings; before making 
each move we should have to pause to remember how to make it. In 
actual fact the occasions when we do proceed in this manner, as, for 
instance, when we work out very carefully the moves to be made in a 
game of chess, contrast very sharply with the ordinary conduct of 
our affairs where we are constantly putting into practice learnt 
skills of various sorts with never a pause. If we all paused to 
remember how to perform each operation whilst we were driving a 
car in heavy traffic (as indeed a novice driver often does have to) 
the result might well be catastrophic.
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Suppose we suggest that remembering how does always take place 
(as a mental preliminary to action), but is very swift, hardly 
noticeable at all, always just a fraction ahead of the action itself. 
This could hardly be disproved on empirical grounds. During the 
learning stages of any skill we are in fact conscious of such 'mental 
preliminaries* and it is always open to us to say that if we intro­
spected more carefully we would catch ourselves mentally rehearsing 
even when we are fully competent. Furthermore, as we shall consider 
later in this chapter,* it is by no means easy to say when a skill 
is perfect, nor what constitutes a particular skill. But to show 
that something cannot be disproved is one thing; to prove it is 
quite another. And there are specific objections to this 'solution* 
which must be considered.
a. The object of attention. According to this view, since the 
overt performance is continuous, our minds would need to be attending 
always to what we were just about to do, to be concentrating upon 
how to make the next move - never upon the move we were then making. 
Thus by virtue of remembering how to perform we would be precluded 
from giving any attention to how we were in fact performing. How­
ever 'swift' the decision, there would always be a further decision 
to be made as soon as it was completed.
_
See p.159ff
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b. The infinite repress argument. There have also been attempts 
to demonstrate logically that no prior mental directive can be 
entailed by the skilled performance of any action. The argument 
usually runs thus: Remembering and planning are activities which, 
like any other activities, can be done well or badly. If no 
skilled performance can be given until a prior remembering has 
occurred, then that remembering cannot occur until a prior remem­
bering has occurred, and so on ad infinitum. Thus we could never 
even commence the overt performance itself.
I do not, however, attach great importance to this argument as 
it begs the point at issue. Unless we are already agreed that 
remembering is a skilled performance of the same kind as swimming 
or driving motor-cars the argument does not hold. And if we were 
agreed upon this the demonstration would be redundant. Further, 
as I shall argue in section 3 of this chapter, doing a thing well or 
badly has nothing to do with doing it intelligently in the sense 
of that word which is relevant to remembering, 
ii. ’How to* is not recallable
In ’The Concept of Mind' Ryle produces two closely connected 
arguments designed to show that 'remembering how' and 'remembering 
that' are different in a way which would make it impossible to reduce 
the former to a mere sub-species of the latter, 
a. The applicability of 'partial knowledge'. 'We^ never speak 
of a person having a partial knowledge of a fact or truth, save in 
1
'The Concept of Mind’, p.59.
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the special sense of his having knowledge of a part of a body of 
facts or truths...* On the other hand) it is proper and normal to 
speak of a person knowing in part how to do something, i.e. of his 
having a particular capacity in a limited degree’. And Ryle claims 
that this means only that the person knows how to do the thing 
fairly well, i.e. that he performs fairly well - not that he is 
conversant with only some of the maxims governing its successful 
performance. 'Remembering that' is necessarily a closed affair - 
either we remember or we do not. 'Remembering how' is always an 
open affair - we can perform the task in question with a greater or 
lesser degree of skill.
b. When does knowing how commence? Remembering that A was B is 
always traceable, in principle, to discovering that A was B at some 
exact time, whereas remembering how to perform some task can never 
be traced to an exact moment when we knew how for the first time. 
'Learning* how or improving an ability is not like learning that or 
acquiring information. Truths can be imparted, procedures can only 
be inculcated, and while inculcation is a gradual process, imparting 
is relatively sudden. It makes sense to ask at what moment someone 
became apprised of a truth, but not to ask at what moment someone 
acquired a skill’. It is noticeable that Ryle does not explain how 
we can improve an ability unless we have already acquired it, i.e. 
learnt how.
'The Concept of Mind', p.59.
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The im portance  of R y le 's  c la im s  i s  t h a t ,  i f  th e y  a r e  t r u e ,  then  
i t  s im ply  does n o t  make sense  to  t a l k  o f  remembering how to  do some­
th in g  ex ce p t  a s  be ing  ab le  to  do i t  more o r  l e s s  e f f e c t i v e l y .  And 
th e  t e s t  of 'b e in g  a b l e ’ i s  th e  perform ance on demand of th e  t a s k  
in  q u e s t i o n .  On th e  o th e r  hand, i f  i t  can be shown t h a t  i t  does 
make sense  to  t a l k  o f  remembering how a s  d i s t i n c t  from th e  g iv in g  
of p u b l i c  p e rfo rm ances ,  th e n  i t  fo l lo w s  t h a t  th e s e  c la im s ,  however 
co n v in c in g  th e y  may seem, s im ply cannot be t r u e .  We s h a l l  now 
c o n s id e r  some argum ents  which might le a d  us t o  deny t h a t  remembering 
how .just i s  pe rfo rm ing  a p p r o p r i a t e l y .
2 .  Causes f o r  r e s e r v a t i o n s  
a )  Knowing and doing  
i . Perfo rm ing  and r e h e a r s in g
I f  I am asked 'Do you remember how to  d r iv e  a motor c y c le ? '  I 
may w ell  r e p ly  'Y e s ' n o tw i th s ta n d in g  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no motor cy c le  f o r  
me t o  d r i v e .  On what a u t h o r i t y  do I make t h i s  r e p ly ?  I t  could  be 
t h a t  I r e c a l l  some occas io n  on which I drove a motor cy c le  and I 
assume t h a t  I could  do so a g a in .  Or i t  cou ld  be t h a t  what I r e c a l l  
i s  n o t  any s p e c i f i c  o c c a s io n ,  b u t  simply th e  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  formed 
a t  some tim e in  th e  p a s t  (when does n o t  m a t t e r )  ' I  can d r iv e  a motor 
c y c l e ' .  In  th e s e  c a se s  th e  c la im  ' I  am now remembering how t o  d r iv e  
a motor c y c l e '  would n o t  be j u s t i f i e d .  What I am remembering i s ,  
in  th e  one case  a c e r t a i n  e v e n t ,  and in  th e  o th e r  c a s e ,  a c e r t a i n  
p r o p o s i t i o n  from which I am i n f e r r i n g  t h a t ,  g iven  o p p o r tu n i ty ,  I
cou ld  d r iv e  a motor cy c le
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But suppose I am remembering, n o t  a s in g l e  e v e n t ,  nor th e  s in g le  
p r o p o s i t i o n  ’ I can d r iv e  a motor c y c l e ' ,  bu t a s e t  of p r o p o s i t i o n s  
wiiich c o n s t i t u t e  th e  r u l e s  f o r  d r iv i n g  a motor c y c l e .  And suppose 
a l s o  t h a t  I have c l e a r  k i n a e s t h e t i c  images o f  b a la n c in g  and d i r e c t i n g  
a motor c y c l e .  Could we th en  deny t h a t  I am remembering how to  
d r iv e  one? The p o in t  i s  t h a t  we f r e q u e n t ly  do f e e l  j u s t i f i e d  in  
c la im in g  t o  remember how to  do som ething a s  d i s t i n c t  from c la im in g  
t h a t  we a r e  a b le  t o  do i t  -  or even t h a t  we e v e r  have done i t .  No 
doubt t h e r e  a r e  many o ld -w o rld  Jap an ese  who remember how to  commit 
H a r i - K i r i .
C onsider  th e  q u e s t io n  'Do you remember how to  p la y  t e n n i s ? '  
a d d re s s e d  to  a man now co n f in ed  to  a w h e e lc h a i r .  Must he r e p ly  'No' 
s im ply because he i s  in c a p a b le  o f  g e t t i n g  up and d em o n s tra t in g ?  I f  
a man i s  asked  'Do you remember how to  swim th e  c ra w l? '  when he i s  
s i t t i n g  a t  home he may re h e a r s e  in  h i s  mind th e  movements invo lv ed  
and c o n s id e r  images o f  perfo rm ances  he has seen  and answer 'Y es, I 
do ’ , w hereas, i f  t h e  same q u e s t io n  i s  ad d re s se d  to  him when he i s  
in  th e  swimming pool he may sim ply ex ecu te  a few s t r o k e s  by way of 
r e p l y .  The two ways o f  answ ering  th e  q u e s t io n  a r e  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t ;  
b u t  i t  i s  th e  same q u e s t io n  which i s  being answ ered . The e f f e c t i v e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  answ ers i s  t h a t  th e  one g iv en  in  th e  w a te r  
t e l l s  us more th a n  we a sk ed .  By h i s  d e m o n s tra t io n  our man i s  
showing us n o t  only  t h a t  he remembers how t o  swim th e  crawl but 
a l s o  t h a t  he can swim i t ,  whereas th e  v e rb a l  r e p ly  would s t i l l  be
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j u s t i f i e d  i f  he remembered how only  in  th e  sense  t h a t  th e  man in  th e  
w h e e lc h a i r  remembers how to  p lay  t e n n i s ,  e . g .  he could  i n s t r u c t  
o th e r  p e o p le .  I t  i s  worth n o t in g  t h a t  many d ram a tic  p roducers  a re  
v e ry  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  a c t o r s  -  but we should  h a rd ly  say  t h a t  t h i s  i s  
because  th ey  do n o t  know how to  a c t .  
i i • The need f o r  a c r i t e r i o n
Now, why do we say t h a t  th e  man showed us b o th  t h a t  he can swim 
and t h a t  he remembers how? I f  a sm all boy p ic k s  up a s to n e  and h u r l s  
i t  i n t o  a  pond t h i s  i s  ev idence  enough t h a t  he can perform  t h i s  
' t a s k ' .  But i t  i s  s u r e ly  n o t  ev idence  t h a t  he i s  remembering how to  
do a n y th in g .  The boy could  be doing something q u i t e  c l e v e r ,  th row ing  
a s to n e  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  way t h a t  he has been p r a c t i s i n g .  But, e q u a l ly ,  
he cou ld  be a c t in g  q u i t e  c a r e l e s s l y  and t h o u g h t l e s s ly  and have nev er  
throw n a s to n e  b e f o r e .  Our swimmer’ s perform ance coun ts  as an a f f i r m a ­
t i v e  answer to  our q u e s t io n  only because  (a) i t  fo l lo w s  th e  a sk ing  
o f  th e  q u e s t io n  and (b) we presume i t  i s  th e  a p p l i c a t io n  of a s k i l l  
he has l e a r n t .  We acc e p t  i t  a s  an example of remembering how only  
on th e  assum ption  t h a t  he i s  aware t h a t  h i s  d em o n s tra t io n  p ro v id e s  
th e  answer t o  our q u e s t io n ,  i . e .  t h a t  h i s  p r e s e n t  performance has 
c e r t a i n  e s s e n t i a l  resem blances  to  an i n d e f i n i t e  number of p a s t  p e r ­
form ances which have been c l a s s i f i e d  as  swimming th e  c ra w l.  We a r e  
in  f a c t  assum ing, as  th e  c o n d i t io n  o f  our g r a n t i n g  t h a t  he i s  
remembering bow, some a s s o c i a t i o n  by him of h i s  p r e s e n t  perform ance 
w ith  o th e r  perform ances he has g iven  o r  w i tn e s s e d .  P a r t  of what we
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are attributing to him is the ability, should he make a wrong stroke, 
to realise that it is a wrong stroke and correct it. But how can he 
realise that this is a wrong stroke unless he has some present idea 
of what constitutes the right stroke? To argue here that it simply 
'feels wrong' is simply to make this into a 'negative memory situa­
tion'. And, as I have argued,1 such situations have always a basis 
of positive remembering. In his claim to be remembering how the 
man in the water is adopting at least some of the same criteria as 
the man on the land.
iii. Automatic and 'quasi-automatic' performances
It may be instructive to compare the extents to which conscious 
activity is involved in (a) breathing (b) walking (c) riding a bicycle 
and (d) playing Bridge.
(a) Breathing (though not deep-breathing) is something we just do - 
we do not need to be conscious at all,
(b) To walk we usually need to be conscious - but not conscious of 
our walking. Although it is something we have had to learn, and is
to that extent a skill, it has become almost as automatic as breathing. 
The difference is principally that we can and do decide to start and 
to stop walking. But only if we have not walked for a very long time 
do we need to pay attention to the performance itself.
_
See p,130ff.
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(c) In contrast to this, riding a bicycle does require a lot of 
attention. We can think of other tilings while we are riding, but 
unless we are aware to some extent of what we are doing and how we 
are doing it we shall soon meet with disaster.
(d) In playing Bridge we are constantly 'telling ourselves' what to do 
next. Our minds do the 'real work’, our hands and lips are just the 
labourers on the job. Here there is generally very little about our 
performances that we would call automatic - only such things as the 
actual holding and handling of the cards.
Let us allow, for the sake of argument, that walking (notwith­
standing that we once learnt how) is for most of us a wholly automatic 
affair, and that playing Bridge is a wholly intelligent affair. Hiding 
a bicycle, which is a fairly standard example of remembering how, might 
then be called a quasi-automatic affair since it patently includes a 
great deal of conscious (deliberate) and a great deal of unconscious 
(motor-responsive) behaviour. In the preceding section I described 
the 'conscious part' of 'remembering how' as the association of what 
we are now doing with - and its guidance by - what we have done or 
witnessed in the past. The question we must now consider is how we 
are to regard the unconscious part of the performance, and what if 
anythingthis has to do with remembering, 
iv. The ability to forget
One maxim that may fairly go unchallenged is that whatever we 
can remember we can forget. What does forgetting how to do some­
thing amount to? Suppose we say it amounts to not being able to do
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i t  any more. But ( re g a rd in g  w alk ing  a s  a w holly  au to m atic  perform ance) 
i f  I  q u i t e  suddenly  could  n o t  walk we would n o t  no rm ally  say t h a t  I 
had f o r g o t t e n  how to  w alk . Even i f  no p h y s ic a l  d e f e c t  could be 
d is c o v e re d  to  account f o r  my i n a b i l i t y  we shou ld  be more in c l in e d  to  
assume some u n d isco v e re d  p h y s ic a l  d e f e c t  th a n  to  a t t r i b u t e  i t  t o  a 
breakdown of memory. I have f o r g o t t e n  i f  I  do n o t  know something I 
p re v io u s ly  knew -  and what in  t h i s  c a se  d id  I know p re v io u s ly  t h a t  
I do n o t  know now? We cannot r e a l l y  say  I knew how to  walk; I 
s im ply walked -  t h e r e  was no knowing how to  abou t i t .  And t h i s  would 
s u r e ly  be t r u e  o f  th e  au to m a tic  p a r t  of any perfo rm ance . One of 
th e  t h i n g s  we mean by c a l l i n g  a perform ance au to m a tic  i s  t h a t  i t  does 
n o t  make sense  t o  say we have f o r g o t t e n  how t o  do i t ,  though we might 
f o r  o th e r  re a s o n s  cease  to  perform  i t .  And, i f  remembering how to  
r i d e  a b ic y c le  were simply being a b le  t o  r i d e  a b i c y c l e ,  what could  
f o r g e t t i n g  how to  r i d e  a b ic y c le  be b u t  n o t  be ing  a b le  t o  r i d e  one?
But t h i s  would be no p roo f  o f  hav ing  f o r g o t t e n .  I t  would be q u i t e  
r e a s o n a b le ,  i f  I co u ld ,  n o n e th e le s s ,  s t a t e  t h i n g s  abou t how a b ic y c le  
shou ld  be r id d e n ,  t o  say ’I remember w e ll  enough how t o  r i d e  a 
b i c y c l e ,  bu t nowadays my le g s  a re  n o t  s t ro n g  enough to  do i t ' .
There i s  n a t u r a l l y  a c lo s e  a s s o c i a t i o n  in  our minds between 
remembering how and be ing  a b l e ,  so c lo s e  t h a t  we o f te n  t r e a t  th e  
con cep ts  a s  in t e r c h a n g e a b le .  But th e  v i t a l l y  im p o rtan t  p o in t  i s  
t h a t ,  w h i l s t  t h e  e x e m p l i f i c a t io n s  o f  th e  two c o n ce p ts  so f r e q u e n t ly  
o v e r la p  in  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e r e  i s  no n e c e s s i t y  f o r  them to  do so .  A c h i ld
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told to draw a picture entitled ’Earthquake' would almost certainly 
draw a scene of devastation - but this does not mean that the 
concepts 'earthquake' and 'devastation' are identical. It is our 
ability to differentiate 'remembering how' from 'being able' if and 
when the occasion arises that has led to the use of the expression 
'remembering how' even if it is not always used in a way that makes 
the distinction obvious.
b) What constitutes a skilled performance?
Since 'remembering how' is so evidently connected with the 
exercise of acquired skills, it is strange that so little attention 
has been paid by writers on memory to two crucial questions: (i) 
what constitutes a particular skill? and (ii) By what criteria is 
a performance judged to be skilful? 
i. The determination of a skill
Suppose I mount my bicycle after many years of driving cars and 
promptly fall off. Does this show that I have forgotten how to ride 
a bicycle - or only that I have forgotten how to balance a bicycle?
I may still remember how to do a great many other things which come 
under the general heading of riding a bicycle. Let us look again at 
Ryle's argument in which it was claimed that knowing in part how to 
do something is not a matter of being conversant with only some of the 
maxims governing its successful performance.* It certainly does seem
See p.152.
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p o s s ib le  t o  m a in ta in  t h a t ,  j u s t  a s  b a lan c in g  i s  p a r t  though n o t  th e  
whole o f  r i d i n g ,  so o th e r  a c t i v i t i e s ,  s u b -S K il ls  l e t  us c a l l  them, 
a r e  p a r t s  o f  b a la n c in g ;  t h a t  every  ’ im p e rfe c t  pe rfo rm ance ' may c o n ta in  
w ith in  i t  many ’ p e r f e c t '  o nes .  Now, I am n o t  go ing  to  su g g es t  t h a t  
every  such ' s u b - s k i l l '  could  n e c e s s a r i l y  be co n ta in e d  in  a v e rb a l  
maxim so t h a t  i f  each maxim i s  fo l lo w ed  th e  b a la n c in g  ( th e  'm ajor  
s k i l l ' )  must be s u c c e s s f u l .  On th e  c o n t ra ry  th e  p o in t  I am making 
i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no such th in g  a s  a 'b a s i c  u n i t '  o f  s k i l l ;  t h e r e  a re  
simply g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s e r  s e t s  o f  e f f e c t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and i t  i s  
p e r f e c t l y  l e g i t i m a t e  t o  r e g a rd  any of th e s e  a s  a s k i l l  which cou ld  be 
t h e  o b je c t  of a maxim. As I argued in  c h a p te r  I I ,  we remember a 
g r e a t  many 'p r o p o s i t i o n s '  w i th o u t  words a t  a l l ,  and some of th e s e  
could  w ell be concerned  w ith  m uscu lar  f e e l i n g s  in  our b o d ie s .  I 
g r a n t  t h a t  by th e  tim e we a re  competent c y c l i s t s  b a la n c in g  a b ic y c le  
has  become a w holly  au to m a tic  a f f a i r .  But t h e r e  seems n o th in g  absurd  
about th e  s u g g e s t io n  t h a t ,  a t  t h e  l e a r n in g  s ta g e  when we a re  in  f a c t  
remembering how to  b a la n c e ,  b a la n c in g  should  n o t  be reg a rd ed  as  one 
s in g le  s k i l l  bu t a s  a complex mass o f  s k i l l s ,  each  w ith  i t s  own 
co rresp o n d in g  m e m o ry -d ire c t iv e .
Under t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  ' im prov ing  a s k i l l ' ,  a s  Ryle c a l l s  i t ,  
becomes a m a t te r  o f  dev e lo p in g  from l e s s e r  s k i l l s  t o  g r e a t e r  s k i l l s .  
And th e  f a c t  t h a t  ' a  s k i l l '  i s  developed  over a long  p e r io d  o f  tim e 
no more proves  t h a t  i t s  e x e r c i s e  i s  n o t  dependent upon 'remembering 
t h a t '  (o r  a complex of 'remembering t h u t s ' )  th a n  th e  f a c t  t h a t  a
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complicated piece of information is gleaned over a long period of 
time proves that the remembering of it is not a case of 'remembering 
that'.
ii. What makes a performance skilled?
I have argued that we should talk of remembering only such things 
as it makes sense to talk of forgetting. The skill that we remember 
is, therefore, something that it is possible to forget. It is in some 
sense an intelligent performance. This, so far as I know, nobody 
has openly denied. But there is a tendency in recent philosophy to 
slide from statements attempting to reconcile this fact with the 
apparent absence of 'mental directive' in the exercise of skills, to 
statements which, though similar-sounding, pay lip-service to the 
'intelligence' of skilled performances while in fact rendering im­
possible any intelligible analysis of them. Compare, for example, 
these two short passages from 'The Concept of Mind'. Ryle allows 
that there is a difference we are all aware of between an action done 
accidentally or automatically and one done deliberately and carefully, 
and he writes:
(a)* 'But such differences of description do not consist in the 
absence or presence of an implicit reference to some shadow—action 
covertly prefacing the overt action. They consist, on the contrary, 
in the absence or presence of certain sorts of testable explanatory- 
cum—predictive assertions'•
'The Concept of Mind', p.25.
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(b)* 'But to admit, as we must, that there may be no visible or 
audible difference between a tactful or witty act and a tactless or 
humourless one is not to admit that the difference is constituted by 
the performance or non-performance of some extra secret acts’.
Assertion (a) says in effect that although something is going 
on in the mind in accompaniment to what is going on in the body, it 
is not in the form of a rehearsal prefacing the actual performance, 
but rather of attention to that performance, its nature and purpose. 
With this we may very well agree - and still go on to consider what 
constitutes the difference between attending to our performance simply 
as to any object of observation and attending to it as our means of 
achieving certain desired ends.
But assertion (b) goes much further. It not only denies the 
existence of any prior mental directive of the action, it denies in 
effect that there is a distinguishable mental element involved at 
all. I feel that Ryle has deliberately selected words which evoke a 
certain emotional reaction: 'extra* suggests 'extraneous' and 
'secret' suggests 'kept secret', and we may well wish to deny the 
existence of any such entities. If we substitute the more neutral 
expression 'additional private factor' we shall be able approach 
the question much more dispassionately. Now, it may be protested 
that I have no right to substitute the neutral word 'factor' for
'The Concept of Mind', p.32.
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' a c t ' .  A mere ’mental e x i s t e n t ’ i s  no more a ’mental a c t ' ,  i t  may be 
claim ed, than a p h y sica l e x is te n t  i s  a p h ysica l a c t .  But, w hereas, in  
con sid erin g  th e p h y sica l th ere  i s  a c lea r  d is t in c t io n  -  we can a l l  say 
which p h ysica l fa c to r s  are a c ts  and which are e n t i t i e s  -  th ere  i s  no 
such obvious d is t in c t io n  when we con sid er the m ental. Any term inology  
which su g g ests  th a t 'mental a c ts '  are d is t in g u ish a b le  from 'mental 
e n t i t i e s ’ in  th e way th a t p h y sica l a c ts  and e n t i t i e s  are d is t in g u ish a b le  
i s  bound to  be m is lea d in g .
Now, i f  th ere  i s  no 'a d d it io n a l p r iv a te  fa c to r ' in  the s k i l l e d  
performance, wherein can th e d if fe r e n c e  between i t  and the autom atic  
or a cc id en ta l performance l i e ?  I t  has been conceded th a t we are a l l  
aware o f the d is t in c t io n  and th a t  th ere  i s  no v i s ib l e  or aud ib le  
d if fe r e n c e , so any fa c to r  present in  one performance and not in  the  
other must be p r iv a te  in  th e  sense o f being knowable on ly  to  the  
a g en t. I t  may be argued th a t th e  d is t in c t io n  i s  sim ply a m atter of 
whether or not th e performance can be rep eated . But what does 'can  
be repeated' mean u n le ss  i t  i_s repeated? And su re ly  we do not have 
to  perform everyth in g  tw ice  in  order to  know th a t th e  f i r s t  occasion  
was an e x e r c is e  o f s k i l l .  Apart from which an overt a c t done once 
a c c id e n ta lly  may w ell be repeated  in t e n t io n a l ly .
The problem i s  p r e c is e ly  to  know what doing something in te n t io n a lly  
i s .  Ryle speaks of a c ts  done 'on purpose' but he seems to  su ggest  
th a t the agent may not know what he does on purpose and what he does 
'n o t on p u rp ose '. I would say th a t  I am doing something on purpose
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when I am aware as I do it of my aims and intentions, and because 
of this it is reasonable for me to take it that you are doing something 
on purpose when you express your intentions before or during the 
activity or when your activity has every appearance of being intelli­
gently directed to what I believe to be a reasonable goal for you.
It is true that people are sometimes accused of doing things 'on 
purpose' - and perhaps rightly so - when they have not been 'aware of 
their intentions’. But such cases (which are in the province of 
experimental psychology rather than of epistemology) show only that 
a pre-determined action has been taken by the agent to be an accidental 
or automatic action. They do not set up a separate group of deliberate 
acts which are not pre-determined. When children slide along the 
floor and fall down on their bottoms v/e have to ask them whether they 
did it on purpose or not. We mean - was it an accident or did they 
decide to do it? The choice remains the same whether they are able 
to tell us or not. Because 'on purpose' is contrasted with 'acci­
dental' there is an obvious sense in which a lizard catches flies 
on purpose, simply in that it does not do so accidentally. But 
plainly this sense of 'on purpose’ is too limited to make the dis­
tinction Ryle does in fact allow' to exist. Assuming that the lizard 
does not decide to catch the fly, his catching it is a purely auto­
matic response
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c) Remembering hew in terms of remembering that 
i. Our viewpoint or point of interest
The claim, by Ryle and others, that ’remembering how' cannot be 
reduced to or explained in terms of ’remembering that’ seems to contra­
dict the assumptions that most of us make, apparently quite successfully, 
whenever we give instructions. When my little boy calls to me that 
he cannot remember how to do up his football boots, I call back to 
him that the laces must go through the eyelets in such and such 
order, that they then go through the loops at the sides and back, and 
so on. It is true that there are elements of most performances which 
we may find difficult, if not impossible, to describe in propositions 
of this kind. But this seems to reflect the limitations of our 
existing language rather than any mysterious inexplicability of those 
elements themselves. There is also (as we shall presently consider) 
in every performance some motor-responsive behaviour which, though 
it forms an essential part of the 'remembered performance', is not 
itself remembered in the ordinary sense of that word.
If we are employing someone to do a job for us then clearly our 
only concern is that the job be done. We are pleased to concede 
(that is, we have no wish to deny) that he ’remembers how’ so long 
as the job is done properly. In such a case we can fully endorse 
Ryle's assertion^ 'Our enquiry is not into causes ( and a fortiori
1
'The Concept of Mind', p.45
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not into occult causes), but into capacities, skills, habits, 
liabilities and bents’. It is when, not as employers but as 
epistemological enquirers, we turn our attention to what his remem­
bering how amounts to that we seem obliged to attribute to him all 
sorts of ’memories that'. It is one thing to observe skill and quite 
another to attribute skill. We observe the 'skill' of the lizard 
which never misses the fly it aims for, but our attributing skill to 
a marksman who repeatedly scores bull’s eyes (though not to a child 
who lets off a rifle and just happens to hit the bull's eye) seems 
to rest upon our ability to explain his repeated success in terms 
of his knowing that the sights must be in such and such a position, 
that his breathing must be controlled in such and such a way, and so 
on. It is more natural to say *1 remember how to hit the bull's 
eye’ than to say 'I remember that bullets hit bull's eyes when the 
sights of the rifle are so and so, and ray finger squeezes so and 
so, and allowance is made for the wind' - and etc., mainly because 
it is so much more economical of words, and because, as I pointed 
out above, we do not always have the words to express everything we 
would need to say. Nevertheless 'he remembers how to' must 'stand 
for' all these unexpressed, and perhaps unexpressable, assertions. 
The lizard can catch flies all day but we do not want to say it 
remembers how to. The marksman need display his prowess once only 
and we grant immediately that he remembers how to hit bull's eyes.
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ii. When do we ask 'do you remember how to?'
It may be helpful to consider under what circumstances I would 
ever ask myself whether I remember how to do something, or, for that 
matter, ask anyone else whether he remembers how to do something. Not, 
surely, while he is actually doing it. But, if ’remembering how* 
is in fact quite distinct from being able, why is it unreasonable 
to ask the man performing the task whether he remembers how?
The answer is that it is not unreasonable; it is simply an odd 
and confusing way of putting the question. We could, for instance, 
ask such a man whether he was exercising a learnt skill or attempting 
the task for the first time. But we would have to make it quite 
clear what ’task’ we were referring to; as pointed out above, even 
if he is experimenting in the 'major task' he is almost certainly 
exercising his learnt ability to perform certain 'sub-tasks’.
In fact we do not generally ask the question in these circum­
stances, not because it would be absurd but simply because it would 
be uninteresting to us. What does interest us is whether he can 
carry on - whether he can master the next stage in the performance with 
the same apparent ease. 'Do you remember how -?’ is always in some 
sense appropriate - but it is in fact asked only when the performance 
in question is not being given - though it may be pending. And 
if the reply is, as it may well be, 'I'm not sure - but I dare say 
I would remember if I had to' this need not mean that the man we 
have asked is identifying remembering how with being able. The
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assumption behind the reply could be that under the stimulus of 
actually attempting the task the ’memories that' which now elude 
him would come back to him. 
iii. Recollection as directive knowledge
It is sometimes held that we cannot know how to do certain things 
because we remember certain events and propositions, since remembering 
is never a source of knowledge. Now, there is a sense in which this 
may well be true - but is completely trivial. Assuming that I cannot 
remember anything until I have already known it, I must come to know 
it in the first place by some means other than memory.
But, quite apart from the possibility (discussed at length in 
chapters III and IV) of making factual discoveries from the re­
interpretation of our memories, there is a very real sense in which 
memory is the source of practically all our knowledge. In the 
dispositional sense I know a great many things which I am not at 
present thinking about; but the existence of any disposition pre­
supposes the periodical occurrences which actualise it, and I am 
now knowing only those things which I am now thinking about. Since 
I was not thinking about them half an hour ago I am now knowing 
them because I remember them, unless, of course, I am presently 
perceiving them.
It is interesting that Ryle, in discussing the question of 
the allocation of praise and blame, decides that a boy is
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blameworthy if 'knowing how to tie the knot, he still did not tie 
it correctly*.* There is no suggestion that the boy deliberately 
tied the knot wrongly. We must assume therefore that by ’knowing 
how to tie the knot’ Ryle means knowing in the dispositional sense. 
Most of us would say here ’He could have remembered how to do it 
but he didn’t bother’ . And what he did not bother about could only 
be knowing (or remembering) in the occurrent sense. And if it be 
protested that knowing how in the occurrent sense .just is tying it 
correctly, I once more point out that the lizard .just does catch 
flies correctly. And the boy could tie the knot correctly entirely 
by accident.
3. Intelligence and intelligent behaviour
We may say that in doing something we remember how to do we are 
giving an intelligent performance, but we must be quite clear what we 
mean by this. For we feel a certain natural reluctance to say that 
the child who deliberately falls on his bottom is giving an intelli­
gent performance. I believe that a great deal of the difficulty in 
the question, what constitutes remembering how, arises from the 
confusion of quite different senses of the word 'intelligent*. We 
want to say that remembering how to do something is always an 
exercise of intelligence (whether the remembering is ’public’ or 
’private'), but the word ’intelligent' is commonly used as a term of
1
’The Concept of iaind', p.71
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approval, and at other times as the contrary of 'automatic' or 
'motor-responsive', and the two uses are by no means the same - 
even though both frequently apply to the same instance. It is most 
important that we see clearly in which sense of the word remembering 
how to do something is always an intelligent performance, 
a) Intelligence and effectiveness 
i. Paying heed
Some recent philosophers, most notably Ryle, have made great use 
of the concept of paying heed. We are paying heed when we are fully 
aware of what we are doing, how we are doing it, and why we are doing 
it. But none of these guarantee that our activity will be effective. 
The boy who is busily misapplying a mathematical formula is paying 
heed to what he is doing, but he will not get the answer right.^ On 
the other hand the man who is thinking about anything and everything 
but what he is doing while he climbs a ladder will still get to the 
top if he carries on as he is going. Now, clearly we regard the 
performance of the boy as ineffective and that of the man as effective 
if we believe that their respective aims are answering the problem 
and surmounting the ladder. But, if we equate intelligence with 
attention, or 'paying heed', then the boy is giving an intelligent 
performance whilst the man is not, for the boy is heeding what he 
is doing. We shall be forced into the position of claiming,
1
Note H.H. Price's observation that the mark of intelligence is the 
ability to make mistakes - 'Thinking and Experience', p.87.
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paradoxical though it may seem, that a dull man is exercising more 
intelligence when he is puzzling over the completion of an operation 
than a bright man who achieves the required end with a minimum of 
mental effort.
ii• Conscious and unconscious repetition
Here you may well object that the second man is obviously the 
more intelligent man simply because he does not need to puzzle over 
the task. But already you have shifted to another (and, I grant, 
more common, though perhaps derivative) use of ’intelligent'. What 
we are now speaking of is a capacity for effective behaviour. Indeed 
the building up of such a capacity is an excellent thing, but with 
it comes a lessening, not an increase, of intelligence in our 
conduct in the only sense of that term in which intelligence could 
be used as the mark of 'remembering how'.
For, as allowed at the outset of this chapter, the better we 
get at doing anything the less we need to think about it. Exercising 
any acquired skill is largely a matter of repetition. In the early 
stages it may be conscious repetition; in the later stages it will 
tend to become unconscious repetition. But, to an observer, this 
difference shows up simply as an improvement in effectiveness. We 
must never forget, however, that a well-regulated machineuay be a 
greater improvement still - unless and until it breaks down.
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Ryle cites the case of a chess-player developing this kind of 
competence.* 'Very soon he comes to observe the rules without 
thinking of them. lie makes the permitted moves and avoids the for­
bidden ones; he notices and protests when his opponent breaks the 
rules. But he no longer cites to himself or to the room the formulae 
in which the bans and prohibitions are declared. It has become 
second nature to him to do what is allowed and avoid what is forbidden. 
At this stage he might even have lost his former ability to cite the 
rules'. But 'second nature' is a very vague sort of term, suggestive 
somehow of being aware in a non-occurrent kind of way of the thing 
to do, a situation much easier to suggest than to analyse. Playing 
chess is not the most fortunate example since it involves both the 
formal rules which constitute the game itself and also what we might 
call the 'informal rules' which constitute good playing, and it is 
not altogether clear to which Ryle is referring. But either way,
if the player really had lost the ability to cite the rules by which
2he was in fact playing, would it not be fairer to say that he had 
reached a stage of physiological conditioning which enabled him to 
carry on by motor-responses alone — that he had in fact become a 
kind of human chess machine? This need not, of course, be to his
1
'The Concept of Mind', p.41.
2
We are concerned here with the propositions — not just the forms 
of words.
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discredit. A human chess machine, like a real chess machine, may 
play a very effective game of chess. The point I am making is that 
if ever this stage were reached it would not be a case of 'remem­
bering how’ so well that he need no longer bother about 'mental 
states'. On the contrary, it would be a case of reaching a stage of 
physiological conditioning where he need no longer bother to 
remember how.
b) Intelligence and stupidity
We have already encountered the use of 'intelligent' in which 
it is applied to persons and contrasted with 'stupid'. Although this 
is not the sense of the word in which remembering how is an intelligent 
performance (we can remember how to do stupid things as well as clever 
ones) some further consideration of it may nevertheless throw light 
upon the relationship between remembering how and remembering that. 
Intelligence in the laudatory sense is not measured by our ability 
to remember things but rather by our ability to make good use of 
the things we remember. Indeed we often contrast intelligence with 
the mere possession of a good memory. But, as H.H. Price has pointed 
out, we must be careful not to push the 'contrast' too fur.^
'Without memory' he says 'there would be no primary recognition; 
without primary recognition, no abstraction, and therefore no basic 
concepts; and without basic concepts there would be no derivative
'Thinking and Experience', p.59.
1
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concepts, which are acquired by intellectual operations directed 
upon these basic ones’. Inventiveness is the mark of the intelli­
gent man. As Ryle says^ ’He has to meet new objections, interpret 
new evidence and make connections between elements in the situation 
which had not previously been co-ordinated. In short he has to 
innovate...'. But it is his memories which provide the basis for 
his inventiveness - and indeed it may well be that much of the 
'inventiveness' is itself simply the reapplication of certain kinds 
of memories, the recognition of similarities which are not obvious 
to less lively minds, 
ii• Remembering rules
Insofar as we do work out how to achieve some end, whether this 
'working out' be a slow, deliberate performance or a spontaneous 
realisation which seems to occur along with the action itself, we must 
in some way classify the situation before us and predict the outcome 
of our actions accordingly. This, I presume, is what Ryle means by 
'the presence of certain sorts of explanatory-cum-predictive asser­
tions' .t" And these classifications and predictions certainly involve 
operations of memory; the recognition of kinds and the memory of 
cause-effect sequences. Thus discovering how is in part a matter 
of remembering how - which in this case is very clearly a matter of
I
'The Concept of Mind', p.47.
'The Concept of Mind', p.25. See also p. 161 (of this essay).
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remembering that certain kinds of things behave in certain ways 
in certain kinds of situations. Our ’inventiveness' rests upon our 
ability to observe relational similarities in past and present situa­
tions and so make predictions about the achievement of our present 
needs, and the more extensive our memories the greater opportunity 
we have to make such observations. If we remembered, and appreciated 
the full predictive implications of, every cause/effect sequence 
we had ever witnessed we should indeed be well equipped to tackle 
any problems which confronted us.
I agree with Ryle's assertion* ’Often we deplore a person's 
ignorance of some fact only because we deplore the stupidity of 
which his ignorance is a consequence’. But, as we have seen, what 
we praise and what we deplore is a totally different question from 
what we do and do not consider to be instances of rememoering how.
i'he reason for our disgust is that we are assuming that the person 
remembers certain facts which constitute premises and yet is 
incapable of moving from these to an obvious conclusion. As we 
saw in the previous paragraph, classification and prediction cannot 
operate without memory; thus we can hold the man to be stupid only 
on the assumption that his memory is sound. If he were proved to 
be suffering from amnesia (and therefore ignorant of the 'premises' 
in question; we should not then think him stupid. Even in normal
'The Concept of Mind’, p.28.
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conditions ’I forgot' is often the best defence against a charge 
of stupidity.
c) Intelligence and ignorance
It would undoubtedly be wrong, a misunderstanding of the 
language, to equate lack of intelligence with lack of knowledge.
A man is not unintelligent because he does not know something he has 
had no opportunity to learn - nor yet because he has forgotten 
something he once knew. On the other hand it would be equally wrong 
to overlook the very real connection, for the purpose of the question 
we are considering, between intelligent behaviour and knowledge of 
facts, for the current awareness of, and guidance by, certain facts - 
those proposed in our 'explanatory-cum-predictive assertions' - is 
the only factor we have been able to find to differentiate intelli­
gent performances from both automatic and accidental ones, 
i. Remembering how as recognition
In chapter III we discovered that 'remembering by doing' 
involved at least the recognition of our present situation as 
similar in some vital respect to some past situation. It is not 
enough that a situation 'looks familiar’; it must look familiar in 
a particular, informative way. We cannot expel 'remembering that' 
from the situation simply by concentrating our attention upon the 
present perception. Thus when my remembering how to go home is 
manifest simply in my going home, insofar as it ij3 remembering how 
and not just 'sleep-walking', it is in part dependent upon my knowing,
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i.e. remembering, a great many fadts of the kind 'this is the street 
which has led me to such a place - the turning I took on those 
occasions is just past the gasworks', whether I recite these pro­
positions to myself or not. Intelligence, as it is involved in 
remembering how, is not a matter of knowing a great many facts, but 
its exercise is wholly dependent upon knowing the relevant facts, 
ii• 'Remember' is transitive
Whilst we do not hold a man to be ignorant because of the things 
he cannot do, we may be justified in suspecting that he cannot do 
them because he is ignorant. If a man cannot write down the English 
for a passage of Greek prose this is more likely to be because of his 
ignorance of Greek or English than because of an inability to mani­
pulate a pen. And although it might well happen that a man could 
recite every instruction a good teacher had given him but still not 
be able to ride a bicycle, his failure could be the result of his 
ignorance of certain facts which his teacher had been unable to 
express in words. There are elements in most performances which defy 
description, at least within the framework of our existing language, 
but this does not mean that they are in principle indescribable 
in language. We do use public words for many of our private experi­
ences. (For instance, how else could we separate, as we do, the 
concepts of misery and melancholy?)
It is a point we should always bear in mind that 'remember' is 
a transitive verb; when we remember we always remember something.
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And when the something we remember is ‘how to cycle' the quotation 
marks must always be implied even if they are not shown. Unless we 
use 'remember how' simply as a synonym for 'be able' - and this, if 
my arguments are sound, would render impossible the distinction 
between intelligent and non-intelligent performances - then it is 
hard to see what remembering how to do something could amount to 
unless it involved the occurrent remembering of at least some of the 
rules, maxims and propositions which may be held to constitute 'how 
to do it'. How else could we characterise the distinction we are all 
aware of between 'remembering how' and 'being able'?
4. Conclusions
There should be no further danger of confusion between 'intelli­
gent behaviour' and commendable behaviour (the behaviour of 
'intelligent people') and so we can return to the real problem which 
is:
We are satisfied that many of our performances are intelligently 
directed towards some specific end in the light of our experience of 
similar performances in the past. We therefore view them as instances 
of remembering how. Yet, in performing, we do not generally seem 
to be relying for guidance upon any memories of past events. We can 
appreciate the difference between purely automatic responses and 
intelligent performances, and also between accidental and intentional 
performances, yet we cannot find by introspection that series of 
directive memories which is the only differentiating factor we can
conceive between them
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The solution to the problem lies, I believe, in: (a) the 
realisation that every performance includes a great deal of auto­
matic motor-response whether or not the performance counts as an 
instance of ’remembering how’; (b) a considerable broadening of our 
view as to what constitutes remembering events, 
a) Dispositions to perform and dispositions to remember
i. General applicability of the disposition/occurrence distinction
The point I made in chapter II, that the distinction between
disposition and occurrence, though applicable to memory, is not 
peculiar to memory, is here very important. We develop dispositions 
(how we do so is the concern of physiologists; both to remember 
certain experiences and to give certain bodily performances when 
stimulated in the appropriate ways. In the dispositional sense, 
therefore, it is possible that I both can perform the bodily activi­
ties which are essential to my driving a car and do remember those 
rules, maxims and propositions which may be classified as ’how to 
drive a car'.
ii. Joint actualisation of dispositions
While I am sitting at my desk, I may run through in my mind 
all these rules, maxims and propositions. To do this would be to 
actualise my disposition to remember how to drive a car. On the
other hand I may, on a long, straight, lonely road, sit back at
the wheel of a car allowing my mind to wander while my hands and
feet respond automatically to the feel of the car beneath me and
the sight of the road uhead, and then I would be actualising my 
dispositional ability to make the efficient physical manoeuvres 
which constitute the overt performance.
But, when I am driving through the town, easing the clutch, 
touching the brake, marking to whom I must give way and who must 
give way to me, making signals, anticipating traffic jams and 
avoiding one-way streets (all of which operations come under the 
general heading of ’driving a car') then, unless I am an extremely 
practised driver, I am actualising both dispositions together.
My performance 3till includes much that is purely automatic; but 
it also includes much that is planned and considered, the 
conscious application of those rules and maxims which constitute 
'how to drive'. There is no harm, of course, in our speaking of 
a single disposition to drive carefully - provided that we bear in 
mind that driving carefully includes both remembering how and 
being able, just as working happily includes both working and being 
happy about it.
When we appreciate that the body can retain the capacity for 
effective activity just as the mind can retain acquired knowledge, 
and further, that with the continued repetition of any task what 
we might call the 'motor-response dispositions' become adequate 
to account for an ever increasing part of the efficient performance 
of that task, there is no longer any mystery about those performances 
which we feel to be both wholly effective and completely 'unconscious'
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There is no reason why tney should not be both. What makes these
performances seem mysterious is only our insistence upon calling
’ )
them 'remembering1. And we do this simply because there was once 
a time when similar performances were remembering, and also, because 
as overt performances (even when the observer is also the performer), 
they are indistinguishable from consciously planned performances, 
b) The 'event' being recalled
By showing that within an effective performance there are both 
'automatic' and 'intelligent' elements, we simplify, but do not 
solve, the problem. The fact remains that the 'mental factor' of 
which we are conscious, in even what we now accept as the 'intelli­
gent part' of our behaviour, does not seem to be a series of memories 
of past events running through our minds, but rather, to use Ryle's 
phrase, 'certain explanatory-cum-predictive assertions'. Yet how 
are we able to make these explanatory-cum-predictive assertions 
except by virtue of being apprised in some occurrent way of past 
situations and events?
It is true that we can become physiologically conditioned to 
utter (or sub-vocally speak) certain sounds in response to certain 
stimuli just as we can become physiologically conditioned to act in 
certain ways with our hands and feet. In fact we often 'catch 
ourselves' giving a muttered commentary on our activities and plans 
as we go about our business. But it is noticeable that on these 
occasions we are generally engaged in routine tasks which demand
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little of our attention, tasks which we frequently do perform 
quite automatically, like washing up dishes or sorting a pack of 
cards into order, and the commentary is simply an extension of the 
automatic performance; it could be said to be 'directing* our 
activities only if we were to attend separately to it as we might to 
any independent instructing agent - a gramaphone for instance - and 
obey its dictates. But this re-introduces deliberate intelligent 
behaviour, the following of the instructions, and the problem 
breaks out afresh.
It does not seem possible to avoid the conclusion that, insofar 
as we are actually remembering how to perform some task - are pre­
dicting the outcome of our conduct and shaping it accordingly - we 
must be basing our predictions upon our occurrent remembering of 
similar tasks performed in the past or on maxims formed in the light 
of past experience. That is, we must be relying on our occurrent 
remembering of events in some sense of that expression. We must 
therefore consider what sense of remembering events this can be. 
i. Degrees of determinateness
What constitutes one particular event must always be an arbitrary 
matter. It can be misleading to talk of remembering an event as 
though there were certain fixed limits to this achievement as there 
are to eating on apple. One event is whatever we choose to regard 
as one event and it may be remembered in more or less detail. My 
remembering sitting down on this chair a moment ago is no more
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remembering an event in any essential way than my remembering coming 
to this room nearly every day last year. Each memory could be 
augmented by greater detail and each 'event* could be sub-divided. 
Further, the temporal location of events is not an essential part 
of the memory of them.* It is possible, therefore, to allow that in 
remembering how to swim sidestroke I am not actually recalling some 
specific previous occasion of swimming sidestroke, without being 
committed to the view that I am not recalling any event which could 
be described as my swimming sidestroke in the past. I may well be 
recalling, though not necessarily in verbal propositions, my exercise 
of the skills and 'sub-skills' involved on an indeterminate number 
of past occasions, and being guided accordingly in ray present perform­
ance •
Now, I contend that, unless and until our 'motor-response 
dispositions' develop to the point where we no longer need to remem­
ber how, the effective performance of tasks is. dependent upon our 
occurrent remembering of this kind. And, further, that since there 
is an obvious thread of connection between all these past performances, 
the recollection of any of them, with or without specific location 
in time, can quite properly be described as the memory of an event 
^or of events - there is no real difference), even though the 'event' 
in question may spread over a considerable period and be of too in-
_
This point was made in chapter III, p.70.
determinate a character to ever be thought of as 'an event’ in 
normal contexts.
ii. Remembering 'states of mind*
It is necessary, in view of current ruling opinion on the 
question, to say something in support of my claim that these events 
may be remembered 'though not necessarily in verbal propositions’.
In chapter III, I distinguished between remembered propositions and 
the forms of words which are used to convey them and gave my reasons 
for believing that we must accept the existence of non-verbal 
thinking and remembering. The separation of memory-claim from 
memory in chapter IV and the conclusion that the memory, as distinct 
from the memory-claim, is £f our private experience in perceiving 
the event, not £f the public event itself, shows how a non-verbal 
memory can play its part in the production of a verbal claim. The 
memory-claim when it is made must (qua claim) be made in verbal 
propositions, but there is no reason why the memory on which it is 
based should contain anything verbal.
Now, in the case of ’remembering how', instead of an uttered 
(or otherwise formulated) claim we have a deliberate activity. The 
memory is manifested not in a piece of knowledge but in a piece of 
purposeful behaviour. And the memory which gives rise to this piece 
of purposeful behaviour need not itself be a verbal memory, [it 
may, of course, take the form of a verbal proposition (an ordinary 
memory-claim), as it tends to in our hesitant 'learning' performances 
But here no problem arises.
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Suppose that whilst I am swimming I am aware that a certain 
muscular movement of my body has produced on previous unspecified 
occasions a particular thrusting effect through the water. It is 
very doubtful that this could be expressed precisely enough in words 
to be of any directive value to me, yet it does not seem at all doubt­
ful that I am remembering a certain relationship which I have observed 
in the past, and whilst I may not be able to describe this to myself 
in words I can exemplify it in action. It seems to be a matter of 
complete indifference whether we say that the actual ’subject of 
memory’ here is an event or a series of events or a belief formulated 
non-verbally to myself at some past time as the result of my obser­
vation of a series of events. The important point is that my failure 
to make specific memory-claims to myself does not entail that I am 
not in fact remembering in the occurrent sense.
Thus, whilst Ryle is no doubt right when he says* 'A well-trained 
sailor boy can both tie complex knots and discern whether someone else 
is tying them correctly or incorrectly, deftly or clumsily. But he 
is probably incapable of the difficult task of describing in words how 
the knots should be tied', he is wrong in supposing this to show that 
the sailor boy is not in fact remembering how the knots should be 
tied in order to tie them. It shows only that his remembering is not 
in the form of verbal propositions.
1
'The Concept of Mind', p.56
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In the case of this sailor hoy, assuming that he is not per­
forming by motor-response alone (which he could be), much of the 
remembering may well be in the form of imagery. If he is able to 
perform the task without watching what he is doing, there would be 
a good case for denying any visual imagery. But not all imagery 
is visual. There are certain bodily feelings involved in the per­
formance of tasks, and the memory of these feelings, as distinct from 
the memory of any propositions about them, would be one kind of imagery 
kinaesthetic imagery. And he could remember how to tie the knot by 
rehearsal, as it were, without an actual rope in his hands, and 
without the recitation of any rules. His remembering could be in a 
series of visual or kinaesthetic images of the stages of the performance 
and he may also twist his hands in a kind of mime, possibly, though 
not necessarily, accompanied by a stumbling verbal account based on 
his imagery.
The manner in which we learn a skill must to a great extent 
determine the way in which we remember it. When we learn by instruc­
tion we tend to retember by recitation; when we learn by attempt we 
tend to remember by imagery, together with half-formed dictums made 
to ourselves during the attempts. Since most often we learn by a 
combination of both, our way of remembering will depend largely upon 
the relative effectiveness for ourselves of the two ways of learning 
the skill in question. This is why some men can tie bow-ties 
(usually a very 'conscious performance') only upon themselves,
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whilst others can tie them only upon other people or on themselves 
with the aid of a mirror.
The tasks which we think of ourselves as remembering how to 
perform are for the most part muscular tasks in the broadest sense, 
and it is reasonable to suppose that any imagery involved in remem­
bering how to perform them is mainly of the kinaesthetic kind. This 
fact makes it particularly easy for us to overlook its presence.
Thus, in an article entitled 'Remembering' B.S. Benjamin wrote* 
'Anyone who assigns the memory-image a central role in the analysis 
of remembering must explain the connection or lack of connection 
between our rememberings when memory images naturally are likely to 
occur, as in our memories of places and faces, and those where they 
are not, as for instance when we remember how to tie a running- 
bowline...'. Since tactual or kinaesthetic imagery would be very 
likely to occur in our remembering of how to tie a bowline, once 
it is allowed that the tying and the remembering are not one and the 
same thing, it seems clear that Benjamin is regarding memory-images 
as visual images - which for a very obvious reason play only a minor 
part in remembering how to perform physical tasks. It should be
noted however that not all recent writers have fallen into this trap.
2E.J. Furlong writes“ 'This stress on the visual has given a handle 
1
'Mind', vol• LXV, 1956, p.317.
’Imagination', p.70.
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to those who for one reason or another are ill-disposed to imagery.
Perhaps impotent to visualise themselves they write of ‘’mental images"
in any form’. And H.H. Price* attributed his own poor performance
at golf to his weakness in kinaesthetic imagery-powers.
iii. The simultaneity of act and directive
We are now in a position to answer the argument that if we were
occurrently remembering events in the sense described and acting in
accordance with the dictates of our memories whenever we performed
intelligently, we could not then achieve the smooth continuity which
2characterises our overt behaviour.
Let us suppose that I am building a wall, and that my performance 
is an instance of 'remembering how*. It would clearly be absurd to 
suggest that I must therefore remember every detail of how to build it 
before commencing operations. I do not have to 'remember how' and then 
build - nor yet do 1 have to remember how to lay a brick and then lay 
it. It is enough that my remembering keeps, as it were, always one 
jump ahead of my performance, that each 'task' (and what constitutes 
one task is what we choose to regard as one) be considered with a 
degree of determinateness suitable to its complexity and, insofar as 
it demands direction, planned accordingly in the light of my memory 
of how it can be accomplished. Many such 'tasks' are wholly contained
1
'Thinking and Experience', p.237.
2
This argument was put forward in the first section of this 
chapter. See p. 149.
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w i th in  o th e r  ' t a s k s ' ;  th e  m eres t  f l i c k i n g s  of th e  w r i s t ,  s t r a i g h t e n ­
in g s ,  sm ooth ings , s e t t i n g s ,  may each be reg a rd ed  a s  s e p a r a te  t a s k s .
Thus th e  remembering how need n o t  p recede  th e  b u i ld in g  of th e  w a l l ,  
o r  th e  l a y in g  o f  th e  b r i c k  -  i t  may accompany i t .
I  say  ' i n s o f a r  a s  i t  demands d i r e c t i o n '  because  much o f  th e  a c tu a l  
perfo rm ance  does n o t ;  i t  i s  s im ple  m o to r- re sp o n se  to  a p h y s ic a l  
s t im u lu s .  T hat i t  may be a l e a r n t  a b i l i t y  l i k e  w alk ing ,  and n o t  an 
in h e r e n t  a b i l i t y  l i k e  b r e a th in g ,  i s  h e re  q u i t e  i r r e l e v a n t .  I t  i s  th e  
a b i l i t y  o f  our b o d ie s  t o  c a r ry  on, so to  speak, w ith  th e  job  in  hand 
which SDiooths o u t  and re n d e r s  c o n t in u o u s  our o v e r t  p e rfo rm an ces .  Our 
m o to r - r e s p o n s e s ,  by f i l l i n g  th e  gaps between our p lanned  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
a l lo w  our o v e r t  perfo rm ances  to  co n t in u e  u n in t e r r u p te d .^  
i v .  The a c i d - t e s t  o f  remembering how
T h is  com ple tes  my account o f  what i t  i s  to  remember how t o  do 
som eth ing .  I am n o t  d i s p u t in g  t h a t  we can and sometimes do perform
w ith  com plete  e f f i c i e n c y  t a s k s  which we once l e a r n t  to  perform  and
2
t h a t ,  in  A . J .  A y e r 's  w ords ,"  's u c h  e x e r c i s e s  need n o t  be accompanied 
by a n y th in g  t h a t  anyone would be even tem pted  to  c a l l  a memory- 
e x p e r i e n c e '  . But I c la im  t h a t  in  such ca se s  we a re  concerned , no t 
w ith  memory in  th e  normal sense  of t h a t  word, b u t  on ly  w ith  a c q u i re d
1
Compare R u s s e l l  'An O u t l in e  o f  P h i lo s o p h y ' ,  p .198 ' I n  t a l k i n g ,  words 
su g g e s t  o th e r  words, and a man w ith  s u f f i c i e n t  v e rb a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
may be s u c c e s s f u l l y  c a r r i e d  a long  by them f o r  a c o n s id e ra b le  t i m e . '
2
'The Problem o f  K now ledge ',  p .1 5 3 .
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p h y s io lo g ic a l  c a p a c i t i e s .  When th o s e  c a p a c i t i e s  were developed , and 
w hether th e y  might someday c o l l a p s e ,  th row ing  us back upon th e  
re s o u rc e s  o f  our memories, i s  b e s id e  th e  p o in t .  I a l s o  c la im  t h a t  
n o tw i th s ta n d in g  t h i s ,  t h e r e  i s  an a c t i v i t y  which can p ro p e r ly  be 
c a l l e d  'remembering how’ , which i s  q u i t e  d i s t i n c t  from 'b e in g  a b l e ' ,  
and which can occu r  w hether o r  n o t  we a re  a c t u a l l y  perfo rm ing  th e  
t a s k  in  q u e s t io n .  I t  i s ,  however, more l i k e l y  to  occur w h i l s t  we a re  
perfo rm ing  th e  t a s k ,  bo th  because i t s  o ccu rren c e  may th e n  be demanded 
and because  th e  perform ance a c t s  as  a s t im u lu s  t o  th e  memory.
I t  i s  i n t e l l i g i b l e  t o  t a l k  o f  remembering only  when th e r e  i s  
something which we remember -  and co n ce iv ab ly  could f o r g e t .  I f  none 
of th e  perform ances  people commonly speak o f  a s  remembering how 
f u l f i l l e d  t h i s  req u ire m en t my argum ents  in  t h i s  c h a p te r  would be ta n ta .  
mount t o  a p le a  f o r  d ropping  th e  e x p re s s io n  from th e  language .  But 
s in c e  many of th e s e  perfo rm ances  do -  in  my o p in io n  by f a r  th e  
g r e a t e s t  p ro p o r t io n  of them do -  my p le a  i s  on ly  f o r  th e  more c a r e fu l  
a p p l i c a t io n  o f  th e  e x p re s s io n ,  a t  l e a s t  in  an e p is te m o lo g ic a l
en q u iry
Chapter VI
IMAGES - THE SUBJECTS OF IMAGERY
1. Kinds of imagery 
a) The meanings of 1 image’
I propose to begin this chapter with a brief examination of the 
uses of the term 'image', an examination which I hope will make 
apparent the extent and the limitations of the connections between 
these different uses.
When we speak of the graven image of a god the assumption is that 
the statue copies or reproduces the physical characteristics of that 
god, so that by looking at the statue we see what the god is alleged 
to look like. But the term 'image' is often used to mean a strong 
resemblance or suggestive likeness rather than an exact likeness.
When someone says 'Our Fred is the image of our Arthur' he does not 
usually mean that he cannot tell them apart. He does mean, however, 
(though he may, of course, be wrong) that nobody could fail to see 
the resemblance. 'Image of' is much stronger than simply 'like'. 
'Image', in its most basic and general sense, sometimes means an 
exact copy and sometimes not, but always it means an unmistakable 
likeness.
A mirror-image or reflection ijs an exact visual copy, but for 
the reversal of right and left. (The colour photograph is perhaps 
the most exact visual copy).1 But it is not because of its exactness
I
I am ignoring the fact that both mirror-image and photograph are 
usually smaller than the subject imaged.
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that I take ’mirror-image1 to be a special sense of ’image’; a 
mirror-image is something we can examine, it is itself an observable 
entity in the ordinary sense. We speak of the statue as 'an image' 
but it is also, and primarily, a statue, and we see the image of the 
god, as it were, in it. The mirror-image is nothing but the mirror- 
image. To speak of a statue as the image of a god is to speak of a 
relationship between two entities, the god whose existence is assumed 
and the statue, as when we speak of Fred's being the image of Arthur. 
But to speak of a mirror-image is not to speak of a relationship, a 
likeness between a man and something else, his replica; nor yet 
between a man and the sheet of glass or polished steel, or pool of 
water, or whatever else the image is 'in’. It is to speak only of 
the visible image itself. It might be claimed that it is just one 
way of seeing the object - but it is a mediate way of seeing it, and 
the mediating entity is not the mirror but the actual image in it.
After-images are 'entities' in the same way as mirror-images - 
they are things which are there to be seen simply as images. When 
I close my eyes after looking fixedly at a sunlit window the 'picture' 
of that window remains before me as though it had been photographed 
onto my retina. Except by such mechanical means as pressing my 
eyeballs I can neither remove it nor change it; it is just as much 
outside my control as is the view of the window itself when my eyes 
are open. And if the light has been particularly bright the after­
image will remain superimposed on my visual field even when my eyes are 
open, partly obscuring the normal view from a section of that field.
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The study of a fte r - im a g e s , in c lu d in g  the 'r e v e r s a l'  o f th e ir  
co lours in  some ca ses  and not in  o th e r s , l i e s  w ith in  the province o f 
p h ysio logy  -  but th a t does not n e c e s s a r ily  mean th a t they  are p h ilo ­
so p h ic a lly  u n in te r e s t in g . Being a common and e a s i ly  id e n t if ia b le  
ex p er ien ce , the a fter-im a g e  provides a u se fu l co n tra st to  the memory- 
image. There may a lso  be a strong connection  between a fter-im agery  
and e id e t ic  imagery. For e id e t i c  images seem to  have both some 
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  norm ally a s so c ia te d  w ith a fter -im a g es  and some norm ally  
a sso c ia te d  with memory-images and im agination .
In d iscu ss in g  e id e t i c  imagery I am a t a con sid erab le  d isadvantage, 
in th a t I cannot r e c a l l  having ever experienced  i t  m y se lf, and, must 
r e ly ,  th e r e fo r e , on th e rep orts  o f th o se  who have. An e id e t ic  image 
may occur im m ediately, or some con sid era b le  tim e, a f te r  th e  perceptual 
s itu a t io n  which gave r i s e  to  i t .  I t  resem bles an a fter-im age in  
th a t i t  i s  seem ingly 'th e r e , b efore th e  e y e s ’ , in  a way th a t perm its 
us to  study i t  as we might any ex tern a l o b je c t .  I t  i s  claim ed th a t  
an e id e t ic  image can be 'p ro jec ted ' on to  a blank su rface and can 
then be examined,much as we might examine a p a in tin g  or a photograph. 
Normally i t  i s  a f a i t h f u l  reproduction  o f  the scene p erce iv ed .
I t  would seem p o s s ib le ,  th en , to  ex p la in  th e e id e t i c  image as 
sim ply a delayed p o s it iv e  a fter -im a g e , a mere photograph on the r e t in a ,  
provided th a t the reproduction  always was exact and th a t the 'p ic tu r e '  
remained always w holly  o u tsid e  the con tro l o f the 'v ie w e r '. But 
experim ental p sy c h o lo g is ts  su ggest th a t n e ith e r  o f th e se  co n d itio n s
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is in fact fulfilled. Apparently eidetic images are often found on 
’examination’ to be imperfect reproductions of the scenes perceived, 
and the people 'viewing' them can sometimes be induced by suggestion 
to make them change, or even ' come to life'.* If we accept their 
testimony we must allow that eidetic imagery is not simply a 
physiological process of 'photographing' like after-imaging. The 
alternative is to assert that those people who have reported in­
accuracies and changes in eidetic images were unable to distinguish 
the point at which memory-imagery or imagination-imagery came in to 
augment or replace the eidetic imagery. I find this second alternative 
very difficult to reconcile with my own experience of memory-images, 
for these do not seem to be substantives in any sense at all, and would 
hardly seem likely, therefore, to be confused with the kind of phenomena 
I understand eidetic images to be. We can, perhaps, draw comfort from 
the fact that most of the reports of such changes come from young 
children, and it is notorious that children are sometimes carried away 
by their imagination. I do not wish to give any definite opinion on 
the question, firstly, because as I have admitted, I have no experience 
of eidetic imagery, and secondly, because the eidetic image does not 
seem to play any vital part in memory. People who do have eidetic 
images usually allow that they also have other images, distinguishable 
from these, which they call memory-images.
See I.M.L. Hunter - 'Memory - Facts and Fallacies', p.l46ff.
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At this juncture we need only say of memory-images that they are 
our means of being aware (or our actual awareness) of our past sense- 
perceptions as such. It is not essential that they be exact 
reproductions of these past sense-perceptions. Leaving aside for the 
moment the question whether it is proper to speak of seeing or hearing 
our memory-images, it is sufficient that our 'having' them recalls to 
us some past sensory experience of our own, as it were directly, not 
through the medium of verbal description. We need no command of 
language in order to have meoiory-images; on the contrary, psychologists 
claim to have considerable evidence that the occurrence of memory- 
imagery diminishes with the development of linguistic habits. Let us 
say, then, at this stage, that memory-imagery is the direct linkage of 
our past sense-perceptions with our present awareness of them as past 
sense-perceptions. The experience of imaging is similar, in a way that 
seems quite impossible to describe and yet which those of us who 
habitually remember in images must know, to the sensory experiences of 
seeing, hearing, and so on, though it does not involve the present use 
of any sense-organ; there is no reason why a man who has gone blind 
should not still have visual memory-images. Memory-images, unlike 
after-images and eidetic images, can often be induced and dismissed at 
will - though at other times they 'appear' as if from nowhere and seem 
to linger when we would be rid of them. In this their behaviour is no 
different from that of any other form of memory.
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Sometimes we have images which are not, and which we know full 
well not to be, of any particular object we have ever experienced by 
sense-perception. Just as I can have an image of my friend sitting on 
the bicycle he habitually rides, so I can have an image of the same 
friend riding a donkey, a thing I have certainly never seen him do.
And, as images, the two seem to be different only in their ’subject 
matter’. I in fact distinguish between them simply because I know one 
to be a memory-image and the other to be merely a figment of my own 
imagination; but how I know this is a problem which has exercised the 
minds of philosophers for a very long time. The extreme difficulty 
which has always been found in demonstrating how memory-images can be 
distinguished from imagination-images by their own intrinsic qualities 
or their ’modes of presentation’ is one of the factors which have led 
so many philosophers to assert that we distinguish them only by their 
compatibility with other, non-image, memories - and to relegate the 
memory-image to the status of a mere aide-memoir accordingly. But I 
myself am quite unprepared to abandon the belief, arising from my own 
actual experience of in fact being able to distinguish them, that there 
must be inherent distinguishing marks. I want now to suggest that the 
failure of so many people to ’put their finger on’ these differences is 
largely the result of a misunderstanding about the kind of difference 
they are trying to discover.
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b) Images of memory and of imagination 
i. Is the difference of kind or of degree?
however wild or grotesque our imagination-images may be there is at 
least some sense in which they arise out of actual past experience. I 
can visualize my friend on a donkey because, though I have never seen 
this sight, I have seen my friend and I have seen a donkey. I am not in 
the position of the Prince in one of Anthony Armstrong’s fanciful stories, 
who, when given a magic wish, wished for a blue rumped gnurgle because he 
wanted to see what one would look like. Imagination imagery can be 
likened to those cards with heads and middles and rumps of animals on 
them that we used to play with as children; the creatures we 'made up’ 
were quite fantastic, but the individual parts did all belong somewhere.
In the same way our imagination-images are memory-images - but not of 
any single past perceptual occasion. To accept them as re-presentations 
of our own past perceptions would be wrong - but not altogether wrong.
And, conversely, in taking memory-images to be re-presentations of 
our own past perceptions we are right - but not altogether right. For an 
image does not have to be 'perfect' to rate as a memory-image; if my 
memory-image of the friend I lunched with today included a white 
shirt whereas in fact he wore a blue shirt, this alone would not be 
grounds for holding that I am not having a memory-image at all but an 
imagination-image. It would be a memory-image with some of the detail 
inaccurate, that is, including some detail recalled from a different 
perceptual occasion from the one I consider myself to be remembering.
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Where, then, should we draw the line between memory-images and 
imagination-images? The answer is, I believe, that we do not need 
to 'draw a line* at all.
Once we cease to think of memory-images and imagination-images as 
two distinct kinds of phenomena we can point to at least three 
different criteria for 'allotting marks' on the side of memory or on 
the side of imagination - in the act, as it were, of actually having 
the images. I do not mean that we consciously judge the image to be 
'memory-like' or 'imaginationlike', only that there are different 
factors which prompt us to accept it as memory or as imagination, 
ii. Distinguishing features
a. 'Firmness'. There is about my image of my friend on a bicycle a 
unity and 'firmness' that is lacking from my image of the same friend 
on a donkey. In the one case there is a single whole, man on bicycle, 
a single focal point of attention. In the other case there are two 
separate focal points; it is almost as if I were imaging a man and 
then imaging a donkey and trying to 'clip them together'. The bicycle 
image, though it may be sketchy, is still constant and steady. The 
donkey image, though more detailed (as detailed in fact as I want it 
to be), tends to be constantly blurring and changing; details come 
and go and only in the face of my friend does the detail seem to be 
set and firm.
It could well be that Hume was thinking of this difference when 
he spoke of the 'vividness' of memory-images as compared with
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imagination-images. But 'vivid1, as that word is normally used, is 
certainly not the best description. 'Self-sufficient', 'unitary' and 
'constant' are perhaps better terms. I realise that a particular 
imagination-image may be unitary, self-sufficient or constant, but 
since we are considering only one means of 'allotting marks', not a 
rigid distinction of kinds, so long as these qualities are generally 
characteristic of memory-images and not of imagination-images, the 
exceptions are not disastrous. And when exceptions do occur their non­
conformity can often be explained as something peculiar to a particular 
case. They might, for instance, be images of images.* 
b. Controllability. Cur imagination-images come and go and change 
quite freely. The donkey beneath my friend can be turned into an
elephant, his hair can be turned bright green and made to stand on
2end; the image is at the disposal of my every whim. As Hume said 
'A man may indulge his fancy in feigning any past scene of adventure'. 
The odd thing is that Hume then went on to insist that without some 
'memory indicator' he would take what he had feigned to be his memory 
of his own past. Surely the reason we speak of feigning is that we 
are aware of our own control over what is being postulated. Feigning 
and shamming are intelligible only on the assumption that the 
performer knows this is not 'the real thing'.
T
See p. 202ff.
2
'A Treatise of Human Nature', Bk.l, pt.iii, p.85 of 'Hume's 
Treatise' - L.A. Selby-Bigge.
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Of course I can make the bicycle beneath my friend ‘turn into’ an 
elephant - but in doing this I am inmediately aware of having 'taken 
charge of' my image. The bicycle will tend to re-assert itself as 
soon as I discontinue my deliberate fantasy, and there may even be a 
sense, which we shall consider later,^ in which it is 'there' all the 
time.
c. The 'natural development' of context. Closely connected with 
'controllability' is the third criterion, what we might call the natural 
development or expansion of images. The memory-image 1 have of a friend 
on a bicycle leads on naturally to an expanded image which includes the 
trees and buildings behind him, and to further images of his getting off 
his bicycle to greet me and of the sound of his voice as he did so. And 
all this additional imagery has the same 'firmness' and the same 
'involuntariness' as the original image.
There are, of course, occasions when I remember so much and can 
remember no more, when the context simply refuses to 'expand' further - 
a stage which is bound to be reached eventually. But the feeling of 
'expandability' still persists - I seem compelled either to enlarge 
my image, to expand its context - or else to shift ray train of thought 
to something altogether different. So long as my attention remains, 
the 'next move' is both demanded and to some extent predetermined. At 
the conclusion of his book 'Remembering' Bartlett says, 'Always it is
T
See p.214.
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the material from some specially organised mass which has to be
central, and about this the constructions and reconstructions of
memory cluster'.* This certainly seems to be true of imagery.
The imagination-image does not so much expand as simply change.
We have no feeling of predetermination or compulsion; the development,
if any, is haphazard and voluntary (unless it follows some pre-arranged
2
pattern of associated i d e a s ) T o  quote Bartlett again: 'With 
constructive imagination this is not so. The central "scheme" is not, 
so to speak, predetermined by the initial orientation. There is a freer
3
range from setting to setting and from interest to interest'. 
Memory-imagery, on the other hand, is always felt to be an integral 
part of a greater whole. It 'belongs in context', and this may well 
be the basis of the 'feeling of familiarity' of which Russell speaks. 
Certainly this explanation of 'familiarity' would provide an answer 
to Holland's objection that an imagination-image entertained many 
times is more familiar than a memory-image of an experience had but
4once. The imagination-image, however often it occurs, will not 
normally develop a contextual setting into which it naturally, almost 
compulsively, expands.
_
'Remembering', p.313.
2
Cf 'metaphorical imagery', p.242.
3
'Remembering', p.313.
4
This objection was raised in chapter II, p. 48.
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iii. Memory and imagination * elementa * in imagery
bince I have argued that the difference between memory and 
imagination imagery is one of degree rather than one of kind, it may 
be better to speak not of memory-images and imagination-images, but 
rather of the memory-elements and imagination-elements in imagery.
We can then say that, on any given occasion, the memory-elements 
are those 'parts* of an image which derive from a single past percep­
tual occasion, whilst the imagination-elements are those 'parts' 
which derive from past perceptual occasions other than the one we 
take ourselves to be remembering. Or, at the level of 'uninterpreted 
images', when everything in an image derives from the same past 
perceptual occasion it is a memory-image, i.e., composed wholly of 
memory-elements, and when the content of the image is derived from 
more than one past perceptual occasion it is potentially either an 
'imagination image' or an incorrect memory-image - the part which is 
incorrect being dependent upon what we subsequently take it to be the 
image of.
iv. Images of images
Now, there is really no reason why 'remembered experience' should 
be limited to 'remembered perceptual experience*. Just as I can 
remember perceiving things so I can remember imagining things. And 
if my imagining took the form of imagery, my memory of that imagining 
may well take the form of imagery too. In his article 'The Empiricist 
Theory of Memory' Holland considers the possibility of someone amusing
203
himself repeatedly by contemplating an image of Magdalen Tower
1standing on Magdalen Bridge. Such an image, when first entertained, 
would be 'taken as' imagination. The memory-elements and imagination- 
elements would be equally balanced (whether we thought of the image 
as erf the bridge or £f the tower) and would be discordant with each 
other, with a consequent lack of 'firmness'. Tne image would be 
completely controllable and detached from any single context. But 
subsequent occurrences of the same image could be memory-images - 
memory-images of the imagination image - and the image would tend 
to become more 'firm' and less controllable. What would still be 
3een to be the image of a fantasy in the light of other extraneous 
knowledge, could well, in time, come to have many of the inherent 
characteristics of an ordinary memory-image. It could not, however, 
acquire all the characteristics of memory-imagery. For the only 
'context' it could acquire would be one which would show it up 
immediately as the contrived fantasy it is. vVe could, if we wished, 
speak of a habit of forming a particular image rather than of the 
occurrence of memories of a previous image, but the effect would still 
be the same.
This, incidentally, provides us with at least one possible 
explanation of the 'fixed idea', the wrong belief to which we return 
even after we have been shown that it is wrong. I myself got it into
MIND, Vol. LXIII, 1954, p.468.
1
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my mind at an early age that a certain schoolmaster was cross-eyed 
(why I cannot say) and so often entertained an image of him with 
cross-eyes that on meeting him much later i was astonished to find 
that his eyes were in fact quite straight. Notwithstanding this I 
still image him with cross-eyes, and only by a considerable effort 
can I make myself image him otherwise.
v. ’Memory-images1 and 'imagination-images’ as complementary 
I may have a memory-image of my father riding a horse down 
a country lane and then, just to amuse myself, ’turn the horse into 
an elephant', and so create an 'imagination-image'. But suppose 
I then become interested in the elephant. The image may re-orient 
itself, as it were, about the elephant, so that instead of a country 
lane there is a Zoological Garden with an elephant being ridden 
through it - just as I saw it on my last visit. The rider fades 
and becomes nondescript, and once more I have a memory-image. In 
this case the imagination has re-kindled a different memory, but 
sometimes imagination may serve to augment, rather than to distort, 
the original memory. This is how I am inclined to interpret a 
private 'experiment' reported by Furlong.^
He tells how once he groped, with his eyes closed, from his 
chair to the door in a familiar room. A little later, recalling the 
experience, he was surprised to find that his memory of it was in
1
'A Study in Memory', p.7(5.
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visual imagery« Now, no doubt he had made the same journey many 
times with his eyes open. What then is more natural than that he 
should imagine the visual perceptions which would have been involved 
had he had his eyes open, and take this to be his remembering of the 
event? For the imagining in question is simply the transposition 
of true memory-images to another, and essentially similar, occasion.
He himself explains it by saying that what he was remembering was 
his whole state of mind at the time. But this seems to entail that 
as he groped he imagined the visual experience he would be having and 
subsequently remembered these imaginary visual experiences. And 
whilst this is certainly possible, it does not seem here to be 
necessary. ’Imagination-imagery’ quite often ’fills out' our memories 
where memory-imagery is weak or altogether lacking; so long as it is 
correct in essentials we are not likely to be misled by it, though 
clearly, we could be. Had Furlong claimed from memory that he 
passed the cat on the way to the door, we should have felt obliged 
to enquire whether he touched it or only ’saw’ it. 
c) Classifying memory-images by their organic origins
It is notorious that people who write about imagery often become 
so preoccupied with visual imagery that they write as if no other 
forms of imagery existed. I am myself so dominated by visual 
experience that such examples as spring to my mind are nearly always 
of the visual kind, and it is as well to remind ourselves as often 
as possible that memory-images can be of many kinds - as many in fact
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as there are kinds of sense experience. I want, therefore, to make 
it quite clear that whatever I may claim for visual imagery I am 
claiming equally, where it is not patently inappropriate, for every 
other kind of imagery as well, 
i. Correspondence with sense-organs
It is not necessary here to settle the question of how many 
different kinds of sense-organs we have. We need only state that 
whatever can be regarded as one class of organic sensations can give 
rise to what may be regarded as a corresponding class of images. We 
have sight and visual imagery, touch and tactual imagery, smell and 
olefactory imagery, hearing and auditory imagery, taste and gustatory 
imagery. If we claim that there is a separate kinaesthetic sense, 
sense of motion and/or sense of heat, we should also claim that there 
is separate kinaesthetic, motion and/or heat imagery. It is sometimes 
felt tnat there is a special problem about images when the corres­
ponding sensations are, as people say, localised. We know the 
difference between seeing something and having a visual image of it, 
but could there be the same difference (or the same sort of difference) 
between feeling something, say, a pinprick, and having a tactual 
image of it? I can see no reason at all why there should not be.
The people who raise this problem are overlooking the fact that what 
is seen is also ’localised', though not in our own bodies, and if 
it is possible to have a visual image of an ’external object' without 
thereby having an hallucination, it is equally possible to have a
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tactual image of a pinprick without thereby having an hallucination.
The tactual image of the pinprick would not be painful for the same 
reason as the visual image of a car's headlights is not dazzling. In 
principle every sensory experience is recallable, and according to the 
view which I shall develop in this and the following chapters, to recall 
a sensory experience i_s to have an image. Recalling a sensory 
experience is not to be confused with recalling that we had the 
experience, which may take the form simply of a verbal proposition.
Now, here I want to give a caution about a frequently encountered, 
and potentially misleading expression - 'verbal imagery1. Words, like 
images, often function in trains of associated ideas, and, when what we 
are considering is the association of ideas, words and images are 
genuine alternatives at the same functional level. Bartlett, for 
instance, says: 'A person who uses visual cues more readily and 
frequently than other cues can also, as a rule, use other cues - verbal, 
kinaesthetic, auditory, and so on - if he is forced or encouraged to 
do s o ' T h i s  is quite unexceptionable as it stands within a dis­
cussion of memory-cues. But the listing of 'verbal' with 'auditory', 
'kinaesthetic' and 'visual' may lead us, if we are not careful, to 
think of it as 'another of the same kind' in our consideration of 
imagery - and this would be very wrong.
1
'Remembering', p.109.
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Again, we find G.F. Stout saying 'There are some people, 
especially people who are much occupied with abstract thinking, who 
are inclined to deny that they have mental imagery at all. They are 
almost or quite unable to visualise objects, and their general power 
of mentally reviving auditory or tactile experiences may also be 
rudimentary. The images which with them mark the successive steps 
in a train of ideas are mainly or wholly verbal'.^ This too is 
perfectly all right - so long as we bear in mind that these 'verbal 
images' are images of_ words and are in fact either visual or 
auditory ojr kinaesthetic images. 'Verbal imagery' belongs at the 
classificatory level of 'tree imagery' or 'people imagery' - it is 
not a mode of imagery; it is a class of subjects of imagery, 
ii. Joint imagery
Just as perceptual experience can involve a number of different 
sense-organs, so the recall of that experience can involve a number 
of different kinds of imagery. My seeing an apple does not prevent 
my simultaneously tasting it, smelling it, feeling its surface or 
hearing it when I tap it to test its hardness. And my subsequent 
visual imagery of it need not in any way conflict with my tactual, 
olefactory, auditory or gustatory imagery of it. As I.M.L. Hunter 
writes 'Not only may we see again the high green hills, the blue sky,
1
'A Manual of Psychology’, p.149.
'Memory - Facts and Fallacies', p.135.
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the light-flecked waves breaking on the rocky shore, but we may also 
hear again the cries of the sea-birds and the sound of the ship's 
hooter. We may smell again the odour of the wrack on the shore and 
the perfume of the rose in our lapel. We may taste the chocolate 
we ate on that day, and feel again the warmth of the sun in our faces, 
our movements in walking along the heaving deck, and the sinking 
experience of oncoming seasickness’. And, of course, it is not 
necessary that we have these experiences one at a time.
The somewhat lyrical style of Hunter’s example draws attention to 
the richness of image-memory as compared with the somewhat sterile 
memory of proposition. Only in imagery can we ’re-live’ a past 
perceptual experience, and it is not surprising that those of us who 
are much given to imaging regard people who cannot or do not image, if 
indeed there really are such people, as greatly to be pitied.
2. Imageability 
a) What is imageable?
What sort of things are images of? I can have an image of a tree 
or of the smell of a railway train, or of a sentence if it was written 
or heard or spoken, but it just would not make sense to talk of an image 
of a proposition or of a fact. I have said that to have an image is to 
recall a sensory experience. We must consider, therefore, what class 
or classes of 'objects' we can be said to experience by or with our
senses
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i . Sensible qualities
Sensible qualities are obvious candidates, but we must be very 
careful not to confuse image and concept. To say that I have a 
sensation or an image of blue is to say that I have a sensation or 
an image as of a blue surface or expanse. It may be that in recalling 
the colour of the sky on a particular day I have a memory image which 
includes nothing but a blue expanse of no particular size and shape, 
but it still is the image of that particular blue of that particular 
sky. I may be able to have a general idea or concept of blueness 
but I cannot have a general image of blueness* (for what shade of 
blue would this be?), though I may have a series of images of 
different shades of blue. It is possible to image any particular 
sensible quality, but to do so is always to image the sensible quality 
of something, the appearance (or part of the appearance) presented 
by something, 
ii. Appearances
By 'an appearance' I mean a certain combination of sensible 
qualities in a certain relationship to each other as presented to an 
observer. So defined it follows logically that whenever we perceive a 
thing we sense an appearance. R.M. Chisholm has pointed out with great 
clarity that from 'He sees a boat' we may infer ’A boat appears in some 
way to him' or 'A boat presents him with an appearance', but not 'He
T
Cf. chapter VII, p. 265.
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sees an appearance '. However, to make the distinction, which I 
believe to be a very necessary one, between seeing, a perceptual 
experience which involves the use of our eyes and the classification 
or identification of what is presented to them, and mere visual 
sensing, the physiological reaction to a diversity of light and 
colour, to use Berkeley's phrase, at a pre-cognitive level, we cannot 
do better than to state that when the boat presents an appearance to 
me I see the boat by virtue of sensing that appearance. My mental 
reaction is, of course, to a boat, not to the appearance of the boat, 
in normal perceptual cases. And later, when I image what I previously 
sensed, ray mental reaction is, on most occasions, to a remembered 
boat, not to a remembered appearance of a boat.
This may seem to obliterate the distinction I have made between 
the thing and its appearance, but it does not. There are three 
important differences;
(1) The boat goes on in time; it is a thing in the world - the 
appearance is simply the momentary experience of a single observer or 
group of observers.
(2) The boat has many other sensible qualities which we know about but 
which do not enter into the appearance. Therefore if these enter into 
the memory they must do so by means other than imagery of the event or 
occasion in question.
1
'Perceiving', p.151. See also E. Wollheim 'The Difference between 
Sensing and Observing’, ARISTOTELIAN Soc., Supplementary Volume XXVIII, 
1954, 'Belief and Will’, p.219ff.
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(3) The boat i s  what i t  i s ;  the appearance i s  whatever we take
i t  to  b e . So th a t i f  the appearance were such as to  suggest to  us
a whale rath er than a b oat, then our in te r p r e tin g  th e memory-image
as of a whale would r e f l e c t  w e ll ,  not badly , upon our im agery.
S in ce I have d efin ed  'an appearance' as ’a cer ta in  combination
of s e n s ib le  q u a l i t i e s  in  a f ix e d  r e la t io n s h ip 1 i t  i s  necessary  to  say
som ething of th e  im a g ea b ility  o f r e la t io n s .  W hilst what we image must
'carry  r e la t io n s h ip s  w ith in  i t ' ,  i t  i s  important to  be c le a r  th a t ,  ju s t
as an imaged q u a lity  must be a p a r tic u la r  in sta n ce  o f th a t q u a lity , so
an imaged r e la t io n  mu3t be a p a r tic u la r  in sta n ce  o f th a t r e la t io n .
To have an id ea  o f th e  r e la t io n s h ip  i t s e l f  i s  alw ays to  have an
a b str a c t id ea  or concept, and belongs to  an in t e l le c t u a l  sta g e  in v o lv in g  
*
in te r p r e ta t io n  and c l a s s i f i c a t io n ,  
i i i .  The ' t o t a l  momentary e x p er ien ce '
My referen ce  to  the appearance as a momentary exp erien ce may 
c a l l  to  mind a phrase used by R u s s e ll ,  'th e  t o t a l  momentary ex p er i­
e n c e ' .  He d e f in e s  th e  t o t a l  momentary experience as any compresent 
s e t  o f  mental c o n s t itu e n ts  forming fo r  the man who exp erien ces them a 
s in g le  u n it .*  Hut i t  i s  not c lea r  to  me whether he means a compresent 
s e t  o f sensory  exp er ien ces  or o f any exp erien ces a t a l l .  I f  he means 
th e form er, then a ' t o t a l  momentary exp erien ce' would be what I have 
c a lle d  an appearance (though th e  appearance, as r e c a lle d , may be o f
'Human Knowledge, I t s  Scope and L im its ' ,  p .3 1 5 .
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any part of the total momentary experience). But if he means the 
latter, then the total momentary experience may include elements - 
memories, judgments, thoughts, emotions - which are neither sensible 
nor imageable in the ordinary way. Only that which is presented to 
us via our sense-organs is recallable by us in. imagery, as distinct 
from being recallable with the aid of imagery, 
iv. Are images of any one sense mutually exclusive?
It would be generally allowed that, as sensations of the 
different sense-organs do not exclude each other, neither do their 
images. But it seems to have been widely assumed, on the other hand, 
that sensations of any one organic type come necessarily one at a 
time, and therefore so must images. I can see no justification for 
such an assumption. It may well be that this is a case where pre­
occupation with the peculiarities of sight has led to error.
We can smell several smells, taste several flavours, hear 
several sounds, at the same time; and I see no good reason why anyone 
should claim that on such occasions our experience is always of one 
composite smell, sound or taste. Now, but for the accidental fact 
that our eyes look the same way - if for instance they were so 
spaced that their fields did not overlap - we would be able to see 
two views at the same time, not one superimposed on the other but two 
quite distinct views. And visual imaging is not an operation we 
perform with our eyes or any other sense-organ. There seems, 
therefore, to be no logical reason why we should not experience
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several totally different visual images simultaneously. There may, 
of course, be empirical reasons why we do not generally do so. Even 
where there are 'external stimuli' it is difficult to give our 
attention to two distinct sounds at one time, and in imagery there are 
no 'external stimuli'. Nevertheless, we cannot deny the empirical 
possibility of the simultaneous occurrence of two or more images. I 
could not attach any sense to an assertion that we may be having images 
but not (.to any extent) attending to them. Having images implies some 
degree of attention, but divided attention is by no means an unknown 
experience. What, for instance, prompts us to 'correct' an image?
A.D. Woozley gives an account of his visual memory-image of a cricket 
umpire, and says* 'Even while having the image, 1 am sure that the 
bow-tie, the shirt, and the coat are right, I am sure that the 
trousers are wrong, and about the shoes I have no very clear idea 
at all'. It could be that he had an independent propositional memory 
that the trousers were, say, striped, whereas those in the image were 
checked. But Woozley does not give this explanation - he seems in 
fact specifically to discount it - and certainly such situations do 
seem to arise in the absence of any relevant propositional memories.
If we grant the possibility of different simultaneous visual images 
we have immediately one possible explanation. In chapter IV, I 
claimed that in all negative memory situations there is a positive
1
'Theory of Knowledge', p.61.
215
element. In the case of imagery not supported by any propositional
memories that positive element may well take the form of other,
fainter, co-existent memory-images, wiiich, though not 'replacing'
the image under consideration, show wherein it is wrong.
The problem, how an image can persist and nevertheless be known
to be inaccurate, has puzzled philosophers for a long time. I have
suggested one explanation - that an 'imagination-image' known as
such can become habitual* - but clearly this would not meet all cases.
In 'The Problems of Philosophy' Russell wrote 'We are certainly able,
to some extent, to compare an image with the object remembered, so
that v/e often know, within somewhat wide limits, how far our image
is accurate; but this would be impossible unless the object, as
2opposed to the image, were in some way before the mind'. There is 
obviously something very queer about this suggestion. How could any 
one have an object 'before the mind' except by having imagery? He 
could have a description of the object iu the mind, but this is a 
different thing. It seems that Russell realised this, for, some
g
fifteen years later he wrote: 'Suppose you call up an image of
Waterloo Bridge, and you are convinced that it is like what you see 
when you look at Waterloo Bridge. It would seem natural to say that
1
See p. 203.
2
'The Problemsof Philosophy', p.180.
'An Outline of Philosophy’, p.189.
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you know the likeness because you remember Waterloo Bridge. But 
remembering is often held to involve, as an essential element, the 
occurrence of an image which is regarded as referring to a prototype. 
Unless you can remember without images, it is difficult to see how 
you can be sure that images resemble prototypes. I think that in 
fact you cannot be sure, unless you can find some indirect means of 
comparison. You might, for example, have photographs of Waterloo 
Bridge...*. But the fact is that very often we are sure, and rightly 
so. And it could be that our certainty is^  based upon a comparison - 
the comparison of many simultaneous images of slightly different 
appearances presented by the bridge, all of which support and confirm 
each other.
I cannot assert, as a statement about my own experience, that I 
do have many different visual images simultaneously, because, quite 
frankly, I have simply found myself incapable of putting the hypo­
thesis to an empirical test - my powers of introspection have failed 
me. But I do not, therefore, discount the possibility that I may have, 
b) Images and sensations 
i. Their similarities
I have spoken of the causal relationship between organic sensing 
and 'mental imaging* in a way which assumes the two to be so utterly 
distinct that no confusion could possibly arise as to which was which. 
But am I justified in making this assumption? An hallucination is 
precisely the taking of the one to be the other. And, even under
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normal c o n d i t io n s ,  i t  i s  sometimes im p o ss ib le  f o r  us t o  say w hether 
we r e a l l y  h ea rd  or j u s t  imagined th e  f a i n t  n o is e  in  t h e  n e x t  room, 
w hether we r e a l l y  saw or j u s t  imagined th e  f l a s h  of l i g h t  on th e  
h o r iz o n .  Few p h i lo s o p h e r s  have ev e r  faced  up to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  what 
we c a l l  images a re  v e ry  l i k e  what we c a l l  s e n s a t i o n s .  Hume spoke 
of th e  g r e a t e r  ’ l i v e l i n e s s *  of s e n s a t i o n s ;  bu t when we a t tem p t to  
d e f in e  t h i s  ' l i v e l i n e s s *  we a re  u l t i m a t e l y  reduced  to  say ing  t h a t  i t  
i s  th e  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  f e a t u r e  between s e n s a t io n s  and im ages. There 
can be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  Hume r e a l i s e d  t h i s ,  b u t  i t  d id  no t p e r tu rb  
him g r e a t l y  because  -  ’Every one o f  h im s e l f  w i l l  r e a d i l y  p e rc e iv e  
th e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw ix t  f e e l i n g  and t h i n k i n g ' . *  Yet every  one of 
h im se lf  w i l l  r e a d i l y  p e rc e iv e  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between a square  and a 
t r i a n g l e  -  b u t  in  doing so he does n o t  p e rc e iv e  any d i s t i n c t i o n  
between th e  in d iv id u a l  s t r a i g h t  l i n e s  which make up th e  square  and 
th o s e  which make up th e  t r i a n g l e .  I t  i s  hard  to  f in d  any way to  
d e s c r ib e  images o th e r  th a n  a s  a ' r e - s e e in g *  or ' r e -h e a r in g *  of some 
e v e n t ,  and when wre a re  asked  w herein  t h i s  d i f f e r s  from an a c tu a l  
r e —see in g  or r e —h e a r in g  what can we say excep t t h a t  th e  even t i s  n o t  
r e a l l y  b e fo re  us? When th e  n ex t  q u e s t io n  i s  asked ,  'How do you know 
i t  i s  n o t  r e a l l y  b e fo re  y o u ? ' ,  we see th e  t r a p  and a re  a t  a lo s s  f o r  
a r e p l y .  For t h i s  reaso n  I f in d  q u i t e  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  R u s s e l l ' s
*A T r e a t i s e  of Human N a t u r e ' ,  B k . l ,  P a r t  1, S e c t .  1, p . l  of 
'Hume’ s T r e a t i s e ’ -  L.A. S e lb y -B ig g e .
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conclusion that the distinguishing feature by which we tell 
sensations from images is that the former arise wholly from external 
stimuli whilst the latter arise from internal stimuli also.* He is 
doing what Hume also did (though Hume would most likely have denied 
this) - providing formal, i.e. verbal, definitions on the assumption 
that the phenomena to be defined are already known to us, that we 
already have some means of distinguishing between internal and 
external stimuli. But such means could exist only by virtue of an 
inherent detectable difference between the experiences we call 
sensing and imaging in an overwhelming majority of cases, 
ü  • Their differences
I find it strange that recent philosophers have paid so little
attention to the one really outstanding difference between images
2and sensations, although it was suggested by Ward ' and stressed by 
3
G.F. Stout. It is that images never compete with sensations. My 
image of a red sky neither obliterates nor becomes superimposed upon 
my view of the blue sky. The two may ’exist’ at the same time 
quite independently of each other. And whilst I can, if I wish, 
change my image from red to green, the blue of the actual sky remains 
steadily before me quite outside my control. I can look away, but
1
’The Analysis of Mind’, p.l45ff.
2
’Psychological Principles’, p.l71ff.
’A Manual of Psychology’, p.I48.
3
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so long as I keep my eyes directed upon it the sensation of blue 
persists. Now surely this persistence is the feature which disting­
uishes sensing from imaging. When we say that the sky is ‘actually 
there' we are saying (at least) that there is a continuity of stimulus 
which cannot be rejected; it forces itself upon our attention whether 
we wish it or not. This is why the sudden sound or flash of light 
does not have the same distinctive character; we feel obliged to 
ask our companions whether they too heard or saw it. This is also why, 
if one particular image so monopolised a man's attention as to exclude 
from it even present external stimuli, he would be liable to 
hallucination.
If hallucination were a common experience we might well reach a 
stage where we were able to distinguish our sensations (and thereby the 
5 external world') from our imaginings only by constantly checking 
our experience against the testimony of other people. If groups of 
people suffered the same hallucination together then it seems doubt­
ful whether tney could ever finally decide whether the thing they 
’witnessed' really happened. On the one hand there would be the 
inductive improbability, and on the other hand the confirming testi­
mony. hut in fact (and this is a very important fact), hallucinations 
are in any case very rare, and then almost invariably confined to 
a single person. It is possible for us, therefore, to write them 
off as odd exceptions for which psychological explanations must
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be sought and coin the special name 'hallucination' to cover 
them.*
My claim is that there is simply no need to seek any distinguishing 
feature between sensing and imaging other than the compulsive con­
tinuity of the one which is lacking from the other. Thi3 alone enables 
us to divide the real and present from the imagined and remembered, to 
develop a concept of what is 'normal', and to frame definitions by 
which we can decide, after the event, that certain cases are not 
normal.
iii. Are images fallible?
Thus we do in fact distinguish our imaging from our sensing, not 
by their respective 'subjects', nor yet by any difference inherent 
in a single experience itself, but rather by a difference found in a 
sequence of experiences. In the final chapter of this essay I shall 
accept the conclusion that what we call a sensation simply is an 
image, but one stimulated by external causes and thereby rendered 
'persistent'. Now, is it reasonable to make this reduction and at 
the same time to go on talking, as I have done very freely, about 
wrong or inaccurate imagery? For it does not seem to make sense to 
talk of a sensation being wrong; it is simply what it is. Certainly
1
There have been cases of strange 'appearances’ to masses of people - 
some of the 'miracles' for example - which could not be explained 
away as mass hypnotism. And in these cases we simply do not know 
what to say; it must remain an open question whether the event 
'really happened' or was hallucinatory.
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we can misinterpret our sensations, and in the same way we can mis­
interpret our images. But the fault then lies not in them but in 
ourselves, ^nd if it is meaningless to speak of a sensation's being 
wrong, it is equally meaningless to speak of its being right.
H.ri. Price makes this point very clearly in reference to ’primary 
recognition’, recognition at what we might call the sensory level.
’Shall we say then that primary recognition is infallible, or as near to 
infallibility as we can get? This might be misleading, because it might 
suggest that mistaken primary recognitions are theoretically possible, 
though by a fortunate dispensation of Providence they never in fact 
occur. It will be better, pernaps, to say that primary recognition is 
non-fallible, because the notion of fallibility does not apply to it’.* 
Against this view Russell has argued that there is such a thing 
as error at a pre-intellectual level. When we are stimulated to action, 
albeit in a purely motor-responsive manner, by some sensory occurrence,
then if that action is inappropriate there is error. ’There is error
2when a bird flies against a pane of glass which it does not see’. But 
surely this is very much a re-constructed error. We can say that the 
bird did the wrong thing; but can we say that it did a foolish thing? 
Error presupposes some sort of option. We might say that the bird 
behaved as if it thought there was no obstruction, but surely it would
T
’Thinking and Experience', p.86.
'Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits', p.201.
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be truer to say that the bird did not behave as though it thought 
there were an obstruction. To attribute error to the bird we should 
have to claim that it did see the obstruction but believed that 
it did not - which is simply absurd unless we are using ’see' in 
two quite different ways - once as ’visually sense' and the other 
time as 'perceive'.
But, allowing that 'sensations' are non-fallible, does it 
follow that all imagery is non-fallible in the same way? It may 
perhaps be felt that, since an image is already a re-presentation, 
it comes into being, so to speak, with a criterion of accuracy that 
cannot apply to a direct sensory presentation. But the 'imagination 
image’ is wholly composed of misplaced or ill-assorted memory-images 
and that misplacement or ill-assortment is itself a form of initial 
error - only provided that the image is taken to be unitary, i.e. 
provided we regard it as the image of some specific past occasion, 
not as the assortment of images from different occasions which it in 
fact is.
To this extent, at least, there must be interpretation for the 
question of error to arise; and wherever there is interpretation 
there is the possibility of re-interpretation.
The only circumstances, then, under which we could hold the 
imagery itself to be wrong or false, would be if something were 
presented to us in imagery without any basis in past perceptual
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experience. Thus, granted the single assumption that all mental 
imagery is basically the re-presentation of past sense experiences, 
however jumbled these experiences may be in their sequences and 
complexities, then all imagery ijS non-fallible in the same sense 
as sensation is non-fallible.
C hapter  VII
IMAGES (C o n t’d) -  THE FUNCTION OF IMAGERY 
1• Are images i n s p e c t a b l e s ?
In c h a p te r  VI we were p r i n c i p a l l y  concerned w ith  what imagery i s  
o f ; we must now c o n s id e r  what imagery j i s .  I t  i s  taken  v ery  much f o r  
g r a n te d  in  some q u a r t e r s  t h a t  th e  s u b s t a n t iv e  te rm  ’ im age’ i s  on ly  a 
c o u r te s y  t i t l e .  I .M .L . H un te r ,  f o r  example, w r i t e s :  ’S t r i c t l y  speak ing  
we ought n o t  to  t a l k  o f  th e  image o f  a scene b u t  r a t h e r  of imaging 
th e  scene o r  e x p e r ie n c in g  th e  scene in  th e  absence o f  any a p p r o p r i a t e  
e x t e r n a l  s t im u lu s  such a s  e x i s t s  in  p e r c e iv in g .  In  th e  i n t e r e s t s  of 
easy e x p re s s io n ,  we may t a l k  of images as th in g s  in s t e a d  of as p ro c e s s e s  
p ro v id ed  we always b ea r  in  mind t h a t  such language i s  more m e ta p h o r ic a l  
th a n  p r e c i s e ’ .*
W h ils t  I c e r t a i n l y  ag ree  w ith  th e  view he e x p re s s e s ,  I cannot ag ree  
w ith  h i s  manner of e x p re s s in g  i t ,  a s  though i t  were an obvious t r u t h  
which needed no s u p p o r t in g  argum ent. A g r e a t  many e m p i r i c i s t  e p i s -  
t e m o lo g i s t s  s t i l l  t a l k  of images in  ’e n t i t y ’ te rm s w ith o u t  any apo logy , 
and one a u t h o r i t y  of c o n s id e ra b le  w e ig h t ,  H. II. P r i c e ,  has s p e c i f i c a l l y  
defended  t h e i r  r i g h t  to  do so .
1
’Memory -  F a c ts  and F a l l a c i e s ’ , p .137 .
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a ) Price’s defence of images1
In 'Thinking and Experience'* Price specifically rejects the view 
that there is imaging but there are not images, that the relationship 
is two termed, between the public thing imaged and the private act of 
imaging without any intermediate 'entity' being involved. Although he 
admits that there could be a danger of being misled by the substantive 
term into thinking of an image as 'a persistent intra-mental thing or 
continuent', he holds this danger to be so slight as to be of no account, 
and he counter-charges that the upholders of the 'two term* view 'do 
not scruple to talk about words as if they were entities. If they 
insist that there are no images, but only imaging, ought they not 
equally to insist that there are no words, but only speaking and 
writing? Indeed a token word is far less "like an entity" than an 
occurrent image is'
But the two cases are parallel only on the assumption which Price 
himself makes that images are symbols. When we talk about words we 
are talking about symbols - furthermore, about publicly observable 
symbols, e.g. sounds and marks on paper. My seeing or hearing the word 
'Napoleon' may prompt me to think of Napoleon, But my having an image 
of Napoleon already ijs my thinking of Napoleon (even though I may not 
name or otherwise identify him). I am not, of course, claiming that I
1
'Thinking and Experience', p.247 ff.
'Thinking and Experience', p.248 (his italics).
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cannot think about Napoleon without having an image of him - 
clearly this would be possible. I am claiming only that having an 
image is itself one way of thinking about him, which merely reading 
or hearing his name certainly is not.
We are all agreed that imaging is not a public procedure. But 
since it must, in any case, involve some private mental performance 
(which is quite clearly understandable) why need it also involve some 
kind of private mental entity (which is very difficult indeed to 
understand). To think and to have thoughts is exactly the same thing.
The thoughts are not 'there’ to be thought about. And when I remember
*
an event in propositions I do not remember those propositions in^  
propositions. Why, then, when I remember an event in imagery, should 
what 1 am imaging be an image of the past event rather than the past 
event itself? The usual reply: 'Because that event is no longer 
existent’, is entirely pointless. If it were existent we should 
perceive it, not image it. What i^s now existent is the 'act of 
imaging'. And it is the kind of 'act' which can be directed only to 
past, not to present, objects.
Imagery is, in fact, simply one way of remembering things; the 
way of remembering which is applicable to perceived appearances.
It is not something that helps us to remember things the way that 
notes in our diaries do. I agree that it is more natural to think 
of an image which eludes us when we want it and obtrudes itself when
we do not, than to think of an inability to control our imaging, but
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this simply reflects the natural tendency we have to 'substantify' 
our activities, especially those activities which seem to be involun­
tary.^ It is just as natural for us, in the same way, to think of a^ 
nervous tic in the leg rather than of an inability to control our legs. 
And our thinking this way does not make a nervous tic in my leg the 
same kind of tiling (only invisible in some way) as a sneep-tick in 
ray leg.
'Modern philosophers', Price says, 'are never tired of telling
2us that mental images are not at all like pictures. But they are'.
He is quite right, they are - but only in the way that perceived 
views are like pictures; likeness is a reciprocal relationship and 
pictures are like mental images. Having a mental image is in many 
ways very like looking at a picture, but it is a good deal more like 
looking at the 'real thing'. And it certainly is not like looking 
through a picture at the scene it represents.
It is comforting to turn from the work of those philosophers who 
treat imagery as little more than an amusing pastime for the simple- 
minded to an unequivocal assertion like that by Furlong: ”.Ve do also 
visualize, and when we visualize there is something presented to us,
1
It is noticeable that we are more inclined to talk of 'imagining a 
flying elephant' than of 'having an image of a flying elephant' and 
we say 'I just can't imagine it, rather than 'the image of it eludes
me' .
2
'Tninking and Experience', p.249.
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something having the properties we have stated, and this is an image’.1 2
But why ’presented'? Why not simply ’There is something present to our
minds (though not to our senses); and when this occurs we are imaging'?
It is clearly not within my competence to deny any man’s account of his
own experience. And so I must accept that H.H. Price 'cannot help
noticing that in imaging we seem to be confronted with something, to
have something over against us or presented to us - and something
other than the material object or physical event, real or fictitious,
2which we are trying to envisage’, though I might well ask how he 
distinguishes ordinary memory-imagery from eidetic imagery. 1 can only 
assert that this is not my own experience, nor that of other people I 
have questioned on the subject, and attempt to show that, though 
some of our memory-performances do demand that there is imagery, none 
of them demand the existence of any such ’extra entities' as images 
are sometimes held to be. 
b ) Inspecting and 'reading off'
The 'three term' view of imagery arises from the assumption that 
we observe or inspect our images, as we might a newspaper, in order 
to gain factual information from them about the sensible appearances 
of things seen in the past. Russell seems to be making this assumption
3
wnen he writes: 'Suppose, for instance, you want to remember whether,
1
'imagination', p.8l.
2
'Thinking and Experience', p.248.
'An Outline of Philosophy', p.20T.
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in a certain room, the window is to the right or the left of the door 
as viewed from the fireplace. You can observe your image of the room, 
consisting (inter-alia) of an image of the door and an image of the 
window standing (if your recollection is correct) in the same rela­
tion as when you were actually seeing the room’. Now, I do not want 
to deny that imagery can remind us of, or even, in some cases, enable 
us to discover, the spatial relationships which existed between the 
things we have observed. What I do deny, and what Russell seems to 
be suggesting, is the existence of two distinct ’stages' in the memory 
of the room's appearance: the tailing up' of a 'picture' of the room, 
and the inspection of that 'picture' in order to ascertain how the 
room looked.
An image is not something we carry about with us like a map 
(though the capacity to have a certain image may well be part of our 
present physiological make-up); we actually have the image only in­
sofar as we are remembering the appearance in question. I do not 
mean that we must first remember and then have the image. I mean 
thu.t, since what we are remembering is an appearance, our remembering 
of it is in imagery; by imaging the room we are remembering its 
former appearance, which includes the relative visual positions of 
the window and the door. So that what we are observing is the 
appearance of the room with the window and the door, not an image or 
replica of it. Only 'observe' is not the right word here, because the 
things we observe are present to our senses, they are 'really there'.
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The word we want is 'remember'; and in this case the remembering 
is in imagery.
I do not deny that if we genuinely could not remember the 
relative positions of the door and the window, imagery may help us 
to do so. We might, for instance, ’call up* images of various alter­
native window/door relationships, and one of these ’called-up images’ 
might then develop the characteristics of a memory-image, become more 
’firm’ and harder to control, and tend to expand in context.* But all 
we are doing here is imagining in imagery in order to stimulate our­
selves into remembering in imagery. Having the memory-image, if and 
when we did have it, would again jbe remembering.
I am convinced that we cannot, as it were, get anything from an 
image that we have not already put into it. And our ways of 'putting 
something into it’ are by imagining and remembering. We can, of course, 
interpret our images; we can draw inferences about factual relation­
ships from appearances presented in imagery which we did not draw 
when those appearances were presented to perception, or which we did 
draw but have subsequently forgotten. And to this extent we do, in a 
metaphorical sense, ’read off information from our images. But this 
’reading off’ can only be some further interpretation of what we 
already are remembering - not an addition to it.
1
The ’memory characteristics' of imagery, as described in chapter 
VI , p. 198ff.
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Furlong considers the case of a gate of which we had noticed the 
colour but not the number of bars. In the subsequent image of it, the 
colour and general shape are clear and distinct, yet, though the gate 
as imaged is barred, it does not have any definite number of bars, 
only a barred ’look*. And he says:* 'If we are in any way acquainted 
with the past when we remember, then it is hard to see why...we cannot 
read off the number of bars in the gate, as we could have done on 
the original occasion’. But, in the first place, to be acquainted 
with the past is not to be ill the past. And, in the second place, the 
past with which we are acquainted is our own past experience, and this 
happens to have been limited to observing the general ’look’ of the 
gate. People would be far less puzzled by the ’vagueness and sketchi­
ness' of memory-imagery if they realised how very 'vague and sketchy’ 
most of our sense-perceptions are. When I look at a corrugated iron 
roof I am aware that I am seeing 'stripes', but I am certainly not 
aware of the number of these. To ascertain their number I must move 
my eyes along the roof, inspecting the ’stripes' one by one. And this 
is precisely what I can never do with my memory-image of the corru­
gated roof. Our imagery can contain, at most, only that degree of 
detail that the appearance re-presented in it contained. Thus we 
can 'read off an image only such information as it would have been 
possible to have 'seen at a glance’ at the time of the perception.
T
’A Study in Memory’, p.38.
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Tiii3 may be more than was in fact 'seen at a glance'. The 'look' of 
a three-barred gate is quite distinctive, and so the fact that a gate 
was three-barred could be learned from the memory of that 'look' (the 
memory-imagej even though we had not remarked this fact when we saw 
the gate, or, having remarked it, had subsequently forgotten it. But, 
for most people, this would not be so with a twelve-barred gate. So 
there is a sense in which we 'notice' the three-barred character of 
the gate although we do not actually count the bars, whereas it is 
not possible to 'notice' a twelve-barred character in this way.
Noticing the twelve-barred character, as distinct from the multi- 
barred 'look', necessarily involves counting the bars.
2. Imagery and recognition
We sometimes speak of recognising images, and also of recognising 
by means of imagery. Both these are suggestive of an 'entity' view of 
imagery, and, in the light of my argument that images are our memories 
of the appearances previously presented by events and things, but not 
extra inspectable 'entities', we must now consider whether, and in what 
sense: (l) we recognise images, and (2) we recognise by_ imagery, 
a) Recognising images
i. Recognition in absence
I have a visual image which I recognise to be of the man who 
lives in the flat below mine. What does this amount to? I have a 
certain image, i.e. remember a certain appearance. The image is 
'involuntary', 'firm' and 'unitary'; it is a memory-image. It is of
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the upper half of a man, and this is not something I work out or infer; 
in having the image I am conscious that I am imaging a man whose 
appearance is familiar to me. I may then wonder 'Who is this man?', 
which generally amounts to 'Where and when did I see this man?' And, 
as the result either of a 'broadening' of the image or of the stimul­
ation of certain propositional memories, the answer comes to me: 
'Yesterday, coming out of the flat downstairs'. The 'recognition' may 
come immediately, or it may take time, or it may not come at all. It 
may be incomplete; I may, for instance, remember where I saw him but 
not when.
This all seems exactly similar to what would have Happened had I 
passed him in the street instead of having an image of him - except, 
it might be objected - that what is being recognised is an image and 
not a man. But why should this objection be made? In both cases the 
person I am identifying is the man who lives in the flat below mine. 
The only difference is that one time he is within my sight, the other 
time he is not. If we are to call one of these cases recognising an 
image (which amounts, on the view I have expressed, to recognising an 
imaging;, then, what are we to say of the cases where what ia recog­
nised is an image or imaging? I might, for instance, amuse myself 
by imaging an elephant with wings, and be aware as I do so that 1 
have produced a similar image on a previous occasion, here I am 
recognising an image.
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ii. 'Recognising that*
Suppose we draw a distinction between recognising and 'recognis­
ing that'; in recognising the man in the street I also recognise that 
he is the man who came out of the flat below mine yesterday. We might 
then say that in having the image I recognise that it is of this 
particular man.
I do not think that such a distinction would help us because it 
simply robs 'recognise' of any special force, and in any case it is 
wholly arbitrary. For what is my original recognition of the man but 
the recognition that I have encountered him before? And wherein is this 
different from the initial familiarity of my memory-image? If we 
maintain that recognising a man is something prior to any 'recognition 
that' about him, then, to be consistent, we would have to allow that 
knowing an image to be a memory-image is a basic recognition of this 
kind. And since it is not the recognition of an image, it could only 
be the recognition of the subject imaged.
It seems, then, that we can recognise images if we have had them 
or others very like them before - but only in the sense that we may 
recognise any of our performances when we have performed previously in 
the same way. We may also, if we wish, speak of recognising things and 
events in their absence by means of imagery. But to do so is to destroy 
such distinction as there may be between 'cognise' and 'recognise', 
and it is much less confusing to talk simply of reoiembering things 
and also remembering further propositions about them.
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We must now consider the part played by imagery (if any) in 
recognising things in their presence, 
b} Imagery in recognition 
i . The need for comparison
In chapter III, I claimed that recognition implies some form of 
comparison between present and past. When I say ’This is the dog that 
bit me’ or ’This is the same kind of car as my fathers’s’ I must be 
simultaneously aware, in some way, of both present and past instances. 
Now, as we have seen,^ present sensations and memory-images do not 
compete, so that a simple and obvious explanation of recognition is 
that an appearance presented to us is found to be like an appearance 
we remember, that is, an image we are having of a certain past percep­
tual situation.
The catch in this simple explanation is that it does not seem to 
accord with our common experience. In most of the cases which we would 
tend to regard as recognition we simply name things or act in some 
other manner appropriate to them. This does not mean, however, that 
the ’explanation’ must immediately be abandoned. We discovered in 
chapter V that a great deal of our activity can be accounted for in 
terms of developed motor-capacities to respond appropriately to given 
stimuli; and this applies to the great bulk of our recognitions and 
recognitional behaviour in our daily lives, including, incidentally, 
our 'recognitions in absence’.
T
See chapter VI, p. 208.
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And what of those cases where recognition is not immediate? 
j,)uite often we pause and ponder before deciding that this wool is the 
sacie colour as the socks our wives are knitting for us, or that the 
cat outside the window is not our neighbour’s after all. And here, 
although wre could in some cases be reciting to ourselves descriptive 
catalogues which we check against the present object,* there seems 
little doubt that, sometimes at least, we are comparing the perceived 
object with a past object remembered in imagery in exactly the way 
suggested.
Now, if we do in fact behave in this way when recognition is
considered or deliberate, there is at least a good case for suggesting
that this is the basic mode of recognition which renders possible the
development of language habits and other ’motor-capacities'. I find it
surprising, therefore, that Price refers to this theory as an ’extreme
2imagist view’ and doubts whether anyone has in fact ever held it. 
ii. The infinite regress argument
Price supports his condemnation of the theory with a claim that 
it is logically impossible for recognition ever to ’depend upon' the 
presence of imagery. He argues that when we recognise, say, aircraft 
by means of a silhouette chart, the identification is valid only 
because we have independent grounds for believing the chart to provide
1
This possibility is considered later in this chapter, p.249ff.
2
See 'Thinking and Experience’, p.277.
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accurate models. But if our exemplars are simply images in our own 
minds no such independent grounds for accepting them are possible.
Their acceptability as 'models’ must depend, then, upon their being 
themselves recognised as 'true copies’ of the objects we are 
remembering. And if recognition demands the existence of a prior 
image for comparison, their recognition could be achieved only by 
comparison with some pre-image, and so on ad infinitum.
Now, on the view of imagery which I have put forward the 'regress' 
cannot ever get started. For there can be no question of 'checking the 
copy'; the imagery is the memory of the past perceptual situation it­
self. In chapter VI we discussed the manner in which, and the extent 
to which, we can know it to be a past perceptual situation and not 
just a 'piece of imagination'.* It is true that we can be mistaken 
about what it is we are imaging. And, equally, we can be mistaken 
in our recognitions. Price seems to overlook this, to talk as 
though our 'right to recognise' were somehow a 'logical right', and 
clearly it is not; we have all had the embarrassing experience of 
'recognising' somebody and finding that he is a total stranger. But 
so long as recognition (or what we take to be recognition) is a two- 
terraed relationship between a present object and a remembered past 
object, although there is always the possibility of error, there can 
be no question of an infinite regress. As I have pointed out, objects
T
See p. 198ff
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may be ’r e c o g n i s e d '  when we image, b u t  only under s p e c ia l  circum ­
s ta n c e s  do we ev e r  re c o g n ise  im ages, i . e . ,  when we re c o g n ise  them as  
p re v io u s  im ages, n o t  as  p re v io u s  p e r c e p t io n s , 
i i i .  Image d i s p o s i t i o n s
I am n o t  h ere  c la im ing  t h a t  we must a c c e p t  an ' im a g i s t  th e o ry  of 
r e c o g n i t i o n ’ . Our behav iou r  could  be accounted  f o r  w ith o u t i t  -  I  have 
a d m it te d  t h a t  most of our everyday r e c o g n i t io n  i s  s im ple m o to r- re sp o n se  
and th e r e  i s  no l o g i c a l  r ea so n  why th e  m o to r- re sp o n se  d i s p o s i t i o n s ,  th e  
c a p a c i t i e s  we have f o r  r e c o g n is in g  th in g s  in  t h i s  immediate sen se ,  
shou ld  n o t  have developed l i k e  any o th e r  p u re ly  p h y s io lo g ic a l  c a p a c i ­
t i e s .  But I do c la im  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  a s i l l y  th e o ry .  I t  ap p ea rs  to  be 
so only  when i t  i s  ta k en  in  c o n ju n c t io n  w ith  th e  ' e n t i t y '  view of 
im agery . I a l s o  c la im  t h a t  most peop le  a re  capab le  o f  what I have 
c a l l e d  'c o n s id e r e d  r e c o g n i t i o n s '  and t h a t  in  such c a s e s  we seem bound 
t o  adm it t h a t  th e y  a r e  in  f a c t  comparing a remembered appearance w ith  
a p re s e n te d  app ea ran ce .  The f i n a l  d e c i s io n  t h a t  something i s ,  or i s  
n o t ,  th e  same shade of co lo u r  as  something e l s e  was, could  be made 
only in  th e  l i g h t  o f  a knowledge of th e  p a s t  appearance  as  w e ll  a s  th e  
p re s e n t  one. B r ic e  a l low s t h a t  'R e c o g n i t io n  i s  on ly  p o s s ib le  to  a 
be ing  w ith th e  c a p a c i ty  of r e t e n t i v e n e s s , w hatever th e  r i g h t  a n a l y s i s  
of t h a t  c a p a c i ty  may b e ' , *  and in  t h i s  case  th e  on ly  a n a l y s i s  which 
can meet th e  demands of th e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  a d i s p o s i t i o n a l  knowledge £ f
'T h in k in g  and E x p e r i e n c e ' ,  p*58 ( h i s  i t a l i c s ) .
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the appearance. And if I have a dispositional knowledge of an appear­
ance it is always at least empirically possible that I shall have a 
memory-image of that appearance. From the definition I have given of 
imagery as the direct memory of appearances it follows logically that 
a capacity to recognise from a direct appearance is also a capacity 
to have the appropriate memory-image. For the dispositional knowledge 
of an appearance can only be the dispositional memory of that appear­
ance. Thus a dispositional ability to recognise A in its presence in 
the non-motor-responsive sense entails a dispositional ability to 
image A in its absence.
In stressing the fundamental importance of recognition, Price says:
’Having made my generalisation, having learned to expect milk (in my
actions at least) whenever tea is observed, I cannot apply what I
have learned or use it as a guide to my future behaviour, unless I
can also recognise further instances of tea when I meet them; even
though I may be as incapable of conceiving tea in abstracto, as the
cat is in Locke's opinion'.^ how, if we <lo perceive something in
abstracto then we may be able to recognise an instance of it, as it
were, by description - much as the aeronautics students may 'recognise'
2a helicopter the first time they see one. But, apart from cases 
1
'Thinking and Experience', p.43 (his italics). Price is considering 
the case of a cat which has come to expect milk when it sees people 
preparing tea.
2
Price uses this example in ’Thinking and Experience', p.53.
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of immediate motor-response, it is hard to see what the recognition 
of an instance could amount to in the absence of any such abstract 
concept, except the noting of similarities between a present appearance 
and a remembered past appearance.
Once we grant that we can distinguish between immediate, motor- 
responsive recognition and what I have called deliberate and considered 
recognition, and grant also that the occurrence of the latter entails 
at least the capacity to have the appropriate image, then the only 
really strong objection to the ’imagist theory of recognition* is that 
we are not generally aware, even in our most deliberate recognition, 
that we are having images. But imaging, like any other remembering, 
requires a stimulus to 'set it in motion*. And in the case of 
recognition, the stimulus is a present perceptual experience. It is 
hardly surprising, therefore, that we think of the object of our 
attention as, not an image, but its prototype, the actual object 
which is persisting before our eyes.
Nobody thinks it terribly strange that in the 'helicopter case* 
we are at once seeing the machine and remembering a past description 
of it. Why then should it seem strange that in another case we may be 
at once seeing an object and remembering a past appearance of it? On 
the other hand it would be very strange indeed if, under what must be 
the strongest possible stimulus, the actual appearance before us of 
the thing itself, an image for which we have the 'capacity* failed to
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occur; and in fact it is^  surprising when we fail to recognise someone 
we ’ought to’ recognise.
Further, the fact that we often at once recognise a man and notice 
that he is in some way different - has shaved his moustache for 
instance (though we had never 'noted to ourselves’ that he had a 
moustache) - suggests that such images must be occurring even when the 
recognition seems to be entirely spontaneous.
3• Images, signs and symbols 
a) Are images 'signs'?
It has become common practice amongs philosophers to refer to
images as symbols. Thus Ä.J. Ayer writes: 'As in the case of any other
symbol, it is the use we make of its qualities that matters, the
construction we put upon them, not these qualities themselves’,^  and in
his description of what he regards as 'the Imagist Theory of Tninking'
Price writes: 'Mental images are the primary symbols, and all other
2symbols are secondary and derivative'. Tnere is, of course, a dis­
tinction wiiich can be drawn between symbols, phenomena specifically 
(and arbitrarily) made to stand for other phenomena, and signs, pheno­
mena which simply lead us to think of or expect other phenomena. But
1 am not here concerned with this distinction. My argument is that 
both symbolising and signifying are three-termed relationships -
T
'The Problem of Knowledge', p.158.
2
'Thinking and Experience', p.239.
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A signifies or symbolises B to C - and once we reject the ’entity' 
view of imagery we simply cannot maintain that an image is a symbol 
or a sign of a past event. What we contemplate when we image is the 
appearance presented by the past event itself (though it may not be 
the past event we take it to be). This is not to deny that an image 
can be made to act as a sign (and thereby made into a symbol) - 
anything can be made to act as a sign. But when this occurs it is 
the sign of one thing, the image of another, 
ii. Metaphorical images
Price speaks of such cases as 'metaphorical imageryhis 
assumption being that it is the imagery which 'stands for' something 
other than what is being imaged. 'An example of a metaphorical 
image would be an image of a lion which is used, not for thinking 
about lions, but for thinking about courage. It is possible that 
some of our verbal metaphors, even some which are now cliches like 
'the ship of state' may have originated in this way'.^ The only 
thing I wish to object to here is the suggestion that it is the image 
which is a sign or symbol of courage, whereas in fact it is the lion 
which is imaged which is the symbol of courage. In thinking of 
courage we think of a lion, and our thinking of it may take the form 
of imagery.
'Thinking and Experience', p.295 (his italics).
1
243
b) The ’imagist theory1. 
i. Price’s criticism
According to Price the ’Imagist Theory' holds that images are 
the only true symbols of our past experience, and that, although words 
do have meaning, ’they have it only indirectly, as substitutes for 
images. Tnese substitutes are needed because words can be manipulated 
more quickly and easily than images can’.^  But they have, so the 
theory is said to maintain, only a temporary licence - they are 
meaningful only so long as they could be cashed for the images of 
what they stand for.
Now, the most damaging criticism of such a theory would be that 
many word3 stand for concepts which are simply not imageable because 
they are wholly relational, and therefore derived through rather than 
in sense-perception. This difficulty being well known and widely 
accepted, Price does not elaborate it. Instead he develops at length 
an argument designed to show that even for the consideration of 
’qualities’ and ’entities’ the traditional imagist theory is not 
tenable. But he is arguing only against this ’traditional theory’ 
which treats imagery as a combination of ’entity symbols’ (like words) 
by which we identify and classify the objects about us.
Now, I do not want to claim that he is arguing against a ’straw 
man’ of his own creation. There may well be some philosophers against
’Thinking and Experience’, p.239.
1
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whom his arguments are most damaging. But I do claim that his argu­
ment in no way effects the 'imagist theory' (if it should be so 
called) which I am here putting forward. When Price maintains that the 
imagist is wrong to assume that 'thinking can only be in touch with 
reality if it is a kind of inspection',* he is taking this to mean an 
inspection of_ images, not an inspection of the reality itself in 
imagery. And his argument quite fails to take account of the distinct­
ion between the appearance presented to us by reality and our 
perceptual interpretations, definitions, and descriptions of those
appearances, (although this is, in effect, the distinction he himself
2has made between 'primary* and 'secondary' recognition).
The claim central to his argument is that an image cannot be 
essential for thinking of what is absent since we can exemplify a 
concept in many ways other than by imagery - by making a model or a 
drawing for instance. And * if it be objected that one has to have a 
mental image first, in order to produce the model or drawing, we must 
reply that this is both false and vicious in principle. It is false 
in fact. If 1 am asked to draw a hexagon, I may have an image first, 
especially if 1 am somewhat uncertain what a hexagon looks like. But 
it is not true that I must have one. ...And if such comparison with 
an image blueprint were indeed indispensable, how about the production
1
'Thinking and Experience', p.262.
See chapter II of 'Thinking and Experience', p.44ff.2
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of the image blueprint itself? Should we not be driven to say that 
it too could only be produced if we have a super-blueprint to copy it 
from, and to guide us in detecting and correcting any defects it 
may have’ ?. ^ 
ü  • linage and concept
Let us look at the ’false in fact’ claim first. If Price means
that, being unable to remember what a hexagon looks like, he may,
(though he need not), consult his image of a hexagon to find out what
it looks like, then clearly he is simply wrong. If he did not remember
2what it looked like he could not have an image of it. It would be like 
saying ’I couldn’t remember his name so I consulted my memory of it’.
If he means only that one way, though not the only way, of trying to 
remember it would be trying to image it, then, in the case of the 
hexagon, I agree with him. In fact, if I did remember what a hexagon 
looked like, i.e. had a memory of its 'look' in imagery, this may 
(though it may not - compare the barred gate case) assist me to remem­
ber that it is a six-sided figure. But there is a confusion here between 
remembering a ’look’ and remembering a proposition. I agree that I can 
remember the fact that a hexagon is a six-sided figure without any 
image at all - and, remembering it, can draw a hexagon - but this is
1
’Thinking and Experience', p.256 (his italics).
2
I am assuming here that ’looks like' is being used in its popular 
sense, not in the special sense (as distinct from 'how it looks') in 
which I use it in Section 4.a) following. See p.247.
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only because what I am remembering is not the appearance of an 
individual but a formal relationship quite simply definable in words.
If 1 were to set out, instead, to draw from memory a picture of my 
friend John, with a certain peculiar facial expression he sometimes 
has, the story would be very different. For then I would be concerned 
with a particular appearance which would defy any attempt at 'complete 
description', not simply with an instance of a particular quantitative 
relationship. Price fails to make this important distinction. He seems 
to assume that since the occurrence of imagery is not essential for 
all thinking and remembering it cannot be essential for any thinking 
or remembering.
iii. The 'infinite regress argument' again
When we turn to his argument that it is vicious in principle the 
charges made simply do not apply to my view that imagery is indispen­
sable for a certain kind of remembering, the remembering of appearances, 
however damaging they may be to the 'traditional imagist theory'• My 
reply is the same, in effect, as I made to similar charges against the 
'Imagist Theory of Recognition'.1 There can be no question of an 
infinite regress of the images; our imaging simply is our remembering 
the appearance that was presented to us by the thing or event. To the 
extent that the imagery is 'imperfect' our memory is imperfect as to 
the past presented appearance. And, insofar as we are concerned with
1
See p.237
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appearances, it must remain imperfect - unless and until the imagery 
itself is 'perfected'.
4. The need for imagery
a) 'How' and 'what like'
i. The private experience of knowing how
We now come to the distinction which is central to my view of 
imagery, and thereby to my view of memory, a distinction which has been 
foreshadowed, I trust, in everything that I have said to date. This 
distinction is that between how a thing looks, smells, sounds and so 
on, and what it looks like, smells like, sounds like and so on. To 
quote William James: 'The best taught blind pupil of such an establish­
ment yet lacks a knowledge which the least instructed seeing baby has. 
They can never show him what light is in its "first intention"; and 
the loss of that sensible knowledge no book learning can replace'.^
It is this 'first intention' which is how a thing looks. And the 
extraordinary difficulty in talking about it is that, whilst we know
2how it looks, we can describe it only in terms of what it looks iike. 
But, whilst the car standing opposite looks like thousands of other 
cars in many respects, and unlike them in others, how it looks is 
something quite peculiar to itself. Or rather, it is a peculiar 
relationship between itself and myself, the viewer. How something
T
'Principles of Psychology', Vol. 2, p.4,
2
Cf. Wittgenstein - 'Philosophical Investigations', Pt.l, para.78, 
p.36e - We can know, but cannot say, how a clarinet sounds.
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looks refers only to the appearance ft presents; what it looks like
refers to its resemblances to countless other things.
ii. Knowing and knowing about.
Price is quite right when he says 'One man can describe his
visual images to another. He may describe them in great detail, and
1he may be understood'. But when he continues 'You cannot be acquainted 
with my visual images; but you may know them by description if you 
have images yourself' he is obscuring a very important distinction, 
he should say 'You may know about them'. For it is not simply a matter 
of your not being able to be acquainted with my images because they 
happen to be mine and not yours. In this sense you cannot be acquainted 
with my visual perceptions, but if you and I stand successively in the 
same place facing the same motionless scene, tnen we may well be 
satisfied that we have enjoyed effectively similar visual perceptions.
It is reasonable to assume that since we both have equivalent sense- 
organs which were stimulated by the same external causes in viewing 
the scene, we each learned independently how it looked. And, under 
these circumstances we would subsequently 'know each other's imagery' 
if we agreed that we were both imaging that scene as we had seen it.
But we would know it by description. The 'absolute privacy' of most 
imagery arises from two facts; remembering how a thing looked, like 
perceiving how it looks, is a unique experience quite distinct from
T
'Thinking and Experience', p.154.
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any catalogue of descriptive terms; and remembering, unlike per­
ceiving, is not dependent upon any present public object.
Philosophers have not altogether ignored the distinction between 
how a thing looks and what it looks like - the ways in which its 
appearance can be classified. Chisholm, for instance, writes:* 'The 
man in charge of the stage lighting will be concerned not with the 
actual colours of the settings but with the ways in which they appear 
under certain conditions. And philosophers and psychologists, 
studying perception, may be concerned with the nature of the appearances 
rather than with the objects which appear1. And von Leyden asserts 
that 'self-centeredness...is implicit in every recollection, at any 
rate in those cases where we remember how something took place, though 
not perhaps always in those where we remember that something took 
place'
Yet no-one seems to have observed, or if observing to have felt 
it worth remarking, that this 'how it looks' is, at the memory level, 
the peculiar province of imagery, 
bj The alternatives to imagery 
i. Describing appearances
No descriptive catalogue can ever give direct knowledge of how 
something looks. But it does not follow from this that such a catalogue
T
'Perceiving', p.161.
'Remembering', p.78 (his italics).
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can never serve to identify that thing. It would be wrong to suppose 
that the ability to describe some past event is prima-facie evidence 
for the existence of an image of it. Benjamin seems at least to be 
attributing this view to others when he says: ’It is a genuine puzzle 
sometimes to know what is to count as an image. For instance, what the 
writer presumes is his memory-image of the High from Magdalen Bridge 
is so fleeting, blurred and thin that, if, as it were, it could be 
captured for the requisite time, it would undoubtedly prove impossible 
to draw it; yet he can describe the view to himself and others. Would 
this count as an image, a reliving? One tends to put an end to such 
a question, I think, by wearily agreeing that it must be an image’.*
1 agree that if he has an image he has an image, albeit a fleeting, 
blurred and thin one. But his ability to describe the view in no way 
entails his having an image of that view, and few, if any, imagists 
have ever maintained that it does. It entails only that he has 
either a good memory for descriptive propositions (which might have 
been learned from any source, not necessarily his own experience)
or a memory-image of the view.
Thus Russell, who states that he is a poor visualiser, says:
'When now I meet a man and wish to remember his appearance, I find the 
only way is to describe him in words while I am seeing him, and then 
remember the words'. He admits that this method is unsatisfactory if 
1
'Remembering’ MIND Vol. LXV, 1956, p.320 (his italics)
2
’An Outline of Philosophy’, p.195.
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'Two men having these characteristics are present at once'. 'In 
this respect', he says, 'a visualiser would have the advantage of me'. 
But he claims: ’Nevertheless, if I had made my verbal inventory 
sufficiently extensive and precise, it would have been pretty sure to 
answer its purpose'.
ii. The limitations of the verbal alternative
Of course, if the description were sufficiently extensive it would 
answer the purpose. But how extensive must that be? As the police 
know well enough, a couple of good photographs of a wanted man may be 
worth more than a description a mile long of his visual appearance. A 
great many men might still answer the description, but the chances 
are that one man, and one only, would match the photographs. And why 
does Russell say 'unless two men having these characteristics are present 
at once'? We do not use our memories of people only for identifying 
them when we meet them. And, if we take seriously what he has said 
of himself, even when one of the two men answering the same description 
appeared by himself, Russell would still not know who it was, even 
though he might have known the man well for a considerable time.
Since it seems improbable that Russell is in fact incapable of 
distinguishing between his acquaintances, either when he meets them or 
when he just thinks about them, we must suppose either that he makes 
very careful descriptions indeed to himself and is very fortunate in 
that these never coincide, or that verbal descriptions augment his
imagery rather than that they replace it - despite his claim, 'I do
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not think there is anything in memory that absolutely demands images 
as opposed to words’.* Of these two possibilities the latter seems to 
me to be the more probable.
I must grant, however, that wherever distinguishing relational 
features exist it is possible, in principle at least, to isolate and 
describe them, however difficult this may sometimes be in practice.
But what of the case where the distinguishing feature is a quality 
rather than a relation? (What Locke would have termed a secondary 
quality). To take the obvious example: How is it that I can now 
remember that the car which stood outside my window a while ago was a 
different shade of green from the one that stood there yesterday? I 
did not note this fact at the time, and I do not know any names for 
either of the shades. Even without names for the shades I could have 
noted, say, that one was like the colour of peas and the other was like 
the colour of yew trees, and I could now be reasoning that they were 
not, therefore, the same shade. But this only moves the problem a 
stage further back; for how was I able to note these likenesses when 
there were neither peas nor yew trees present to my senses? And how do 
I now know the different shades of peas and yew trees in the absence 
of these objects in a way that enables me to compare them?
Surely v/e cannot seriously suggest that, unless I have noted to 
myself the names for two different shades of colour at the times of
'An Outline of Philosophy', p.196.
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perceiving them, I cannot ever compare them in memory except by means 
oi‘ a complex network of propositions of the kind 'A is the same colour 
as B', 'C is a different colour from D', *D is rather like B', which I 
have framed on various occasions when two or more coloured objects 
were present together for my inspection. Yet this seems to be the only 
way in which shades of colour could be remembered by describable 
relational features. Tue only alternative is that I know that the two 
remembered shades were different, or that they were the same, simply 
because I now remember how each of them looked, i.e. I now have 
memory-images of them both.
If we accept this last alternative, then it seems to follow that 
images of the same (organic) kind are entertained simultaneously. 
Perhaps I could be forming some propositional description of the 
relationship of one imaged colour to some presently perceived colour, 
and then checking the other imaged colour against this description; 
but in fact I am satisfied that I am not doing this. If, then, as
1 have maintained, hoir the colour looked is knowable only in imagery, 
the two images must be simultaneous. For if I had the images in 
chronological succession, then, as soon as I had one, and thereby knew
how i_t looked, I should have ceased to have the other and thereby
o
ceased to know how rt looked. This would render impossible any 
comparison of the ’look' of the one with the ’look' of the other.
1
This question was discussed in chapter VI. See p. 213ff.
2
In the 'occurrent sense', which is what we are here concerned with.
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The two ’looks' could, of course, combine in a kind of composite image. 
But I would still have to be conscious of having two distinct memories, 
not a single ' iniagination-image ' . 
iii. Non-imagers
I have claimed that there is a large and important area of our 
memory ^and our imagination) which is solely the province of imagery. 
This is the memory of presented appearances as such, and, at the intro­
spective level, it is the final court of appeal for all our memory- 
claims. What are we to say, then, about those people, including many 
of Galton's correspondents, who seem to be quite normal in every way, 
and yet simply deny that they ever have images at all? There seem to 
be three possible alternatives:
(l) They lead what would seem to be strangely empty mental lives lin 
the way that we might feel that congenitally blind and deaf people must 
lead empty mental lives). And, further, they can achieve oniy a very 
poor degree of certainty about matters of past fact in the absence of 
supporting testimony or 'cause/effect’ evidence, since their memories, 
being all propositional, would not permit of any individual reinterpre­
tations. If their remembered propositions were wrong - that is, if they 
were formed as the result of misjudgments about perceptual situations 
- they would have no means of setting them right so they would have to 
remain wrong for ever.^ Or
I
The re-interpretation and 'correction' of memories is dealt with in 
chapter III, Section 1, p. 66 and chapter IV, Section 5, p.l3& I say 
'individual reinterpretations' to allow for the 'football team example' 
given in chapter IV, p.121.
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(2) They are lying in order to pose as 'superior intellects' or 
simply to be perverse. Or
(3) They have misunderstood the nature of imagery, and their denial 
that they have images is the result of their misunderstanding, much 
as the denial by a respectable housewife that she has erotic impulses 
would be the result of her misunderstanding.
I discount possibility (2), and I am naturally loath to accept
possibility (l). I shall therefore begin with the third possibility.
Now, I myself have no experience of eidetic imagery, though I am happy
to believe that others have. And if I conceived of imagery as
necessarily the same kind of thing as eidetic imagery - in Price’s
words, 'something over against us or presented to us - and something
other than the material object or physical event, real or fictitious,
which we are trying to envisage'* - then I should have to place myself
in the ranks of the non-imagers. This is exactly the misunderstanding
which A.J. Ayer seems to be guilty of when he says 'I remember that a
moment ago I ran my hand over the surface of my writing table: I
remember how it felt in the sense that I can give a description of the
2feeling, but X do not have any tactual image of it'. Now, unless 
he accompanied the gesture, Russell fashion, with a catalogue of 
descriptive phrases - which seems at least highly improbable - his 
1
'Thinking and Experience', p.248. Note that Price is referring to 
ordinary memory-imagery, not to eidetic imagery.
2
'The Problem of Knowledge', p.156 (my italicsj.
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assertion raust be false according to ray definition. For to remember 
how it felt in a way that makes possible a subsequent description ia_ 
to have imagery, and in this case the imagery would be tactual.
It may be protested here that 1 am simply applying my own defini­
tion in order to convict Ayer of error. But the only point I am 
interested in making here is that we do have a unique experience, the 
direct memory of appearances, the memory of how tnings looked, felt 
and 3o on, and that this does play a central role in our remembering 
of events, and also in our being certain that we are remembering events.
I
I call this kind of remembering ‘imagery’ because this seems the 
natural tiling to call it: if someone else wants to reserve the term
’imagery' for something like eidetic imagery, well and good. Subject to 
this reservation Ayer can make his denial without contradiction; but 
he must find some other term to cover what I am calling imagery. He 
must not ignore its existence, .and he can call it simply ’describing’ 
only if he is prepared to claim that he never has perceived, or 
remembered, how anything looks, sounds, and so on, without actually 
describing it to himself or to somebody else.
For obvious reasons it is hard to see how we could ’demonstrate’ 
or 'ostensify' this unique experience to someone who denied having 
it. Suppose a man, blind from birth, knew and used the word 'smile' 
but claimed that he himself never smiled. To convince him that he 
was wrong you would have to say to him each time you caught him 
smiling: ’That's it, you’re doing it now', and in time he would
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probably get the idea of what a smile is; not the impressive affair he 
had imagined it to be, merely a very mild experience he had hardly 
even noticed.
But with the man who claims that he never images the position is 
more difficult. Not only can he not see our imaging; we cannot see his 
either. The best we can do is to say to him something like: ‘Think of 
your wife - think of her smiling with that particular quizzical expres­
sion she sometimes has', or even: ‘Remember the colour of your new 
curtains - not the manufacturer's fancy name for the colour, or a 
catalogue of other things the same colour, or whether you like it or 
not - the actual colour itself' . And if he says ’Yes, I am doing that' 
we can tell him that he i_s imaging. His reaction may then be like that 
of the blind man - 'Oh, if that's all it is, then of course I image'.
However, if he stoutly maintains that he is having no experience 
which he can distinguish from the construction of descriptive proposi­
tions, or if he finds himself simply unable to perform the tasks asked 
of him, then we must, howrever sadly, revert to the first alternative. 
But we should be well advised, henceforward, before accepting his 
memory-claims about past events, to check very carefully his reasons 
for making those claims - especially if they contain any wealth of 
detail.
5. The actual characteristics of memory-images
In chapter VI we considered what kind of objects images are of, 
and we have now discussed what having images amounts to. But before
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concluding this chapter we should look at imagery itself and consider 
certain questions about what kind of experience imaging is. 
a) The qualities of images
Since we have decided that what we call an image is just a 
particular kind of memory, the memory of how things looked, sounded, 
and so on, it makes no more sense to ask ’Where are images?' than to 
ask 'Where are memories?' Our insistence upon the existence and 
importance of imagery does not involve us in any mysterious speculations 
about other dimensions of space, nor are we obliged to make any such 
empty assertions as 'an image is where it is*. Imagery 'occurs in' our 
minds, and something correlated with it no doubt occurs in our brains, 
and the event imaged occurred, if at all, in physical space at a past 
physical time.
But, even though imagery is a performance rather than a set of 
entities, there are still some questions about the characteristics of 
it which it is reasonable to ask. What are the relationships of size 
and position between the scene as imaged and the scene as originally 
perceived? Do we necessarily image the whole scene as it was perceived? 
Must the original colour, or any colour at all, be reproduced in the 
imagery? 
i. Position
Ideally, when we remember a scene in imagery the parts of that 
scene as imaged are in the same spatial relationship to each other as 
they were in the scene as perceived. There is, however, as we
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considered in chapter VI, an imagination element in nearly all imagery,* 
and this may well manifest itself as a disproportion between the parts 
as imaged, especially if some particular feature is the focal point 
of our attention*
It has been held by some philosophers that there must be a spatial 
relationship of some kind between an image and a presently perceived 
scene, since it is possible to ’project' an image into an actual view 
(although this neither becomes nor obscures any part of that view).
For instance, it is claimed that I could image a cat fis sitting on the 
mat which is now before me. Now, there is no doubt that we often talk 
as if such ’projection' were a possible and quite normal procedure.
But what could it be that we are implying? ’Projecting images' is 
certainly nothing like projecting a picture of a cat on to the mat with 
a cinematograph. Indeed there is really nothing to be projected. When 
we attempt an analysis of what is happening there seem to be two 
possibilities only, neither of which involves anything we would wish 
to call a spatial relationship between an image and a present percep­
tion. It is possible that:
(1) I have an image of a cat and I conceive the possibility of this 
cat being on the mat which I am in fact looking at; or
(2) In addition to my perceiving the actual mat on which there is no
cat, I am also imaging an exactly similar mat (together with its
visible surroundings) on which there sits a cat.
1
See p.197.
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ii. Size
Now, in the second case, would the mat, as imaged, be the same 
‘size1 as the mat as actually perceived? It is clear that we can be 
talking only of visible size, and since in this case it is my per­
ceiving the mat which has stimulated me to image it, the chances are 
that it will be the 'same size'.
A memory-image is as visibly large or small as its object as 
originally perceived, even though it does not 'occupy', as does an 
after-image, any part of the total potential field of vision. There is 
nothing deep or mysterious in this. It simply means that if I saw my 
friend twenty paces away from me, I image him as if he were twenty 
paces away from me. To test this, try to remember a favourite snap­
shot in imagery; you will find that it is always imaged as if it were 
about eighteen inches away, the distance at which we normally look 
at snapshots. By an effort it may be possible to 'enlarge it', but 
once we do this we are immediately conscious of the entry of 
'imagination elements' into the imagery.
It is possible, in principle, to have a visual memory-image of a 
complete visual field, a thing we rarely if ever in fact have, and a 
memory-image 'covers' only that portion of the possible visual field 
which was covered by the object imaged in the original perception of 
it. It follows that there is, as it were, a 'blank surround' to the 
image - much as there is to a particular object looked at through a 
telescope. Now, when a particular area or object is detached from its
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setting, we are aware of the 'blank surround' and of its potential 
occupants which provide the spatial element (there is also the temporal 
element) of that 'context' which is distinctive of the memory-image, 
known as such, and determines the 'expansion' of the image, 
iii. Colour
In 'The mind and Its Place in Nature' Broad asserts:* 'A visual 
sensum must in fact have some perfectly determinate shade of colour; 
and so must a visual image'. It would be very difficult to deny this 
claim, but nevertheless it raises certain questions: Need a memory- 
image include the same colours as the perceived scene? Need the image 
include any chromatic colour? Can we make a distinction between colour 
and mere visible variety?
Of course imagery can include exact shades of colour, as in my 
examples in the previous section. But, if what is being remembered, or 
our particular interest in what is being remembered, is the shapes and 
relative sizes involved in the appearance, colour seems to be no more 
necessary than in a newspaper photograph. We do not feel that the 
picture in the paper is not a true representation of the Prime Minister 
because it shows his face as grey and not pink, though we might well 
do so if the rest of the picture were in colour. Whether or not our 
visual imagery always does involve chromatic colour is an empirical
'The Mind and Its Place in Nature', p.258.
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question vre should each have to answer for ourselves; there seems to 
be no reason why it must do so.
Nevertheless, it may still be held that an image must have some 
perfectly determinate shade or shades of colour. The ’black and white’ 
picture is intelligible only so long as it is a kind of 'translation' 
of the multi-coloured appearance, and blacks, whites, and greys must 
themselves be ’perfectly determinate'. It is true that our concern is 
with the relationship between the shades rather than with the shades 
themselves, but whatever is related must be one shade or another. 
Notwithstanding this, it seems to me that I can image in considerable 
detail a framed photograph of my father in military uniform, yet 1 
would find it very hard to say whether I am imaging it as 'black and 
white' or as 'sepia'. Possibly I am imaging it as both simultaneously.
In another odd case, I remember my supervisor's voice, i.e. remem­
ber how it sounds in auditory imagery, yet without remembering it as 
making any specific utterance. There is at least an initial puzzle 
about both these cases; the second may simply be an extreme case of 
'remembering the "look" of the gute',^ but the first seems to demand 
for its explanation an investigation of what is usually called 'generic 
imagery'.
b) Specific and 'generic* imagery
Thinking and remembering in imagery, as this performance is 
traditionally understood, seems to demand that the image be at once
T
See p. 231
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sufficiently like the original perception to be identifiable, and 
sufficiently unlike it to be productive or reminiscent of the concept 
or idea of a continuous thing in the world. This problem is often 
magnified by the assumption that an image is a kind of symbol for a 
class-concept, an assumption which I have denied. Having an image of a 
dog may lead us to think of dogs in general, but there is no reason 
why it should do so. .^nd certainly I do not ’use the image* to think 
about the concept dog, although I might well regard my having an 
image of Rover as my thinking about Rover as a creature in the world, 
especially if the image I have of him is not identifiable as an image 
of any one occasion in his life. In practice I find that my own 
’standard images’ do tend to be of ’fixed instances'. Thus the images 
I have of people are frequently in fact images of their photographs.
For obvious reasons these photographs can more easily be ’imprinted 
on the memory' than can any single fleeting appearance of the people 
themselves. Similarly, the images I have of places are most frequently 
of the oft-repeated views of those places from certain vantage points: 
houses from their front gates, valleys from the nearby hills we climb 
to look at them, and so on. Nevertheless, we do have memory-images of 
sights seen only once and only for a moment (else our memories of events 
would necessarily be wholly propositional). We also do seem to have 
images of particulars which have been built up over a series of differ­
ent, and differing, viewings, and it is these that are felt to be at
once both like and unlike any one single 'viewing'.
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i. Vague images
We have discussed the way that 'vagueness1 permits us to remember 
the 'look' of the gate without knowing the number of its bars.* Now we 
must consider how 'vagueness' may also permit us to remember the 'look1 
of the gate open, half-open or shut, all seemingly at once. For we do 
seem able, in some way, to do this. Russell contends that the vagueness 
of imagery not only fully explains this strange ability, but also 
'supplies an answer to Hume's query: Could you imagine a shade of 
colour that you had never seen, if it was intermediate between two 
very similar shades that you had seen? The answer is that you could 
not form so precise an image, even of a colour that you had seen, but 
that you could form a vague image, equally appropriate to the shade
2that you had not seen and to the two similar shades that you had seen'.
I believe that, insofar as this is a statement of fact, it is 
wrong. Unless we beg the question by making precision an empirically 
unattainable ideal, then why does Russell assert that you can not form 
a precise image of the required shade of colour? It would be most 
surprising if many painters and other people whose job it is to match 
colours do not do so regularly, and I am satisfied that I not 
infrequently do so myself. If we avoid this difficulty by rephrasing 
the question as 'Could you form as precise an image of a colour you
1
See p. 231ff.
'Human Knowledge - Its Scope and Limits', p.125.
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had never seen as you could of a colour you had seen?’, ray own
answer would be an unequivocal ’No'. What we can have is a concept
of such a shade; the use of the word 'intermediate' shows this to be
possible; but we cannot have an image of it for the very reasons which
led Hume to regard the 'possibility' as a puzzle. The problem only
arises because people have overlooked the fact that colours, like
sounds, form a natural scale. The missing shade is not, therefore, a
completely unknown quantity like the blue rumped gnurgle.'*’
I said 'insofar as it is a statement of fact1, because 'vague' is 
2itself a vague word. Before we can decide in what way vagueness permits 
us to image 'all the positions of the gate at once' we must determine 
what this particular kind of vagueness amounts to. 
ii. Generic Images
There are several possibilities and they are generally classified 
together under the heading 'Generic Imagery'.
a. 'Composite pictures'. Firstly, there is the notion of a composite 
image, rather like a composite photograph, that is, a number of photo­
graphs taken on the same film and superimposed on each other. Clearly 
we cannot take this too literally, for unless the separate objects were 
extremely similar in outline the resultant picture would be simply an 
undecipherable mess. And if they were sufficiently close - say, several
1
See p. 197.
2
This point is made by J.L. Austin. See 'Sense and Sensibilia’, p.125.
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shots of the same face with just slightly varied expressions - the 
need for the composite would be lost; any one of the pictures would 
serve equally well. Except as regards the expression - and this would 
be the one point wherein the composite would be blurred and useless.
With colour the position would be just as bad. A yellow surface super­
imposed on a blue surface would give a green surface, not a surface that 
was somehow both yellow and blue at once.
Suppose we suggest that instead of superimposing each entire image 
upon the others, we ’select’ and combine parts of each to make up a 
composite which is, as it were, a single image drawn from many sources. 
This is certainly possible. But the image itself would still be 
’specific' and, being ’drawn from many sources', it would lack the 
authority of a memory-image; whereas what we want is an image which is 
not specific and yet has that authority. Nor would this composite be 
representative of the continuous object except in the way that a piece 
of china made up from bits of different articles in a teaset would be 
representative of the teaset. And finally, there is also the drawback 
that the appearances involved must still be at least sufficiently alike 
to be compatible, e.g., if the composite image is of a man's face they 
must be all frontface or all sideface; a combination would not be 
possible.
b. Series of images. There is however one other possibility which 
Price, amongst others, has advanced. 'When I think about some 
object or class of objects in an imagy manner, I am not restricted
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to using just one single image. I might use a series of different 
images. Again, the images which I use need not be static'.* Thus 
by a series of different images of the same object, drawn possibly, 
but not necessarily, from a perceived sequence of events, we can image, 
as it were, all round the object in both space and time.
I would also add that it is by no means certain that this would 
have to be a series in the chronological sense. We could find no 
logical reason to deny (and some empirical reason to assert) the pos­
sibility of having several simultaneous images; why then should we not 
have several simultaneous images of different 'aspects' of the same 
object?
iii. Image and concept as complementary
Gur analysis of 'generic imagery' shows clearly that '<* generic 
image' is a misleading expression. What we have is a number of comple­
mentary images or imagings which act jointly to exemplify or bring 
about in us a general idea or concept of a continuous individual 
entity or a set of characteristics. The images are, as Berkeley and 
Hume held them to be, the particular re-presentations to us in memory 
of particular past sense-experiences. Out of them concepts can arise, 
and by means of them concepts can be checked and defined, it is because 
of this that people have been led to refer to what are in fact con­
cepts as 'generic images'.
A memory which consisted wholly of imagery would not be so utterly 
meaningless as a 'perception' which consisted wholly of sense- 
1
'Thinking and Experience', p.272.
268
experience, since it would be possible to form concepts, with the aid 
of present perception, from series of occurrent images. It would 
nevertheless be a very limited and strange memory - the kind of memory 
we are disposed to attribute to 'lower animals'. On the other hand, a 
memory with no imagery would be, as we have seen, both sterile and 
inconclusive. Language permits the development of complex forms of 
thinking; imagery provides the constant link between that development 
and our own past perceptual experience, our actual apprehension of the 
world about us.
Chapter VIII
CONCLUSIONS
1. Recapitulation
a) The problem raised
i. How is it that we are sure?
It may be remembered that in chapter I of this essay I made 
the point that the question to be answered is, not 'Should v/e trust 
our memories?' but 'IIow is it that our memories are in fact trust­
worthy when they seem,.at every stage, to be open to error?’. At 
all times we are aware of a great deal of the experience we have 
had in the past, and aware of it in a way that gives us confidence 
in every way as great as the confidence we feel about our present 
surroundings. Yet in no case, it seems, can we prove to ourselves, 
or to other people, that things did occur as we remember them to 
have occurred, as we feel that we can prove the existence of our 
present surroundings - by pointing to them, knocking against them, 
measuring them, or tasting and smelling them.
Of course, one of the ways by which we prove the existence of 
our present surroundings - the prediction of effects which will arise 
out of them - is open to us, on some occasions at least, for establish­
ing the truth of our memory-claims. But here we are not really 
proving anything about memory, only about matters of fact: the rose 
which is evidence for the accuracy of my memory-claim that I planted
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a rose could have been put there by somebody else, or could have 
grown wild; the crater which reassures me that there was an explosion 
could have been made by an excavator. In any case confirmations of 
this sort do not generally create memory-beliefs, they merely 
reinforce our confidence if we are doubtful whether we really are 
remembering, and assist us to convince other people who may foe 
inclined to doubt our memory reports.
The 'memory-experience1, the certainty we feel about matters of 
past fact whether or not there is any 'objective evidence', suggests 
very strongly that in some way we actually 'look at' or re-live our 
past experiences as part of our present experience. But the diffi­
culty is to give a sense to this which is not purely metaphorical.
When we look at something we are directly acquainted with it, and in 
this direct acquaintance lies our authority to make confident assertions 
about it. Our task, therefore, is to show that in memory, or in some 
kinds of memory, we have the same authority. In short, we must 
explain how, and when, we are directly acquainted with the past when 
we remember, 
ii. Special cases
Firstly - the past with which I am directly acquainted must be 
my own past. It would be blatantly absurd to suggest that when I 
remember that the Battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815 I am somehow 
directly acquainted with that battle itself. It is not so absurd, 
however, (though it may well be false) to claim that I am directly 
acquainted with the occasion of my learning this piece of history.
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To show that the authority of all memory rests upon our direct 
acquaintance with the past, it is first necessary to show that what is 
generally called the memory of events - the memory of one’s own actual 
experiences - is the basic form of memory from which all other forms 
derive. Although it is perfectly natural and intelligible to talk of 
remembering individuals or remembering propositions or remembering how 
to do things, as distinct kinds of remembering, we must show that all 
these can be reduced to, or explained in terms of, remembering past 
events in our lives, events which we ourselves witnessed. Accordingly 
a considerable part of this essay has been devoted to demonstrating 
this reduction.
I have argued that to remember an individual is either to remember 
a particular appearance or a series of appearances which we regard as 
being of the same individual, or else to remember an event or series 
of events in which that individual figures.1 Thus to say that what I 
am remembering is an individual, not an event, is only to say something 
about my point of interest in my memory. The sane memory which I now 
regard as ’of my uncle’ I could equally well regard as ’of the time 
my uncle fell down the steps’ or 'of the time my uncle wore a bowler 
hat ’ .
When we turn to 'propositional memories' it is vital to bear in 
mind the distinction I made between remembering propositions and
1
See chapter III, p.63.
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remembering in_ propositions. All our remembering, insofar as it 
is expressed in memory-claims, is jji propositions. To remember 
propositions is to remember the beliefs we have held in the past about
matters of fact - whether we announced them publicly or not - as
distinct from remembering the events, our perception of which led us to 
hold those beliefs. (And as distinct also from remembering the sen­
tences in which the propositions were expressed).
Clearly, a proposition is not an event in the world. Thinking - 
producing propositions - is, of course, a mental event, and mental 
events as well as physical ones may be remembered. But in remembering
them we are not acquainted with a past public event; we are only
presented with evidence that we have been so acquainted. And the 
past public event need not be the event which the proposition is 
about. It frequently happens that we remember a proposition though 
we have forgotten, or are not presently recalling, or never even 
witnessed, the event to which it refers, though it is always possible, 
of course, if we did witness the event, that we may remember it, or 
some part of it, along with the proposition. For instance, I remember 
that as an infant I lived in West Hartlepool; I can remember several 
occasions of producing my Birth Certificate which showed West Hartlepool 
as my birthplace and several conversations about my having been 
born there. And but for these memories my claim - I remember that I
1
See chapter III, p. 77ff.
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once lived in West Hartlepool - would be quite unconvincing, even to 
myself. For I cannot remember living in West Hartlepool.
To the question of remembering liow to do things I devoted a whole 
chapter, because this, above all others, has traditionally been regarded 
as a special case of remembering, not to be fitted into the ’perceptual 
mould’. My conclusion was that, although it is normal practice in 
everyday speech to identify 'remembering how' with 'being able', 
there is nevertheless a distinction between them which we are all con­
scious of, and which we are sometimes obliged to make in order to be 
intelligible. And though 'being able' may well be, in many instances, 
a case of retentiveness, it is physiological retentiveness only, and as 
such outside the scope of an epistemological enquiry. The 'remembering 
how' which is a function of intelligence, as I defined that term in 
relation to memory, is intelligible only in terms of 'remembering that'
- remembering events and propositions. And, as we have seen, remem­
bering propositions is itself dependent for its authority upon the 
memory of events.
iii. Re—interpretation - memories and claims
In chapter IV, I distinguished between our memory-claims - the 
propositions we produce about our past experiences - and our actual 
memories - the remembered propositions and occurrent imagery which 
constitute the 'remembering state of mind' on which those claims are 
based. I pointed out that, whilst it is by the former that our memories 
are judged to be true or false, it is from the latter, and only from
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the latter, that what 1 called the initial authority of memory can 
arise. The memory-claim may refer directly to a past state of affairs 
in the world; the memory is always of a past state of myself - my own 
perceptions and .judgments when confronted with that state of affairs. 
Thus it is always possibly in principle at least, to amend a memory- 
claim in the light of a re-assessment of the memory itself without 
recourse to any ’external evidence’. When a man is relating what 
happened on some past occasion which he witnessed it is always sensible 
to ask him ’But what are you actually remembering?’. 
b) The problem remaining 
i. Narrowing the gap
We have already come some way towards the solution of our problem. 
If it be allowed: (a) that ail memory-claims must be or rest upon 
memory-claims concerning past events, and (b) that these memory-claims 
are based upon occurrent memories of our own past states when we were 
confronted with these events; then, the authority we attach to all our 
memory-claims must derive from our ability to remember our own past 
states. And since these claims are always open to revision in the light 
of a closer scrutiny of our occurrent memories, it may well be that 
many of our so-called ’false memories’ are not memories at all; they 
are merely false inferences from our memories of our own past states.
It may be recalled that I distinguished two kinds of error which 
could be avoided, or at least guarded against, by introspection. We 
can avoid claiming more that is warranted by the occurrent memory. We
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can also re-check the remembered propositions to ensure that, at the 
time of the perception, we were not misinterpreting the event we 
witnessed - provided only that we have memory-imagery of the event 
against which to check.
Thus our memories are open to 'checking’ and reinterpretation at 
two points. But unless that which is being reinterpreted, the memory- 
imagery itself, is a re-presentation to us of the actual past event, 
and not itself an interpretation of that event, then all our reinter­
pretations are pointless and vain. Before we could decide whether, 
and in what way, our imagery does constitute such a re-presentation - 
a direct acquaintance with the past event - it was necessary to 
consider the nature and function of imagery. This we have done, and 
we are now in a position to see how imagery does constitute an actual 
re-presentation to us of the past events themselves, 
ii. The 'physical element*
I claimed that the function of imagery is to provide a direct 
contact with how things looked, sounded and so forth. I defined 
imagery, accordingly, as the direct memory of appearances, an appear­
ance being what is presented to the senses by a physical event or 
object irrespective of any perceptual judgment or classification. I 
also claimed that we may have a disposition or capacity to image a 
particular appearance (whatever the physiological explanation of 
this may be) just as we may have the capacity to make any overt 
muscular movement, in response to an appropriate stimulus. The
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appearances ’given to us’ in imagery are the same appearances as
were previously ’given to us’ in sensation. The objects which
presented those appearances are no longer here; but the appearances
never were ’here’ in the sense that the objects were, so the absence
of the objects does not entail that the appearance is not the same 
1appearance.
Sensing an appearance is not a cognitive operation, though it may 
be a prerequisite of certain kinds of cognitive operation, e.g. per­
ceptual judgments. To perceive is always to perceive that something 
is the case, to note a factual relationship. Hence philosophers have 
attempted to distinguish between 'knowledge of' and 'acquaintance with' 
the objective world. The danger of making this distinction is that, 
having made it, there is a tendency to then apply it as though it were 
between two 'kinds of knowledge', when in fact it must be between 
knowledge and something else. For, to maintain the distinction at all, 
we must allow that we are 'acquainted with' the world only in the same 
way as the table is 'acquainted with' the floor it stands on. We 
cannot have the benefits of special use and ordinary use at once. 
Ordinarily we say that we are acquainted with certain facts when we 
have not yet decided 'what to make of them'. But we are already 
allowing that we know these facts as such, that we have noticed them.
T
By 'same' I mean qualitatively same. On p.281 following I argue 
that numerical sameness and difference cannot be applied to 
appearances.
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And to notice something is always to notice something about it, even 
if only to notice that it is distinguishable from something else - 
and this is to make a perceptual judgment. We cannot isolate 'objects 
of acquaintance' or 'pure sensations' within our actual experience; 
they are simply inferences from that experience. Our experience is 
of objects in certain relationships. It is true that, since we per­
ceive relationships, there must be elements which are related. But 
it is a further, and unjustified, step to say that we must perceive 
the related elements, as a prerequisite of perceiving the relation­
ship. To quote G.F. Stout: 'it thus appears that we can never have 
absolutely pure sensation, sensation absolutely devoid of meaning 
either original or acquired. We may even go further than this and 
lay it down as a general principle that sensations always have 
derivative meaning; for retentiveness and association operate from 
the very beginning of mental life. It may be urged that this cannot 
be the case in the earliest moments of experience. But even if we 
set aside what may perhaps be due to the results of ancestral 
experience transmitted by heredity, we have to recognise that the 
first instant of conscious life is only an ideal limit, which we cannot 
definitely mark off so as to consider it separately. Thus, even from 
this point of view, the concept of absolutely pure sensation is an 
artificial abstraction*.*
T
'A Manual of Psychology', p.124.
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The point is that sensation, the separate activity of sensing, 
is something the existence of which we seem driven to accept; but it 
is clearly not a mental operation in any ordinary sense♦ It must, 
then, be a physiological operation. Just as we can move our feet 
and judge that they are moving forwards or backwards, so we can 
visually sense and judge that we are seeing trees and houses (that 
is, we can see trees and houses; 'see* is a cognitive terra as we 
normally use it). In neither case are we conscious that the ’physical 
activity' precedes the 'mental activity'. At most we assume that it 
'must do so'.
Sensation, then, is simply the physiological process by virtue 
of which appearances are presented to us. If these appearances can 
be retained, again in a purely physical or physiological way, and 
reproduced in imagery, then we have a permanent physical access to 
external reality, by virtue of which we can make some factual judg­
ments about physical events after those events have occurred, with 
the same right of assurance as we could have made them when the 
events were occurring.
Now, my contention throughout has been that the ability to image 
is simply the ability to retain and re-actualize sensed appearances; 
that is what I mean by calling imagery the memory of how things 
appeared. Thus we have found in imagery, if not a 'physical element’ 
of the past physical event itself, at least a physiological element 
of the past perception of that event. And we have found in memory
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the element we were looking for which is prior to any interpretation 
of the event remembered. The objection that the imagery may not 
be of actual past events is anticipated by my argument that 'imagi­
nation images' are memory-images:* correctly identified, all images 
are seen to be memory-images.
But 'correctly identified' is a quite considerable qualification.
I have argued that the proper question about imagery is not 'Whether it 
was' but 'When it was', and I have considered various ways in which we 
can identify the 'memory character of imagery'. But still it may be 
felt that this is not enough, that we have a better right, and a 
different kind of right, to be sure about what is going on around us 
in the present than to be sure about what has gone on around us in 
the past. To see what justification there may be for this feeling 
we shall now consider 'the past' and its relationship to 'the present’. 
2. The past
There are two distinct, though obviously related, problems about 
the past: how we know the past when it is no longer here to be known, 
and how we come to have the concept of pastness at all - what is the 
origin of our concept of temporal sequence. Perhaps we might assume 
that it originates with our own memories, as the 'home', so to speak, 
of the events we remember. But this is to presuppose that we are 
competent to distinguish actual happenings from imaginary happenings
1
See chapter VI, p. 107ff.
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without recourse to any notion of a 'real past* as a criterion. It 
is imperative, therefore, for those who wish to deny that there is 
any unique memory-experience, and who wish to base their account of 
memory upon our knowledge of the past and our ability to report it 
correctly, to show that the concept of pastness could arise from 
present experience independently of memory. But before examining any 
suggestions as to how this could be, let us look at the first question: 
how can we know the past? 
a) Knowing the past
i. 'Actual presentation1.
There are various ways of knowing what happened in the past: we 
can read about it, or be told about it, or work out what must have 
happened for things to be as they are now. Or we can remember our 
own past experiences. The first group are all quite simple and 
intelligible - once we understand clearly what we mean by 'the past* - 
and they are not directly connected with memory. We simply 'place' 
certain events in a former time.
But with our memories of our own experiences there is no question 
of placing events in a former time; in being remembered they are 
already so placed. We are aware of certain events, and at the same 
time aware that they belong to the past. Now, it would be possible 
to accept this and yet still to feel that saying that in memory we 
are directly acquainted with the past is a strangely 'metaphysical' 
claim. It may be felt that, taken literally, it is simply absurd -
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for the past is past - and, taken metaphorically, it reduces to the 
trivial assertion that the events we remember are always past events.
I do not believe, however, that this feeling would be justified. 
The 'reduction1 cannot be sustained because there is a difference, 
however we may characterise it, between actually remembering an event 
and simply remembering propositions about it. What we may call 'being 
actually presented with a past event' must at least be a particular 
kind of remembering. The charge that the claim is absurd arises from 
the confusion of 'being presented' with 'being present with', and a 
misunderstanding about what is presented in both memory and perception. 
We can be present wnen an event occurs, and we are then presented with 
an appearance of that event (or by that event). We are not presented 
with the event; we merely witness it. When we remember the event in 
imagery we are again presented with the same appearance, but this 
time by our own 'retentive mechanisms', whatever they be, not by a 
current happening in the world. If it be protested that the 
appearance presented is the same qualitatively but not numerically, 
then 1 ask what numerical difference of an appearance could mean.
We are not using the term 'appearance' to stand for an activity; any 
object which does not change presents the same appearance on any 
number of occasions to any number of observers who happen to be 
suitably placed. These presentations are numerically different, 
as are the 'perceptual acts' of the observers. But we are concerned 
with the appearance (how it appears), not the appearing (that it
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appears), and the only criterion of identity which can be applied, 
therefore, is qualitative sameness. If I may use an analogy: The 
same joke may be told many times by many different people but it 
remains the same joke. Numerical difference can apply only to the 
occasions of telling it.
Actual presentation with the past demands only that we be in
effectively the same position as we were in the past for noting and
identifying events which then occurred. It is surely misleading, then,
to characterise direct presentation of the past in such ways as this:
’Just as it is asked whether the sense-datum is a mental representation
of an external object or a constituent of that object, so it has been
asked whether the memory image is a present symbol of what occurred in
1the past or the past event itself'. To suggest that an image is 
itself a past event is an obvious absurdity. But there is nothing 
absurd in asking whether the appearance presented to me in imagery on 
this present occasion is the same appearance as was presented to me 
in perceiving on some past occasion. It is no more absurd than 
asking whether, in hearing a gramaphone record, we are presented with 
a past performance of an orchestra, and tne case for a positive reply 
seems somewhat stronger. For in that case it could be argued that 
what we are really presented with is the effect of vibrations set up 
by the record, whereas, once we have got rid of the 'entity image'
1
From an article by C. Landesman - 'Philosophical Problems of Memory' 
Journal of Philosophy LIX.3. Feb., 1962, p.57.
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notion, there is nothing we could be presented with in the memory 
case except the appearance of the event itself. If anyone should 
wish to push tue analogy to what may be its logical conclusion, and 
say that we are really presented with the mnemic effects of certain 
of our own physiological retentive organisms reacting to a stimulus, 
then 1 have no objection - for these ’effects’ simply are the presen­
tation to us of a certain appearance which has been presented to us 
before.
There will undoubtedly be those who balk at saying that in memory 
we may be actually presented with the past. Very well: let us say 
only that in memory we have an access to the past which is effectively 
equivalent to the access we have in perception to the present. A case 
could be made out for either description, and this would be an argument 
about English usage. The important thing is not how we choose to 
describe the facts, but that we are clear as to what these facts are. 
ii• Knowing and knowing about
I have maintained that in imagery we are re-presented with the 
appearances originally presented to us by past events. When we 
remember propositions, our own past judgments, these are already, as 
remembered, interpretations of the appearances presented by past events. 
In his article ’The Empiricist Theory of Memory’'*' Holland casts doubt 
upon the possibility of making any sharp division within propositional
I
MIND, Vol. LXIII9 1954, p.482. Holland is criticising a distinction 
drawn by Woozley in his 'Theory of Knowledge’.
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memories between those arising from the perception of events and 
those arising from reports and inferences. He does, however, allow 
that 'There is, of course, one way in which I can recall the Rugby 
Match {which he had witnessed] that is not open to me in the case of 
the Boat Race jjwhich he had not], and that is by picturing to myself 
parts of it as 1 saw themj and it seems likely that it is recollections 
in which visual imagery occurs that Woozley has mainly in mind when 
he segregates one sort of remembering from all others as being cog­
nitive. Yet if this is the case, one wonders why he does not say so 
plainly' .
I agree that the only intelligible distinction of kind we can 
make within memory occurrences is that between propositional memory 
and imagery. But, arising out of this is a distinction in memory- 
claias. It is based upon situations in which memory-imagery of the 
event claimed as remembered could occur and those in which it could 
not. The distinction is not based upon memories in which imagery does 
occur and memories in which it does not.
In fact, our memories of events we have actually witnessed 
generally include both propositions and imagery, and the essential 
difference between the memory of the Rugby Match and the memory of the 
Boat Race is that the one can be supported by the memory 'presentation' 
of the event itself, whilst the only 'presentations' which can support 
the others are of other events - reports of the race in newspapers 
or from friends. The question: 'What is it you are actually remem­
bering?' is here very pertinent.
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Having once acquired a piece of knowledge, by whatever means,
I may remember it. Out if that knowledge was acquired as the direct 
result of my perceptual experience I have thereby a far better warrant 
for certainty than if it had simply been imparted to me secondhand.
In the latter case I may always suspect that my informant was mistaken 
or untruthful; in the former case, the more I ponder on the memory, 
the more likely it is that ’supporting evidence’, both imagery and 
remembered propositions, y/ili be forthcoming. Compare, for instance, 
my two memories: that Magna Carta was signed in 1215, and that I 
spent some time in Rio de Janeiro in my youth. In the first case I 
could be convinced that I had misremembered the date by exactly the 
same kind of means as I could be reassured that I had remembered it 
correctly - by historical records and the authority of experts, I 
may be surprised, but I would not be astonished; this is the kind 
of ’memory’ we are used to getting wrong.
If, on the other hand, everybody I knew denied that I had ever 
visited Rio, I could only suppose that they were having some sort of 
joke with me. I would find it quite impossible to account for the 
vivid imagery I have of that city, and the supporting memories I have 
of the voyages to and from it, in terms of any books I may have 
read or films I may have seen. If people, to show that they were not 
joking, produced documentary proof that I could not have ever been 
in Rio, then I would have to allow that I was suffering from what 
I called in chapter I a ’mnemic hallucination’, and visit a
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psychiatrist. But, as I have observed before, it is just a fortunate
fact that hallucinations of any kind are very rare indeed.
Furlong says:* ’The sensuous imagery supplies context to what we
remember; it places our recollections; it focuses our attention’. This
is certainly true, but imagery has a more fundamental role in memory
than this. Additional propositional memories supply a kind of context
to what we remember - as when I remember that once I drank a whole
bottle of brandy, and also remember that I was subsequently very ill.
The thing which only imagery can supply is not context but content to
our memories - the past events as we perceived them. I could have been
ill through drinking whiskey, or because of a stomach infection. But
if I have visual and gustatory images of the bottle in my hand and the
brandy in my mouth this possibility hardly matters. With imagery the
relationship is of evidence to conclusions, not - as with additional
propositions - of premises to conclusions.
2This is why 1 reject Ilyie's claim: 'The question "How can I
faithfully describe what I once witnessed?" is no more of a puzzle 
than the question, "How can I faithfully visualise what I once 
witnessed?". Ability to describe things learned by personal experience 
is one of the knacks we expect of linguistically competent people; 
ability to visualise parts of it is another thing we expect in some
1
'A Study in Memory', p.87.
'The Concept of Mind', p.276.
2
287
degree of moat people...'. In the first place, the ability to 
describe things has nothing to do with whether they were learned by 
personal experience or not. And in the second place, the ability to 
digest food is also something we expect of most people, and this is 
not a puzzle at all - or, if it is, it is a different kind of puzzle. 
To remember how to describe something so that we know that we are 
describing it correctly demands the mental retention of a great many 
propositions, sufficient to support each other, to form an adequate* 
context for the memory. But imagery demands no mental retention, 
only physiological retention. In being re-presented with how the 
object looked I am in a position to decide what it was. That I know 
about the past by means of memory may mean that I am remembering 
propositions ma e in the past, or that i am interpreting my present 
imagery, or both together; but there is a perfectly familiar distinc­
tion between knowing and knowing of or about. I know the man next 
door whereas I know of or about the Prime Minister but I do not know 
him. I can know the past, as distinct from knowing about it, only 
when I am having imagery of it. 
b) Conceiving 'the past1
When we ask how we come to have a concept of space we may be told 
that we simply perceive it directly or that it arises from our 
perceiving objects in certain relationships which we characterise as
For the significance of the term 'adequate' see chapter IV, p. 108.
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’spatial'. But to claim that we conceive time only as the result 
of perceiving (or being aware of) events in a certain relation which 
we characterise as 'temporal', presupposes that our memories of events 
are identifiable as such, and form a temporal sequence, leading up, 
so to speak, to the here and now. Once I have the idea of m^ past and 
also the idea of existents outside and independent of myself, then 
it is a straightforward step to the idea of the past. But, without 
the aid of some memory-indicator to differentiate, within the thoughts 
I entertain, what actually has happened from what logically could 
happen, how could I come to conceive m^ past? It has been suggested 
that our idea of the past grows up, so to speak, with our use of the 
past tense in speech. I do not doubt that the use of past tense 
helps to clarify the concept of the past, but I fail to see how a 
past tense could ever come into use unless and until people had at 
least some concept of their own past lives to which to apply it.
Those who deny that remembering is a unique experience, and as 
such identifiable, are thereby obliged to claim that we perceive 
temporal sequence directly, that memory is a concept derived from 
our acquaintance with the past, and not vice-versa, and they are led 
to what is, in my opinion, a very contrived and unconvincing argument, 
i. The specious present
This argument is that the present, though we treat it as simply 
an ideal limit, has in fact a very short duration - just long enough 
for us to perceive the temporal sequence of events. So that what I
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ani now perceiving has within it one event succeeded by another. Thus
1 can grasp the notion of temporal sequence from present perceptual
experience alone, and from this evolve the notions of past and future.
Furlong, for example, speaks of 'a succession of sounds which we can
apprehend in one act',* the rat-tat-tat of someone knocking at the door.
And he says: ’Thus from this familiar mode of experience, the specious
present, we can learn what it means to say that an event has occurred,
and that one event is before another. And indeed this is likely to
have been the way in which we first acquired this knowledge, for it is
2hard to see how else we could have obtained it*.
Now, I do not want to deny that we apprehend rat-tat-tats 'in one 
act', nor to deny that this could be our first introduction to the idea 
of temporal sequence. What I do want to deny is that it is either 
correct or necessary to maintain that this apprehension is 'in one 
present', whether we call it specious or not.
I can express my argument better in relation to a plea by C.I. 
Lewis for a temporally extended present, though his reason for making 
it is slightly different. "'The present" is "long enough" for the 
genuine apprehension of the data of experience; because otherwise 
there would be no such thing as direct experience, of which anyone
1
'A Study in Memory', p.95.
2
'A Study in Memory', p.96.
'An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation', p.331 (his italics)
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could be aware or even mention as what we do not have*. He argues
that unless there were a present in which we could learn what we
subsequently remember about the world as presented to us, memory could
never even originate. 'Either the pristine given character is there
to be inspected, or there is nothing there the inspection of which
would inform us of what has just escaped'
Now, I grant that perceptual judgments 'take time'. But I deny
that the perceptual judgments which I remember must have been made
within a single 'present'. If we regard the present as simply the ideal
limit of the recent, then, though our sense-organs may be functioning
continuously, our perceptual judgments are being made, as it were,
up to the present rather than in_ the present. So long as we have the
faculty of retaining what is presented to the eyes, ears and so on,
we can still make perceptual judgments; we need only allow that they
are being made about the immediate past as given in memory, not about
the present as given in 'sensation'.
By taking this stand we avoid the problems which must arise from
such claims as this by Russell: 'The specious present includes elements
at all stages on the journey from sensation to image. It is this fact
2which enables us to apprehend such things as movements...'. For here, 
if we take the 'fading of sensations' (Russell's description of the
1
'An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation,' p.331
'The Analysis of Mind', p.174.
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transition) literally, we must expect that seeing a car move down the
street would involve seeing one firm shape with a series of ever
fainter ghost shapes behind it, as we do in fact see shooting stars
which move too fast for our eyes, or objects in photographs when the
camera has been left open too long. And if we do not take it literally,
can it mean anything but that we see the car where it is and also
remember it where it has just been, that a single perceptual judgment
embraces both the ’present sensation* and an indefinite series of
memory-images of past sensations (or the appearances given in past
sensations)? This seems to be the only intelligible interpretation,
and, since the perception of changes must in any case involve memory-
imagery, wliy^can we not dispense with the 'present sensation* as a
distinct kind of experience altogether?
The case for doing so is greatly strengthened by the difficulties
we are bound to meet in explaining how and when a sensation 'becomes*
an image. According to Russell 'We have seen no reason to think that
the difference between sensations and images is only one of degree',1
2yet, within the specious present, 'a sensation fades gradually, 
passing by continuous gradations to the status of an image'. It is 
by no means easy to see how anything can pass by continuous gradations 
from being one thing to being another unless the difference is simply
1
'The Analysis of Mind', p.147.
'The Analysis of Mind', p,174.
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one of degree. This surely is how we would normally define a 
difference of degree as opposed to a difference of kind* 
ii. Perceiving, remembering and imagining as a single scale
Hume, like Russell, was reluctant to deny that sensations are 
different in kind from images. He was faced, therefore, with the 
problem that there seemed to be no way of distinguishing between the 
'liveliness1 by which he differentiated sensations from images, and the 
'vividness' by which he differentiated memory from imagination imagery. 
This fact he tacitly acknowledged by interchanging the two terms 
quite frequently throughout his work. Why did he not simply accept 
that between present perception, memory-imagery and imagination-imagery 
there is a single difference of degree only? Why not allow that they 
all lie on a scale of vividness/liveliness, with present perception 
at one end and wild imagination at the other?
I have already argued that the difference between memory and 
imagination imagery can be one of degree only.^ I have also argued 
that in all our perceptual judgments we must employ memory imagery; 
to deny this is to embrace the apparent absurdity of a 'present' of 
unspecified duration. Surely the next step is to allow that when we 
speak of present appearances we are simply referring to that memory- 
imagery which, due to the proximity in time of its 'external causes’, 
approaches the ideal limit of memory-authority.
1
See chapter VI, p. 19?.
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It may be objected here that this would leave out entirely the 
unique quality of ’substantial existence' which belongs to the subjects 
of present perception, that we would be like people who have lost the 
use of their sense-organs and can 'see' and 'hear' things only in 
imagery, having no direct contact with the world they are actually 
living in. But this is not so. For we have not lost the use of our 
sense-organs; on the contrary they are operating busily all the time, 
constantly introducing to us noval situations. I have stressed the 
fact that 'sensing' is very like imaging - so like it in fact that the 
only effective distinguishing feature is that we 'cannot get away from' 
our sensations.“1 Y/hatever other imagery we may have, our 'present 
sensations' remain firmly, involuntarily and persistently with us.
But, if we regard 'present appearances' as being given in memory- 
imagery like any 'past appearances' except in that they arise out of 
the most recent sense-activity, is any of this going to be different? 
All memory-imagery occurs as the result of some stimulus, and if 
that stimulus, which in this case is the effect of physical events 
upon our sense-organs, is being constantly reinforced ^by the con­
tinuity of those physical eventsj, then the memory-image must keep 
occurring. And it must have the maximum 'firmness', the minimum 
of 'controllability' and a complete, coherent context.
1
See chapter VI, p.219.
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We no longer have any problem about 'continuous gradations'.
There is a single transition from imagery which reproduces the 
appearances presented by 'external events' in exact and perfect 
detail, to imagery which so distorts and rearranges those appearances 
that the perceptual origins of the various elements of them could 
hardly be traced.^ The visual experience of a moment ago is only 
fractionally less 'firm' than that of this present moment, and we 
need not postulate a temporally extended present to explain our seeing 
things as they are, either still or in motion. Nor is it any objec­
tion to say that we must then have both 'sensations' and images at 
the same time. I have shown that there is no logical reason why 
the presence of one image should exclude the presence of any other,
and that there are excellent reasons, quite apart from this present
2argument, for believing that it does not. 
iii. Perceiving as remembering
In a recent article, 'Philosophical Problems of Memory', C. 
Landesman admits that there is a natural, almost inevitable, tendency 
to analyse memory in terms appropriate to perception. But he points 
out, as the one seemingly insurmountable difficulty, 'In perceiving 
one usually learns something that one has not previously known; 
perception is an acquisition of new knowledge. However, it is 
1
For example, the monstrosities which appear in nightmares may seem 
to be wholly unlike anything we have ever seen.
2
See chapter VI, p.213ff.
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e s s e n t i a l  to  memory t h a t  what one remembers one does n o t  know f o r  th e  
v e ry  f i r s t  t i m e ' . 1 2 But I have e s t a b l i s h e d ,  I t h i n k ,  t h a t  memory- 
images can be r e i n t e r p r e t e d  when th e y  o c c u r .  I f  we reg a rd  such r e i n ­
t e r p r e t a t i o n s  a s  p a r t  o f  our remembering, th e n  to  t h a t  e x te n t  we do 
g a in  new knowledge in  memory. There i s  a problem only  i f ,  on the  
one hand we exclude  from remembering a l l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  and on th e  
o th e r  hand we t h i n k  o f  remembering as  a k ind  o f  p e r c e iv in g .  Once we 
a l lo w  t h a t  remembering i s  t h e  m ajor c l a s s  and p e r c e iv in g  i s  s im ply th e  
l i m i t i n g  case of t h a t  c l a s s ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  p e r c e iv in g  i s  a s u b - s p e c ie s  o f  
remembering, th e  problem d i s s o l v e s .  For th e n  a l l  knowledge, new or 
o th e rw is e ,  i s  seen to  be ga ined  in  memory.
!/e a re  a b le  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  'p r e s e n t  p e r c e p t io n s '  a s  a unique c l a s s  
because  th ey  a re  th e  means of a c q u i r in g  new knowledge o f  th e  e x t e r n a l  
w orld . But 'p r e s e n t  s e n s a t i o n '  i s  only an id e a l  c a se ,  one which we 
can assume b u t n o t  examine. For t h i s  rea so n  argum ents  about such 
q u e s t io n s  a s  w hether  we can p ro p e r ly  be s a id  to  see  movements r a i s e  q u i t e  
u n re a l  problem s.*  We r e a l l y  see th in g s  a s  moving j u s t  as  we r e a l l y  see 
th in g s  a s  s t a t i o n a r y .
I want t o  make i t  q u i t e  c l e a r  a t  t h i s  p o in t  t h a t  I am n o t pro­
posing  any s t a r t l i n g  o r  r e v o lu t io n a r y  new th e o ry  of knowledge. On th e  
c o n t ra ry  I  am sim ply  t r y i n g  to  e l im in a te  th e  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  in  th e
1
The «JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, L1X.3. Feb. 1 s t ,  1962, p .5 9 .
2
C onsider  e . g .  II.A. P r i c h a r d ,  ' See ing  Movements' -  ’Knowledge and 
P e r c e p t i o n ' ,  p . 4 1 f f .
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traditional theory of knowledge, advanced by Hume, and adhered to with 
minor variations by every ’British Empiricist' since. And to do so by 
accepting the conclusions to which I am logically committed by that 
theory.
Certainly, nothing I have said need in any way weaken the force 
of the normal, and very necessary, distinction we make between present 
perception and memory. The words we use in our perception-claims - 
'see', ’hear', 'touch', and so on, are perception words. When I say 
that I see a bird on the windowsill I am asserting that there is a 
bird there now, not that there has been one there. The distinction 
between our perception-claims and our memory-claims is perfectly clear: 
both refer to objective reality, one to how it was, the other to how 
it is now.
But this sharp distinction lies in what is being claimed, not in 
our right to make the claims. Memory-claims are based upon memories 
we are having of our own past states at the time we make the claims.
But perception-claims are not based upon some equivalent cognitive 
states called 'perceptions', for to perceive something is already to 
make some claim about a 'present state of affairs', to assert the 
existence of a particular factual relationship. As I argued in 
chapter VII, even recognising is always recognising that.  ^ Perception- 
claims are based, like memory-claims, on the memories we are having 
_
See p. 234
when we make them, but in the case of perception claims these 
memories consist very largely, though not entirely, of 'immediate 
memories'.
It is important to note that the basis of perception-claims does 
not consist entirely of ’immediate memories’. It is generally acknow­
ledged that any perceptual judgment (any perception in the way that I use 
that term) must 'go beyond’ the present ’given’, depending at least as 
much upon memory and the expectancies created by memory as upon 
’present sensation’. The ’pristine given character’, as Lewis calls it, 
is always to some extent tainted by the dubious authority of meLory as 
soon as we advance to any pronouncement about matters of fact. This is 
the point Stout was making in the passage I quoted earlier in this 
chapter. My certainty that the door is now closed may rest much more 
heavily upon my memory of closing it a minute ago and not opening it 
since than upon the cursory glance I have just cast towards it. And 
when I have just switched off the light in my room, my certainty that 
my coat is hanging on the door is likely to arise from my having seen 
it clearly a moment ago rather than from my present perception of the 
vague shape which I now take to be my coat hanging on the door.
'Common sense trusts memory, not blindly, but because it has found 
memory to be trustworthy', Furlong says.1 But with memory-imagery as 
such the question of trusting does not arise; we simply have it and we 
_
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accept it because we cannot do otherwise. It may be truer to say that, 
because we have usually found that our interpretations of the 
appearances which are presented to us are coherent with each other and 
with the reports made by other people, we accept them as knowledge 
about the world. When they are about what is happening now we call 
them perceptions and when they are about what has happened we call them 
memories - without being too precise about our qualification of events 
as 'occurring now', 
iv. 'Present', 'past' and 'absent'
To return now to the question of how we come to conceive the 
past, I suggest that 'past' is simply a classificatory term we apply 
to all those events which present themselves to us (present appearances 
to us) without that persistence by which we identify present events.
It is no accident that 'present' is the contrary of both 'past' and 
'absent'. The constant reinforcement of our imagery 'gives the 
present to us' as persistent, coherent experience which we cannot 
ignore. Events which we are aware of as real events, but which are 
not presented with this persistent continuity - which are in fact dis­
cordant with the events so presented - are thereby negatively 
classified as 'not present'. That I am now thinking of my friend's 
appearance, i.e. how he looks, though I am not now seeing him, 
entails that I have seen him at another time and also that, if he 
still exists, he is in another place.
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That we conceive the past simply as the 'not present' within 
'the real1 is suggested in a passage by Furlong (though I do not claim 
that Furlong had any such idea in mind or that he would necessarily 
accept the view I propose, especially in the light of his claims, which 
I quoted above, for the specious present). 'The imaginary is what we
invent, what is largely dependent upon our will. The real is what
comes to us without our asking; its main characteristic is involun­
tariness, spontaneity.... Now in memory there is also this involuntary, 
spontaneous character; it is understandable therefore, that we should 
ascribe reality to what we remember. But we can clearly observe that
what we remember is not now happening, and so we place it in the past,
thus assigning to it a reality of a sort'. *
My only comments on this passage are that the distinctions between 
perceiving, remembering and imagining are not the sharp distinctions of 
kind which it suggests,, and that we do not 'place' remembered events in 
the past; rather we exclude them from the present.
3. The verification of memories 
a) Coherence
Thus we identify our current memories as the basis of both our 
perception-claims and our memory-claims, allowing differences of degree, 
but not of kind, in their value as 'evidence' for the claims made. And, 
in doing so, we deny that the perception claim is in any specially
1
'A Study in Memory', p.98.
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privileged position. As a matter of empirical fact it is less likely 
to be wrong. But this is only because the sense-evidence on which it 
is based is up-to-the-minute evidence, not because it is better evidence 
in some other way.
When Holland speaks of ’the distinction which we certainly draw in 
ordinary life between those recollections which can only be supported 
by further recollections and those which are supported by something 
better’,* he is speaking of a distinction which simply does not apply 
to the authority of memory as such, but only to the comparative 
authority of one's own memories and the claims made by other people.
He says: 'If I claim to remember putting some money into a box and 
certain other people saw me do it and later the box is destroyed by 
fire, then, supposing my recollections to be called in question, there 
may be no better means open to me of supporting my claim than to 
bring forward these other people to bear me out by saying that they 
also remember my putting money in the box. But suppose the box is 
not destroyed. Then I can if necessary fetch it and display its 
contents. How can it be said in this latter case that my recollection 
is only supported by other recollections in the way it was in the 
former case?'.
The important question is: What is it that causes us to make 
this distinction in ordinary life? The answer may be: To convince
T
'The Empiricist Theory of Memory', MIND LXIII, 1954, p.4v6.
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people that we did put the money in the box, or even: To convince 
people that there is money in the box. Surely it is not: To convince 
ourselves that we remember putting money in the box. I certainly do 
not deny that people are more readily convinced by what they see 
with their own eyes than by other people's memory-claims. But this 
fact does not, as Holland suggests, free us ’from dependence on 
memory in general'. My arguments above show that we can say that the 
recollection is still supported only by other recollections, even 
though these include the ’immediate recollections’ of the people who 
witness the opening of the box. Their greater conviction arises, 
not from the fact that a memory is replaced by a 'present perception', 
but from the fact that someone else's claim is replaced by their 
own experience. Whether this is perceptual experience or memory 
experience is of minor importance. It is also true that people are 
more readily convinced by their own memories than by the claims of 
other people.
The important point is that all cause/effect confirmation must 
involve sense-perception, and once we allow that ’perceiving’ is 
simply our name for that remembering which'runs up to’ the ideal 
limit we call the present, then it follows that the coherence by 
which we judge our memories to be true operates wholly within memory. 
And, as we have seen,* the most recent memory is not necessarily the 
strongest and most reliable.
1
See p. 297
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We judge our memory-claims to be true by their coherence with 
other memory-claims, our own and other peoples. And we feel our 
memory-claims to be true because of their seeming coherence with other 
memory-claims. We should never lose sight of the fact that, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, when we feel them to be true they 
are true. Von Leyden is perhaps right when he says that we may rule 
out the suggestion that the only characteristic of memory is 'the 
experience of being under the influence of some sort of an impression, 
arid of a confidently held belief, concerning one's own past'. But I 
do not accept his claim that: 'It is impossible that the nature of 
this experience by itself should constitute the "essence" of memory, 
since an unjustified or even disproved memory-claim does not cease 
to be associated with, and even upheld by, precisely that same sort 
of experience'.1 The feeling of belief arises out of an initial 
contextual coherence, and it is true that, on occasions, belief 
attaches to a memory-claim before the context of the memory has been 
expanded sufficiently to justify this belief. But, if the claim 
has been disproved (and I take it that Von Leyden means disproved to 
the claimant, else his claim is utterly trivial), then this can only 
have been by the introduction into the memory-context of some fact which 
is not coherent. When this happens the claimant must see the need to 
amend or modify his memory-claim, and the feeling of belief cannot 
persist.
T
'Remembering', p.105 (my italics).
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b) 'Looking again1.
i. Temporal location of memories
It is always possible to ’believe too soon’. And because of this 
we can never achieve 'absolute certainty' about matters of past fact. 
But this need not distress us, for we can never achieve ’absolute 
certainty’ about matters of present fact either. If we suspect that we 
may have made a perceptual error, or even if we are just particularly 
anxious not to, we look again - or in some cases keep looking - until 
we are satisfied that our perceptual judgment is right. But sometimes 
it is by no means easy to be satisfied. We may look at a distant 
object for some time, seeing it sometimes as a man and sometimes as 
a bush blowing in the wind. Looking again is not a sure-fire way of 
becoming certain; at most it is a means of knowing whether we are 
certain or not - or of just how much we can be certain. And exactly 
the same applies when we ’look again' in imagery at the events we have 
witnessed in the past. But in this case it is generally necessary to 
’look again’ harder, more often, and more carefully, for we have to 
decide not only what it is, but when it was as well. This is to say, 
we not only have to be sure that we have identified the remembered 
objects or events correctly. We have also to be sure that these 
objects or events do belong to a single past perceptual occasion.
The 'immediate memories' we employ in perception are felt to be 
immediate, and the question of their temporal location does not arise. 
The appearances presented to me in imagery all belong in my past, but
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in what part of my past may not be at once apparent. Some philo­
sophers have claimed that when we have memory-images we ’see', as 
it were, the temporal location of the event imaged, i.e. the 
comparative ’distance' of the event from the present moment, almost 
as we see objects as more or less distant from us in space. Furlong, 
for instance, writes: 'We seem also to have some ability to judge 
what we might call ’’temporal distance" by means of vividness, detail 
and spontaneity of our imagery. To image this morning's breakfast 
is one thing; to image that of yesterday is another. The vividness 
and other such qualities of our imagery are "secondary signs" of 
temporal distance'.* Now, I believe that this is substantially true, 
especially in the case of our more recent memories. But, when we 
consider our more remote memories, it is clear that the notion 
of 'judging temporal distance' requires some further analysis. It 
is not enough to speak of 'vividness'; my memory-imagery of some very 
exciting happening in my early youth is likely to be much more vivid 
than my memory-imagery of the hum-drum events of this morning.
First and foremost, our memories are temporally located by the 
other memories coherent with them. I know, for instance, that my 
present imagery of my children in a boat is a memory of my last 
holiday because it 'runs off into' other memories: of the scenery, 
the house we stayed in, the journey home, and so on. But this is
1
'A study in Memory', p.99.
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not enough; there must also be some fixed reference point. All 
these events were (roughly) at the same time; but what time was 
that? To fix the temporal location of a remembered event seems 
possible only if we connect it to the present moment by an unbroken 
chain of coherent memories. And this is, I believe, what in fact 
happens.
This does not necessarily mean that to remember when anything 
happened to us we must also remember everything that has happened to 
us since. My claim seems much less odd when we realise how very 
indeterminate the memory of ’an event' can be. A set of coherent 
memories may be narrow and highly detailed, or it may be much wider 
and very sketchy; or it may be both at once - a nucleus, as it were, 
of detailed memories, fanning out into an extended context of less 
detailed memories, until it extends, however sketchily, over the whole 
of our past experience.
This extension of the context is made possible by the use of 
'fixed markers'. If I wanted to colour in the eighteenth fiftieth 
part of a line drawn across this page I should not divide the line 
into fifty equal parts and then count along it. I should halve it and 
then halve one of the parts and so on, and the marks I made would 
remain on the page as a ready-made guide for any future endeavour of 
the same kind.
Our 'temporal markers' work in much the same way, and we all 
establish them for ourselves in the course of our lives. My own are
306
mainly such things as the size and general appearance of my family, 
the places where 1 have lived and the kind of work I was engaged in.
As soon as any expanding memory-context embraces any such ’marker' 
the memory can take a short-cut, as it were, to the present time. The 
noticeable inability of small children to distinguish between the 
recent and the comparatively distant past may well be due, in part at 
least, to their lack of adequate ’markers'.
In this way most of our memories do 'come labelled’ with the 
temporal location of the events remembered - with a greater or lesser 
degree of determinateness. On occasions I remember some event but have 
only the haziest notion of when it happened, but every memory of a 
past event in my own life has some degree of temporal determinateness 
and that temporal determinateness tends to increase with any expansion 
of the memory-context. 
ii. Non-fallibility and evidence
At the end of chapter VI, I stressed that imagery, as such, is 
non-fallible; error can arise only in its interpretation; the imagery 
itself is only evidence for our memory-clains, it does not enter into 
those claims. There must, therefore, be a certain arbitrariness in any 
distinction we may make within memory-claims between what we really 
saw and what we took ourselves to be seeing.
We can make a distinction between seeing what is in fact a book, 
and seeing what we take to be a book (whether it is or not). But, in 
the case of memory, the very point at issue is whether or not what we
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took to be a book was in fact a book. We can distinguish between 
remembering seeing a book and remembering the visual appearance of a 
book, but this is only the distinction between remembering a parti­
cular event and remembering a particular individual. The distinction 
we cannot make is between remembering seeing a book and remembering 
seeing an appearance, for, as I argued earlier, we do not see 
appearances.* Appearances are presented to us by the things we 
see. To see is always to see something jis something, even if only as 
a patch of colour. The only distinction of kind we can make is between 
how we saw (our evidence) and what we took ourselves to be seeing (our 
claim). The problem is that some initial degree of interpretation 
must be put upon our imagery to allow it to function as evidence. To 
assert that the man was bleeding on the strength of our memory of how 
he looked we must at least identify what we saw as a red patch 
spreading over a white patch.
At this point I must say, quite boldly, that the ultimate justi­
fication for our memory—beiiefs is not logical but psychological. In 
chapter III, I made the distinction between what we (psychologically) 
could not see as anything but a certain object or event, and what we 
see as a certain object or event as a result of expectancies we happen 
to have at the time, or judgments about what it 'must be'. Having 
made this distinction in any given case, we have reached the terminal 
point of checking of our memory-claim.
1
See chapter VI, p.210ff
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iii• Verification is always confirmation
But this situation is not peculiar to memory. We cannot reach 
logical certainty about matters of fact, whether they be of past fact 
or of present fact. To ’verify’ a claim, whether it be a memory-claii.. 
or a perception-claim, is simply to confirm it - not to put it beyond the 
reach of doubt. The question ’Are you sure?’ is really only an invita­
tion to reconsider, and the reply 'Yes I am’ is only a rejection of 
that invitation.
I have claimed that the context of most of our memories spreads, 
so to speak, throughout our entire past histories, very sketchily ex­
cept in the 'immediate vicinity' of the event which is the subject of 
the memory-claim, but clearly enough to enable us to ’locate' the 
remembered event, and to indicate to us with that degree of determinate­
ness we are entitled to 'locate' it. In the case of our 'present 
perceptions' practical certainty is usually immediate. They are in a 
favoured position in that they rest, in part, upon the imagery of 
appearances which are still being presented, and this is sufficient to 
account for the greater likelihood of error in memory, a likelihood 
which increases as the events remembered 'fall away from1 the present.
But the recentness of events is not the only factor which makes 
for 'firmness' in the memory of them. The extent to which we noticed 
them, i.e., the extent of the observed context, is ultimately of 
greater importance. That is why I can be more certain of my memory 
of travelling from Perth to Canberra two years ago than of my memory
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of stubbing out a cigarette a moment ago, or even of my perception, 
in which i have no interest at all, of the people and cars now passing 
my window.
We trust our memories in the same way, and for the same reasons 
as we trust our eyes and ears - and with the same kind of justification. 
The advantage on the side of 'present perception' is that the memory- 
context expands automatically with the passage of time. The compen­
sating advantage on the siae of our more distant memories is that 
they are concerned only with those events which did interest us, did 
command our attention, whether we realised this at the time or not. 
Because of this the supporting memory-context is not only always 
available to us, it is in fact already 'present' as the setting to 
the memory. It is only the presence of this context that leads us
to claim to remember
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS CITED IN THE ESSAY
(The dates shorm are of the impressions actually used).
ALEXANDER, S., Space, Time and Deity, Vol. 1, London: Macmillan and 
Co., Ltd, 1934.
AUSTIN, J.L., Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962.
AYER, A.J., The Problem of Knowledge, London: Macmillan and Co.,
Ltd, 1956.
BARTLETT, Sir F.C., Remembering, Cambridge University Press, 1950.
BENJAMIN, B.S., ’Remembering’, MIND, Vol. LXV, No.259, pp.312-331, 
1956.
BROa D, C.D., The Mind and its Place in Nature, London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd, 1947.
CHISHOLM, R.M., Perceiving, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957.
DEUTSCHER, M., Review of Remembering (W. Von Leyden), MIND,
Vol. LXXI, No.2S2, pp.277-9, 1962.
FURLONG, E.J., A Study in Memory, London: Thomas Nelson and Sons,
Ltd, 1951.
FURLONG, E.J., Imagination, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1961.
KARROD, Sir R.F., Foundations of Inductive Logic, London: Macmillan 
and Co., Ltd, 1956.
HOLLAND, R.F., 'The Empiricist Theory of Memory', MIND, Vol. LXIII, 
No.252, pp.464-86, 1954.
HUNTER, I.M.L., Memory: Facts and Fallacies, London: Penguin 
Books, 1957.
JAMES, W., The Principles of Psychology, Vols 1 and 2, London:
Macmillan and Co., Ltd, (1S90).
LANDESMAN, C. ’Philosophical Problems of Memory', JOURNAL OF 
PHILOSOPHY, Vol. LIX, No.3, pp.57-65, 1962.
310
311
LEWIS, C .I . ,  An Analysis of Knowledge and V aluation, I l l i n o i s :
The Open Court Publishing Co., 1950.
PRICE, H.H., 'Memory-Knowledge', A Symposium ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 
Supplementary, Vol. XV, ’What Can Philosophy Determine,’ pp ,16-33, 
1936.
PRICE, II.H., Thinking; and Experience, London: Hutchinson’ s University  
Library, 1953.
PRICIiARD, H.A., Knowledge and Perception, Oxford: The Clarendon 
P ress, 1950.
RUSSELL, Earl B.A.W., The Problems of Philosophy, London: Williams 
and Norgate, 1920.
RUSSELL, Earl B.A.W., Our Knowledge of the External World, London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1926.
RUSSELL, Earl B.A.W., The Analysis of Mind, London: George Allen  
and Unwin Ltd, 1949.
RUSSELL, Earl B.A.W., An Outline of Philosophy, London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1948.
RUSSELL, Earl B.A.W., Human Knowledge I t s  Scope and L im its , London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1948.
RYLE, G., The Concept of Mind, London: Hutciiinson's U niversity  
Library, 1955.
SELBY-BIGGE, L.A. Hume’s T reatise , Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1951.
STOUT, G.F., A Manual of Psychology, London: U niversity  Tutorial 
Press Ltd, 1949.
VON LEYDEN, W., Remembering, London: Gerald Duckworth and Co.,
Ltd, 1961.
WAISMANN, F .,  'V e r i f ia b i l i ty '  -  in Logic and Language (F irst  
s e r ie s )  Ed. A.G.N. Flew, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1951.
WAISSMANN, F . , 'A n aly tic -S yn th etic ',  I-VI, ANALYSIS, Vol. 10, No.2 
(December), 1949, Vol. 11, No.2 (December) 1950, Vol. 11, No.3 
(January), 1951, Vol. 11, No.6 (June), 1951, Vol. 13, No.l 
(October), 1952, Vol. 13, No.4 (March), 1953.
312
WARD, J . ,  Psychological P r in c ip le s , Cambridge U niversity  P ress, 1933.
WITTGENSTEIN, L ., Ph ilosophical In v e stig a tio n s , Oxford: B asil 
Blackw ell, 1953.
WOLLHEBi, R ,, 'Sensing and O bserving', A Symposium ARISTOTELIAN 
SOCIETY Supplementary V ol. XXVIII ’B e lie f  and Wi l l ’ , pp.219-40, 
1954.
WOOZLSY, A. D. , Theory of Knowledge, London: Hutchinson's U niversity  
Library, 1949.
